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RÉSUMÉ 
 
Entre 1988 et 2008, les Philippines ont mis en œuvre le Comprehensive Agrarian Reform 
Program (CARP) qui visait à redistribuer 9 million d’hectares de terres agricoles aux paysans 
sans terre. En dépit des échappatoires du programme et d’une structure sociale très inégale qui 
freinent sa mise en œuvre, ce modèle de réforme agraire présente des résultats surprenants 
alors que 82% des terres ont été redistribuées. Concernant les terres plus litigieuses appartenant 
à des intérêts privés, Borras soutient que le succès surprenant de plusieurs cas de luttes agraires 
s’explique par l’utilisation de la stratégie bibingka qui consiste à appliquer de la pression par le 
bas et par le haut afin de forcer la redistribution. Sa théorie cependant ne donne que peu de 
détails concernant les éléments qui rendent un cas plus ou moins litigieux. Elle ne traite pas 
non plus de la manière dont les éléments structurels et l’action collective interagissent pour 
influencer le résultat des luttes agraires. Dans ce mémoire, nous nous attardons d’abord à la 
manière dont certains éléments structurels – le type de récolte et le type de relation de 
production -  influencent le degré de résistance des propriétaires terriens face aux processus du 
CARP, contribuant ainsi à rendre les cas plus ou moins litigieux. Ensuite nous analysons 
l’influence du contexte structurel et des stratégies paysannes sur le résultat de la mise en œuvre 
du programme de réforme agraire. Pour répondre à nos deux questions de recherche, nous 
présentons quatre études de cas situés dans la province de Cebu. 
 
 
Mots-clés : Réforme agraire, Philippines, Cebu, Action collective, Bibingka  
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ABSTRACT 
 
Between 1988 and 2008, the Philippines have been implementing the Comprehensive Agrarian 
Reform Program (CARP) which aimed at redistributing 9 million hectares of agricultural land 
to landless peasants. Despite the loopholes of the program and the highly unequal social 
structure which constrain the implementation, this land reform program shows a positively 
surprising rate of accomplishment of 82% after 20 years. On the more contentious private 
agricultural land, Borras has argued that the unexpected successful outcome of various land 
struggles can be explained by the peasants reliance on the bibingka strategy which consists in 
applying pressure from below and from above to push for land redistribution. His theory 
however does not go into details about what makes a case more or less contentious, and on 
how agency and structure interact to influence the outcome of particular land struggles. In this 
thesis, we first look at how structural features – namely the type of crop produced and the 
tenurial status of farmers – influence the strength of landowner resistance to key CARP 
processes of land reform, thus contributing to make a case more or less contentious.  Then we 
analyze the combined influence of the structural setting of the case and of the strategy used by 
peasants on the implementation outcome of land reform. To address our two main research 
questions, we present four case studies from the province of Cebu. 
 
 
 
 Keywords: Agrarian Reform, Land Reform, Philippines, Cebu, Agency, Bibingka 
Strategy  
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         INTRODUCTION 
UNDERSTANDING LAND REFORM STRUGGLES IN THE PHILIPPINES: AN 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
This day of May 2008 was one of celebration for the families of Dalag, a barangay located in 
the northern municipality of Medellin, in Cebu province. After almost 20 years of struggle, 
they were finally being installed on the 51-hectare landholding they had been working on prior 
to 1988 and fighting for ever since. Thus a special thanksgiving mass was celebrated that 
morning to launch the official ceremonies. Counting their blessings and visibly proud of their 
achievement, the old farmers receiving one by one their legal titles from the hands of DAR 
officials could however not hide the scars of the past. All these years of hard work and struggle 
had darkened their skin and wrinkled their hands. As they stood by to watch the symbolic first 
plough of their sugarcane landholding, their hearts were twisted by memories of relatives and 
friends who have not lived long enough to see this day. A bitter sweet moment which they 
hoped would tip the balance towards the sweet side for the years to come. 
 
1.1 Problem Definition 
In 2008, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the Philippines came to its 
20th year of implementation amidst debates about its accomplishments and its future. In a 
country where economic inequalities were amongst the highest in Asia at the time, the main 
objectives of the CARP were to promote rural development and industrialization, and reduce 
inequalities through a more equitable distribution and ownership of land. This agrarian reform 
program was comprehensive in that it encompassed all lands regardless of size, crops or 
tenurial arrangements. It focused both on redistributing land and providing support services. 
 
The initial target for land distribution set in 1988 was ambitious. Within ten years, the 
Philippine government was to distribute over ten million hectares of land to some four million 
rural poor households across the archipelago.1 However when CARP came to its 10th and what 
was supposed to be its final year of implementation, the program had redistributed only a little 
more than half of its target, which had already been reduced by two million hectares in 1996.2 
This shortcoming prompted President Fidel Ramos to extend CARP for another 10 years at a 
time when CARP seemed to have gained some momentum. In 2008, after 20 years of 
implementation, the redistribution target had still not been met fully.  
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Although redistribution remained incomplete, the national implementing agencies - the 
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the Department of Environment and Natural 
Resources (DENR) - were reporting in 2008 a positively surprising rate of accomplishment of 
about 80%.3 The figure was surprising considering that local observers had little hope that 
CARP would accomplish any substantial redistribution of land at all due to the anticipated 
resistance of politically entrenched landowners and to the numerous legal loopholes of this 
program crafted in part by the landowners themselves.  
 
The official data of the DAR and the DENR have been criticized however for not giving an 
accurate portrait of the situation on the ground. The definition of what constitutes a successful 
distribution is a first problem.4 Government institutions such as the DAR computerized land 
distribution as being successful once they have emitted a Certificate of Land Ownership Award 
(CLOA) to the Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries (ARBs), not when peasants physically take 
possession of their land. Thus on the ground there are numerous cases where farmers, after 
receiving  a legal title to the land, were still barred from entering it by former landowners and 
their private armies or goons. A second problem is that the land distribution process can easily 
be delayed by resistant landowners. A vast number of farmers had to wait for 10, 15 or 20 
years before they were finally granted ownership because their cases were pending in court. A 
third problem is that due to the lack of funds for the program, many communities do not 
receive the support services they are entitled to under CARP, such as the building of 
infrastructure or credit facilities. This often leaves the peasants with little choice but to sell 
their land - although this is not legally permitted5 - or lease it back to the former landowner.  
 
If statistics do not tell the whole story of agrarian reform in the Philippines, some numbers are 
indicative of where the program is falling short. Numbers show for example that the main 
problem with land reform under CARP is the redistribution of private agricultural lands 
(PALs) for which DAR reported a rate of accomplishments of only 57% as of 2008.6 Once 
taken into account the aforementioned problems related to the official data, it is clear that the 
successes reported in national agencies reports are not always being ‘felt’ on the ground.7 But 
despite all these problems, there have been a significant number of successful cases of land 
redistribution over the years in the Philippines, even on private lands.8 Enough anyway to 
wonder why redistribution occurred in certain cases and not in others. Thus examining the 
conditions under which CARP can be successfully implemented on contentious private lands, 
and the strategies that can be used by peasants and their allies to ensure land redistribution, is 
crucial to understand the situation of agrarian reform in the Philippines.  
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Map 1.1 The Philippines in Southeast Asia 
 
Source: Southeast Asian Affairs 2008 
 
In this thesis, we will look at the influence of four variables (three structural variables and one 
process variable) on key CARP processes and on the implementation outcome of four specific 
cases of land reform.9 Our first research question will focus on the influence of two structural 
variables - the type of crop and the tenurial status of farmers – on the strength of landowner 
resistance to four key CARP processes of land reform. The strength of landowner resistance 
identified in the analysis of this first research question will then allows us to create a typology 
of structural settings based on the level of contentiousness of each landholding. Then in our 
second research question, we look at the influence of the structural setting – an independent 
structural variable – and of the peasant strategy – an independent process variable - on the 
implementation outcome of land reform. These questions are meant to increase our 
understanding of two issues that have not been fully addressed in the literature on land reform 
in the Philippines: the influence of structural variables on the strength of landowner resistance 
to land reform, and the interaction between structure and agency to explain the outcome of 
specific land struggles. This research presents four case studies located in the province of 
Cebu. These case studies are identified according to the name of the barangay in which they 
took place: Salacan, Kalimpak, Manlayo, and Dalag.10  
4 
 
 
 
 
1.2 Literature Review 
Understanding the conditions of successful land redistribution in the Philippines is not 
possible without first examining the land reform model that the country has adopted, and 
the debates that underpin the various perspectives on land reform. In this section, we 
discuss first some of the major issues which have shaped the debates around the 
economical and political rationale for land reform. We then look at four current 
perspectives of land reform at the international level, and at the debates which led to the 
adoption of the CARP in the Philippines in 1988. Finally we consider the constraints to 
land redistribution under CARP, the strategies available to Filipino peasants, and the 
limits of the theoretical model of Borras to explain the successful redistribution of 
contentious private lands in the Philippines. 
 
1.2.1 Why Land Reform?  
Economic Arguments. A first set of arguments used by land reform advocates is based on 
economical considerations and focuses on three issues: tenure security as an incentive for 
investment and productivity; the relation between productivity and farm size; and rural 
development as the path to national economic growth and poverty reduction.  
 
The first issue is the least contentious one as most authors argue that there is a positive 
relationship between tenure security on one side, and investment and productivity on the 
other. As Dekker says, « a person secure of long term access will care more for the land, 
will work intensively, [and] make capital improvements ».11 World Bank economists 
support this idea and further suggest that tenure security increases farmers’ access to 
credit.12   
 
The issue of productivity and farm size has sparked more debates although the argument 
in favour of large-scale farming has been increasingly criticized. The support for large-
scale farming productivity is based on the idea that economies of scale can be made 
where labour is replaced by equipment and machinery.13 Kautsky for one advocated that 
large farms were superior in « terms of costs, yields, economy of labour, and efficiency of 
the division of labour ».14 Stevens also concluded that productivity, as the estimated 
output per unit of land or labour, was higher in the modern agriculture associated with 
large farms than in the traditional agriculture associated with small family farms.15  
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The problem with that argument is that, as Lipton noted, although it may apply to 
developed countries which have a lot of capital and a relatively small labour force, it does 
not fit so well the context of developing countries.16 In developing countries where the 
land is scarce, the labour force is large, and the amount of capital is low, an increase in 
productivity is better achieved by applying more labour rather than more capital.17 Many 
have also made the argument that notwithstanding the scarcity of land and lack of capital 
issues, there is an inverse relationship between farm size and productivity. Hayami, 
Quisumbing and Adriano for example showed that productivity on rice lands in the 
Philippines was higher on small farms than on large farms because tenants on small farms 
know the particular conditions of their land better, and are likely to invest more effort in 
production than wage labourers hired on large farms.18 Development economists of the 
World Bank such as Deininger, Binswanger and Feder have also endorsed small-scale 
farming as being more productive.19 
 
In terms of economic growth, the World Bank argued in 2000 that previous development 
models’ predictions were wrong and that a one-time distribution of assets can in fact be 
associated with permanently higher levels of growth and with poverty reduction.20 
Binswanger adds that « small-scale farmers generally use land, labour, and capital more 
efficiently than do large-scale farmers » and that « redistributing land from large farmers 
to family farmers can bring efficiency gains to the economy ».21 Land reform thus leads 
to higher economic growth. 
 
As Griffin argues however, national economic growth and poverty reduction are two 
different things and there is no causal relationship between national economic growth 
measured in terms of GNP and reduction of inequalities measured by the Gini 
coefficient.22 He adds that because poverty is evaluated in relation to wealth, the only 
way to reduce poverty is to reduce inequalities.23 Borras explains that by transferring to 
the rural poor control over productive resources, land reform is crucial in giving them the 
capacity to construct livelihoods and overcome poverty.24 Griffin believes that even in 
cases where GNP rates would not increase as a result, land reform would still 
significantly contribute to poverty reduction.25  
 
Political Arguments. Aside from economic arguments, political arguments are also used 
to justify the necessity of land reform. The first argument focuses on social justice and 
presents land reform as a means to change the balance of power in the countryside in 
6 
 
 
 
order to bring about a more equal society. Hazra argues that in many developing 
countries, the power relation between landlords and tenants is an impediment to the 
development of productive forces, and that reform is needed to transform the structure of 
agrarian relations and economies.26 Land reform is thus inherently a political process and, 
historically, the social justice objective has been achieved through state confiscation and 
redistribution of land.27  
 
The second political argument is that land reform can ensure political stability. Hayami, 
Quisumbing and Adriano explain that newly independent developing countries after 
World War II pursued land reform as a means to ensure political stability - a stability 
which would be the basis for economic progress and eradication of poverty.28 According 
to Dekker, empirical evidence show that land reform has indeed increased political 
stability in Latin America for example.29 It is suggested that political reforms to transform 
power relations in the countryside are a necessary and prior condition for economic 
development and that a purely economistic approach to land reform is bound to fail not 
only in achieving social justice and political stability, but also in achieving sustained 
economic development.  
 
In sum, the redistribution of large tracks of land to small family farms through land 
reform in developing countries contributes to increased investment and productivity in 
the countryside as well as to economic growth and poverty reduction. It can also 
contribute to social justice and lay the foundation of a more equal society, increasing 
political stability and reinforcing economic development. Although some have used both 
to justify the need for land reform, there can be a tension between economic and political 
arguments. This tension is well described by Bernstein who explains that for those 
supporting the economic arguments alone, the notion of ‘land to the tiller’ is supported as 
a way to increase productivity and investments in rural areas.30 However « once pre-
capitalist landed property (...) is destroyed, and a fundamental condition of capitalist 
agrarian transition thereby satisfied, there remains no rationale for redistributive land 
reform ».31 In the next section, as we discuss the current perspectives on how land reform 
should be implemented, we relate these perspectives to the economic and political 
arguments sustaining them. 
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1.2.2 Current Perspectives on Land Reform 
Typologies of land reform are abundant in the literature. Some like Patnaik focus on 
historical paths to distinguish between conservative landlord-dominated redistribution 
and more democratic and revolutionary peasant-dominated redistribution.32 The Land 
Research Action Network (LRAN) suggests that land reforms of the 20th century are 
better categorized in terms of ‘endogenous social revolution’, ‘cold war proxies’, 
‘postwar allied consolidation’, and ‘endogenous political compromise’.33 Akram-Lodhi, 
in a review essay, suggests that there are now two contending frameworks left: the 
Market-Led Agrarian Reform (MLAR) of the World Bank, and the food sovereignty 
movement of La Via Campesina.34   
 
For this research, the distinction made by Borras between four ideal-types of land reforms 
- peasant-led, state-led, market-led and state/society-driven - is most useful because it 
highlights the importance of the political actors (state officials, landowners, peasants, and 
CSOs) involved in the implementation of agrarian reform and it provides a heuristic 
framework to understand the land reform debates and implementation in the 
Philippines.35 The following discussion on how land reform can be implemented will thus 
be structured around Borras’ typology, while also presenting different authors’ views. 
 
Peasant-Led Perspective. For Borras, the first ideal-type of land reform is the peasant-led 
perspective. In this perspective, land is seen not only as an economic factor of production 
but also as a socio-political and cultural resource.36 The focus on both economic and 
political arguments in favour of agrarian reform is important because it drives both the 
purpose of land reform and the means to achieve it.  In the peasant-led perspective, it is 
assumed that the market forces are dominated by elite interests and opposed to pro-poor 
agrarian reform while the state is too captive of the elite.37 Peasants are thus the only 
actors which can achieve a pro-poor agrarian reform.38 This model is described in the 
work of Eric Wolfe who has written about ‘peasant wars’ such as those which occurred in 
China, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union.39 In these wars, land reform was driven by peasant 
revolutions which often allied themselves with radical left movements.  
 
State-Led Perspective. The second ideal-type of land reform is the state-led perspective. 
Much like in the peasant-led perspective, the necessity of land reform is based both on 
economic and political arguments. The necessary condition for land reform in this case is 
strong political will, and the mechanism needed to achieve redistribution is the 
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expropriation by the state. Although peasant movements and CSOs are considered as 
important actors in this perspective, they are attributed a subordinate administrative 
role.40 The state-led model was prevalent between 1945 and 1980 when the dominant 
Keynesian discourse gave a central role to the state in economic development. Today 
however, Rossett believes that the only two states which have « a sincere commitment to 
genuine land reform » are Cuba and Venezuela.41 Critics of state-led land reforms, such 
as the World Bank, say that these are bound to be abandoned before completion and will 
thus remain partial precisely because they are politically motivated.42 Barraclough argues 
however that « in every Latin American case where significant land redistribution 
benefiting the rural poor took place, the state played a decisive role ».43 According to 
Byres and Bernstein, state-led agrarian reform was also a ‘key motif’ of the period of 
state-led development in Asia.44  
 
Market-Led Perspective. The third ideal-type of land reform is the market-led 
perspective. In this perspective, land is viewed as a commodity, a scarce resource and a 
factor of production. Land reform here is seen as a way to improve economic efficiency 
and productivity but not as a mean to address the unequal distribution of power within a 
society. A main argument for land reform in this perspective is that the skewed 
distribution of land results in lack of access to productive resources by rural households 
and leads to poverty.45 Advocates of this perspective however argue that state 
intervention in redistributing land distorts land markets and that redistribution must be 
carried through market-oriented mechanisms such as ‘willing seller-willing buyer’ land-
transfer schemes, land-rental markets, and the privatization of land property rights.46 
 
Bernstein and Byres explain that state-led development started to gave way to the 
ascendancy of neo-liberalism in the late 1970s.47 Under neo-liberalism, the poverty 
discourse adopted the ‘growth paradigm’, moving away from the objective of 
redistributing the pie and towards the objective of enlarging the pie.48 Thus with the 
growing predominance of the market in the economic discourse, the political argument 
for land reform and the role of the state came under attack. Neo-liberal thinkers of the 
World Bank lobbied for the avoidance of state-led land reforms on the basis that they 
‘provoke and aggravate violence’.49 Even Griffin – who had underscored in the 1970s the 
importance of land reform as a mean to reduce inequalities in the countryside – seemed to 
agree as he criticized in 2001 previous state-led land reform programs for having been 
‘unduly confiscatory’.50 According to Deininger, the advantages of a market-led model 
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are that it replaces central bureaucracy with local empowerment; that it is demand-driven 
rather than supply-driven; that it reduces the costs of the program; and that it is faster and 
less conflict-ridden.51 Having previously taken position in favour of small farms over 
large ones in the debate over productivity, Deininger may have overestimated the 
capacity of peasant families to acquire land in an open market. 
 
The market-led model has been severely criticized in recent years. One argument 
formulated by Borras and Franco against this model is that it promotes a purely 
economistic view of land as a scarce factor of production, and it focuses only on its most 
efficient use and allocation.52 This downplays the fact that land is also a source of 
considerable wealth and power. Patel adds that a fundamental problem of the market-led 
model is its « stubborn refusal (...) to acknowledge the existence of divergences in power 
between those who control land and those who don’t », and that « markets compound and 
consolidate these power relations ».53 Market mechanisms favour the rich, not the poor. 
As Riedinger argues, « a market-based approach to land reform is likely to be 
unaffordable to the would-be beneficiaries because the market value of land exceeds the 
agronomic value of the land ».54 He adds that « in such context, land sales markets are 
likely to become a means for large landowners to accumulate more land ».55   
 
The fact that there seems to be no known case of a successful land reform based on 
market-led principles to this day is also a severe blow to the MLAR proponents.56  Borras 
and Franco argue that « where implemented, these programs tended to benefit the non-
poor households and other corporate elites more than the rural poor ».57 Bernstein agrees 
that recent market-led land reform in Southern Africa « have had negative consequences 
for employment and poverty, and especially for the weakest groups in rural labour 
markets ».58 Riedinger’s conclusion is that the market-based approach « offers little 
promise of benefiting a significant number of families or of distributing significant 
amounts of land. It is likely to serve only as a screen for government temporizing on the 
critical issue of redistributive reform. »59   
 
State/Society-Driven Perspective. The fourth ideal-type of land reform is the state/society 
driven perspective.60 In this case, the implementation of land reform is driven by the 
interactions between peasants, CSOs, state actors, and landowners. The originality of this 
perspective is that rather than focusing on a single type of actor to lead the 
implementation, it focuses on the interactions between them.61 Here peasants have an 
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active role to play in pushing for the implementation of land reform. Barraclough says 
that « in every case where significant land reforms occurred, protests and demands by 
organized peasant producers and rural workers made crucial contributions to bringing 
them about ».62 In this model, peasant mobilization is considered to be a necessary but 
insufficient step towards land reform implementation. To succeed, peasants need to find 
allies wihin civil society to help them overcome landlord resistance and scale up their 
mobilization beyond the local level.63 The state/society driven perspective also offers a 
different viewpoint on state actors who are not seen as homogenous but rather as divided 
between those supporting the interests of the peasants, and those supporting the interests 
of the landlords.64 Thus land reform is not driven by revolution, by state expropriation or 
by market mechanisms alone. It is driven by different types of actors and its 
implementation is likely to depend on the local context, landowner resistance and peasant 
strategies.  
 
1.2.3 Land Reform Debates in the Philippines 
Peasant-Led versus State-Led. After the People Power Revolution and the end of Marcos’ 
dictatorship in 1986, peasant organizations in the Philippines « wasted little time in 
pressing their demands for swift action on agrarian reform ».65 The progressive elements 
of civil society were not in agreement however on the ideal-type of land reform 
implementation to promote. This led to a debate which opposed the radical groups who 
shared a peasant-led perspective, and the moderates who shared a state-led perspective.  
 
The group of radical peasant organizations was led by the Philippine Peasants Movement 
(KMP)66 which was guided by, and sympathetic to, Maoist revolutionary objectives.67 
KMP advocated a ‘genuine agrarian reform’ and its demands included the free 
distribution of land to peasants; selective compensation to former owners; and the 
nationalization of lands owned by multinational agribusinesses.68 The moderate group 
was a social-democratic coalition of NGOs and was led in part by the Philippine 
Partnership for Development of Human Resources for Rural Areas (PHILDHRRA).69 
Their demands differed from those of KMP on two main aspects: they proposed that 
beneficiaries pay the land awarded to them according to their capacity rather than receive 
it for free; and they suggested a more moderate two-tiered approach to landowner 
compensation with a cut-off at fifty hectares.70 As a political opportunity arose to push 
through with land reform legislation, the ideologically divided peasant sector decided to 
unite ahead of an inevitable battle with a landlord-dominated Congress by creating the 
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Congress for a People’s Agrarian Reform (CPAR) in May 1987.71 The CPAR was 
composed of 12 national peasant organizations and coalitions - including KMP72 - and 
saw the supporters of the peasant-led perspective of land reform throw their support 
behind a state-led perspective.  
 
The CPAR’s demands were assembled in a legislative program called the PARCODE.73 
The progressive agenda of CPAR however was going to face strong resistance from the 
landlord-dominated Congress. The ensuing debate in 1987 was described by Putzel as 
one between « the conservative and the liberal approaches to agrarian reform ».74 The 
CPAR represented the liberal approach, one that put the emphasis on the political 
arguments for land reform such as the need for a more equitable redistribution of land, 
and argued for widespread land redistribution from large landowners to landless 
peasants.75 These arguments were shared by the advocates of both the peasant-led and the 
state-led models of implementation. The conservative approach on the other hand focused 
on the economic argument of agricultural productivity to justify land reform and had a 
strong free-market component. It was based on the assumption that large landholdings 
allow for economies of scale and that ownership of land must thus remain in the hands of 
the traditional landed elite.76 The advocates of the conservative approach, i.e. the 
landlord-dominated Congress, thus supported a market-led model of implementation. 
 
The result of that debate was the creation in 1988 of the CARP, a land reform program 
which mainly reflected the conservative approach and the market-led model of land 
reform. The CPAR thus initially rejected the CARP because it was « fundamentally 
opposed to the interests of the rural poor »77 while Bello argued that it was « riddled with 
loopholes, making it a dubious vehicle for genuine reform ».78 For Putzel, the weakness 
of the CARP was a consequence of the vested interests of the ruling elite.79 But despite its  
market orientation, CARP is better described as a hybrid type of land reform program 
because it also provides the state with expropriation power.80 This mix of market-led and 
state-led features of the CARP, as well as the return to democracy in the 1980s, opened 
the door for a struggle between peasants and CSOs pushing for the use of the state-led 
mechanism on one side, and landlords and their allies trying to avoid land reform or rely 
on the use of market mechanisms on the other side. In the end, CARP is a state/society-
driven model of land reform where the implementation outcomes are contingent upon the 
interactions between peasants, CSOs, landowners, and state actors.   
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1.2.4 Constraints to the Implementation of Land Reform  
As a state/society-driven model of land reform, CARP does not rely exclusively on 
market mechanisms and offers some political space for peasants and civil society actors 
to influence the process. The social structure of Filipino society however constrains the 
implementation of land reform. Understood as more or less enduring patterns of 
behaviour and relationship in a society, the social structure is characterized in the 
Philippines by a highly unequal distribution of power in favour of the landed elite. 
Simbulan for one argues that these inequalities are rooted in the social divisions of the 
Pre-Spanish period.81 These divisions were exploited and reinforced by both the Spanish 
(1571-1898) and American (1898-1946) colonial regimes, giving rise, as Putzel argues, to 
a landed oligarchy composed of families which are still prominent today in the Filipino 
political and economic life.82 According to Clarke, 130 out of the 200 House 
representatives of the Philippines in 1987 belonged to traditional landed elite families 
while an additional 39 were their relatives.83   Jose Maria Sison has argued that, in the 
Philippines countryside, this highly unequal social structure translates into persistent 
feudal relations of production.84 Thus in a context of such gross power imbalance 
between landowners who controlled the state apparatus and landless farmers of the 
countryside, prospects for land redistribution on a large scale were dim. The return to 
electoral democracy in 1986 and the adoption of the CARP in 1988 however, despite 
their shortcomings, opened new spaces of contention for peasants and agrarian reform 
advocates in their struggle for land reform implementation. Thus to understand how land 
reform successes emerged in such a constraining social structure, it is necessary to look at 
the strategies used by the peasants. 
 
1.2.5 Strategies for the Implementation of the Land Reform 
This democratic space opened by the end of the Marcos dictatorship was crucial because 
the involvement of the peasants themselves in the implementation of CARP is a key 
condition for success.  Franco for one has stressed that poor farmers are not merely 
passive victims of socio-political processes but that they can change the social 
relationships in which they are embedded.85 Putzel even attributes the failure of Marcos’ 
land reform program (PD 27) specifically to this lack of space saying that: 
 
(…) by relying on central government agencies and government established organizations, 
the Marcos state prevented the kind of peasant involvement that was needed to implement 
and maintain redistributive reform, even on the small scale dictated by the scope of PD 27.86  
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In other words, in the absence of sufficient political will to implement a state-led land 
reform, political space is crucial to allow pro-reform actors to push for implementation. 
As a land reform activist quoted by Bello puts it: « If you don’t push, you don’t get 
anything ».87  
 
Peasants have different strategies at their disposal in their struggle for land reform.  
Under Marcos, because of the lack of political space, they were basically limited to two 
main strategies: violent uprisings or ‘everyday forms of resistance’. Scott developed the 
concepts of ‘everyday forms of resistance’ and ‘weapons of the weak’ to refer to 
individual strategies such as foot dragging, theft, avoidance, or acts of petty revenge, 
showing that the absence of collective action on the part of peasants does not equate 
acceptance of domination.88 Bernstein and Byres emphasize that sometimes « these 
‘weapons of the weak’ have a greater cumulative effect in ameliorating their condition 
than organized collective action and dramatic but intermittent outbursts of rebellion ».89 
This comment illustrates the dichotomous choice between everyday forms of resistance 
and rebellion in absence of political space. The end of the Marcos regime and the new 
space of contention it opened allowed and incited farmers to go beyond these everyday 
forms of resistance  and risk avoidance strategies to use more open and active strategies. 
 
In the early 1990s, the rural social movements that had united behind the CPAR in 1987 
split in different groups according to the type of strategy they relied on.90 One of these 
was the revolutionary group led by KMP, which was sympathetic to the Maoist 
movement led by the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the New People’s 
Army (NPA). After CARP failed to produce the model of land reform they had hoped for, 
KMP radicalized its position and decided to pursue the land reform struggle outside the 
legal framework provided by CARP, seeking to eventually seize state power and 
implement its own genuine land reform. In recent years, they have been criticized by 
more moderate activists for not tolerating other left-wing autonomous peasant 
movements, harassing and intimidating peasant leaders.91   
 
Some however advocated strategies designed to secure gains within the legal framework 
of the CARP. As Franco argues, between all-out revolution and apparent quiescence, « 
there is a vibrant and variable rural social movement field where peasants engage in 
purposive collective action ».92 The 1990s, according to Borras, saw a shift in strategy 
away from « revolutionary seizure of state power, and toward radical reformist assertions 
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of the right to have rights by autonomous peasant movements, around the state land 
reform law ».93 Aware of the shortcomings of the CARP, peasants have nonetheless been 
more inclined to use the increased political space to claim their rights to land within the 
legal framework provided by CARP. 
 
The most successful of these middle-ground strategies under CARP has been one based 
on critical engagement with the state and better known as the bibingka strategy.94 Borras 
developed the theoretical framework for this strategy in a book published in 1998.95 
Based on empirical evidence, he showed that land redistribution could be successful on 
contentious private landholdings when using a strategy which combines the pressure of 
peasant mobilization and social movement involvement from below with a positive 
interaction above with pro-reform members of the state implementing agency.96 When 
this coalition is stronger than the one organized by the landowner and his own state allies, 
redistribution occurs. The combined involvement and positive interaction between 
peasants, civil society organizations, and state reformists in the land reform 
implementation is thus presented as the best strategy for achieving redistribution of 
contentious private landholdings under CARP. 
 
In sum, the state-society-driven model of land reform requires peasants to participate 
actively in the implementation process in order to secure gains. Taking advantage of the 
political opportunity offered by this model means engaging, albeit in a critical way, with 
the state. To do so effectively, peasants also need to find allies among CSOs. Everyday 
forms of resistance will not provide the necessary peasant mobilization for 
implementation while the road of the revolution leads outside the legal framework and 
exposes peasants to repression and often times limited results. In this context, the 
bibingka strategy has proved to be the best way to ensure redistribution. 
 
1.2.6 Limits of the Bibingka Strategy 
The surprising results of the CARP and the unanticipated successes of many land reform 
struggles on contentious private landholdings in the Philippines have been partly 
explained by Borras. The bibingka strategy has achieved significant gains in terms of land 
redistribution, particularly during the Ramos presidency. However we do see two areas 
which would benefit from further research in order to deepen our understanding of the 
conditions under which land reform can be successfully implemented on contentious 
landholdings: the influence of local structural variables on the strength of landowner 
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resistance to land reform, and the interaction between structure and agency to explain the 
outcome of specific land struggles. 
 
Borras argues that the pro-reform alliance created in the bibingka strategy must be 
stronger than the one organized by the landowner and his allies to achieve redistribution. 
He does not go into details however to describe what constitutes a contentious 
landholding or how much resistance should be expected in specific cases. In his book, he 
identifies two types of landholdings: the private landholdings which are more contentious 
and the public lands which are less contentious.97 The rationale is that private 
landholdings are generally owned by powerful members of the traditional landed elite and 
that these owners are likely to put up strong resistance to the redistribution of their lands. 
The limit of the argument is that it puts all private landholdings on the same foot and does 
not allow for discrimination between different levels of contentiousness.  
 
In his most recent work, Borras argues that the bibingka strategy was very effective under 
the progressive leadership of Garilao - the head of the DAR during Ramos’ presidency - 
but that since Arroyo took over as President of the Philippines, the political opportunity 
for land reform gains has decreased significantly. Although we believe this to be true, we 
argue that the success of peasant strategies cannot be predicted solely on the basis of 
political opportunity at the national level. Land reform struggles face different local 
conditions which should be taken into account in assessing their chances of success.  
 
1.3 Analytical Framework 
1.3.1 Definition of Concepts 
Some of the concepts we use in this thesis can be understood in different ways. To be 
sure, we are not suggesting that the definitions we give here are the only appropriate 
ones: our objective is merely to avoid misunderstandings and ensure clarity. The concepts 
which need to be defined here are those of agrarian and land reform; land distribution and 
redistribution; farmer and peasant; tenant and farmworker; structural feature and 
structural setting. 
 
The terms agrarian reform and land reform are sometimes used indiscriminately 
although they refer to different concepts. Based on the definitions provided by Suarez, we 
refer to land reform as « a program which seeks to change landlord-tenant relationship 
with the end view of transferring the ownership and control of the agricultural land to the 
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actual tiller ».98 In short, we understand land reform as being synonymous with land 
redistribution, i.e. land that is redistributed from a previous private owner to a new one 
through either state confiscatory power or market mechanisms. Land distribution on the 
other hand refers mainly to the distribution of public lands and is less contentious as it 
does not imply the confiscation of private property. Agrarian reform is a broader concept 
which refers to « land reform, coupled with a package of support services, price control, 
and government assistance (...) ».99 Agrarian reform refers to the combination of land 
reform and the provision of services. Although much could be said about the provision of 
these services under the CARP in the Philippines, the scope of our research is limited to 
the land reform aspect of the program.  
 
The use of the terms farmers and peasants can also lend themselves to 
misunderstandings. In this research, we refer to a farmer as a « person whose primary 
livelihood is cultivation of land or production of agricultural crops ».100 Farmer is a large 
concept which can include big landowners, small owners, tenants and farmworkers. It 
encompasses both people who own land and people who do not, as long as the cultivation 
of land is their primarily livelihood. The concept of peasant is different in that it refers 
more to a social condition than to a profession. It also has proven very difficult to define. 
Some like Bernstein prefer the term simple commodity producer while some among 
Marxist writers even reject it completely as an analytical concept.101 Wolf on the other 
hand refers to peasants as « populations that are existentially involved in cultivation and 
make autonomous decisions regarding the processes of cultivation ».102 His conception of 
the peasant includes small ownerss and tenants but not farmworkers. Because this thesis 
focuses on the struggle for land reform, the exclusion of farmworkers - who are potential 
beneficiaries of land reform - from the definition would be problematic; in particular 
since authors like Borras include them when speaking of peasant strategies. Therefore we 
will rely on a broader definition provided by Colburn, which refers to a peasant as 
someone who works in agriculture and who has a subordinate position in a hierarchical 
economic and political order.103 In this research, the term peasant is meant to encompass 
tenants and farmworkers but not landowners. The ARBs involved in our case studies may 
thus be called peasants or farmers as they generally fit both definitions given above. 
 
Another useful albeit easier distinction to make is between the concepts of tenant and 
farmworker. According once again to Suarez, a tenant is one who resides on and farms 
land owned by a landlord.104 Depending on the contract, tenants pay the landowner a 
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fixed rent or share a percentage of their harvest. A farmworker is one who is employed by 
an agricultural enterprise or a farm on a permanent, recurrent, periodic, or intermittent 
basis to work as a labourer.105 The tenants and the farmworkers are both potential 
beneficiaries of land reform but the distinction between them is particularly important 
since they imply different relations of production with the landowner. 
 
In this thesis, the term structural feature refers to specific aspects of landholdings which 
can alter the power relations in the countryside between peasants and landowners. The 
two structural features referred to in this research are the type of crop and the tenurial 
status. Also, we refer to the term structural setting as the specific setting resulting from 
the structural features of a case and the strength of landowner resistance to CARP 
processes The structural settings in this research are categorized as highly, moderately 
and somewhat contentious. In the next sections, we present our main research questions. 
 
1.3.2 First Research Question 
The first research question deals with the structural features which make land reform 
cases more or less contentious. We suggest that each case presents particular structural 
features which influence the strength of landowner resistance to key CARP processes of 
land reform. Because every case must involve the production of a crop  and some 
arrangement between those who own the land and those who cultivate it, we chose the 
type of crop and the tenurial status as the two structural features of this research. These 
variables were also given considerable importance as factors of land reform success or 
failure in the literature.  
 
Table 1.1.Key CARP Processes of Land Reform 
CARP KEY 
PROCESSES 
SHORT DESCRIPTION 
Land coverage 
 
This process involves gathering official documents 
regarding the land to be covered, issuing a Notice of 
Coverage (NOC) to the landowner, and conducting a 
survey of the land. 
Identification of 
ARBs 
This process involves a preliminary screening of 
potential ARBs, and the issuance of Certification of 
Qualified potential ARBs. 
Land 
compensation 
This process involves the determination of the land 
value, the acceptation/rejection of the valuation by the 
landowner and payment by the Land Bank. 
Installation of 
ARBs 
This process takes place after the ARBs have received 
their legal title and after the landowner received his 
compensation payment. It consists in the ARBs 
physically taking control of their land. 
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As we will explain in more details further, these two structural features influence key 
CARP processes of land reform. The general Land Acquisition and Distribution Process 
of the CARP is actually divided into four main phases and 21 steps. (See Annex 1)  The 
four key processes which have the most influence on the implementation of land reform 
however are the following: land coverage; identification of ARBs; land compensation; 
and installation of ARBs. (See Table 1.1) It is these four key processes which are 
influenced by the type of crop and the tenurial status of peasants on a landholding.   
  
The Type of Crop. The type of crop is our first structural feature and independent 
variable. The relevance of this variable has been demonstrated through the historical 
study of past land reform programs in the country. Before CARP, no land reform program 
had ever attempted to redistribute land planted with anything but subsistence crops. For 
example, Marcos’ land reform from 1972 to 1986, known as PD 27, only covered rice 
and corn lands. Redistributing lands planted with a subsistence crop is less challenging in 
part because of the low value of their product compared to traditional (coconut, sugar, 
etc.) or non traditional (banana, pineapple, etc.) export crops. Here we use corn land and 
sugar land as the two possible variations of the variable because of their prevalence in the 
country in general and in the area where are located our case studies in particular.  
 
Corn is essentially grown as a subsistence crop by farmers in areas which are not suitable 
for rice cultivation and has an even lower commercial value than rice. The fact that little 
profit can be made out of growing corn, that corn lands are usually divided in relatively 
small tenanted lots, and that PD 27 began the redistribution of these lands in 1972 (16 
years prior to CARP) leaves fewer incentives for landowners to put up strong resistance. 
On the other hand, sugar lands in the Philippines are notorious for being difficult to 
distribute. When CARP was still being debated in Congress in 1988, landowners tried to 
have sugar crops totally exempted from coverage.106 And although its price has collapsed 
in the world market in the 1980s, sugar has been - and is still - one of the main export 
crops of the Philippines. Thus land redistribution is expected to be more difficult on sugar 
lands than on corn lands because sugar lands generate more profit, giving landowners 
more incentives to resist CARP processes.  
 
The influence of this structural feature can be seen in the landowner resistance to the 
process of land coverage, which is the initial phase of land reform. Owners of sugar lands 
often try to avoid CARP coverage on their land by filing petitions for exemption of 
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coverage while owners of corn land are less likely to do so since corn lands have been up 
for redistribution since the early 1970s. The influence of the type of crop can also be seen 
in the landowner resistance to the land compensation phase of land reform. Corn lands 
are generally covered under the OLT mechanism - a compulsory acquisition mode 
initiated under PD 27 - which leaves little room for negotiations. Sugar lands however are 
generally distributed through more ‘market-friendly’ mechanisms such as the Voluntary 
Land Transfer (VLT) and Voluntary Offers to Sell (VOS).107 Owners of sugar lands are 
likely to put up strong resistance to the land compensation process in order to maximize 
their profit, either by obtaining a higher compensation than the one initially offered by the 
state or by delaying the implementation to reap the benefits of the land over a longer 
period of time. As land titles cannot be issued to ARBs as long as the former landowner 
has not been compensated by the Land Bank, it can significantly delay the 
implementation. Thus corn land is a facilitating variable in the implementation of land 
reform while sugar land is a constraining one.  (See Table 1.2) 
 
Table 1.2 Influence of the Type of Crop on Two Key CARP Processes 
Type of 
Crop 
Expected Landowner 
Resistance to the Process 
of Land Coverage 
Expected Landowner 
Resistance to the 
Process of Land 
Compensation 
Case Studies 
Sugar Strong Strong Manlayo and Dalag 
Corn Weak Weak Salacan and Kalimpak 
 
Tenurial Status. The tenurial status is our second structural feature and independent 
variable. Aside from the fact that they generate less income for their landowner, rice and 
corn lands were targeted in previous land reform programs in part because of their high 
rate of tenancy. PD 27 for example focused exclusively on tenanted lands and did not 
include farmworkers as potential beneficiaries. Being a tenant facilitates land 
redistribution because it simplifies the process of identification of the ARBs, making it 
more difficult for landowners to oppose resistance. Tenants generally live on the lot they 
till while paying a fixed rent or engaging in formal or informal sharing arrangements with 
their landlord. Farmworkers however do not necessarily live on the land where they 
work. Hayami, Quisumbing and Adriano stress the difficulty of identifying farmworkers: 
« (…) unlike tenanted land, in which ‘tillers of the land’ can easily be identified, workers 
in plantations are typically organized into teams according to tasks and, thus, no specific 
plot of land is assigned to an individual worker ».108 The second process on which the 
tenurial status has an influence is the installation of the ARBs. Once a mother CLOA has 
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been issued, the installation of the farmworkers can more easily be delayed by the former 
landowner since unlike tenants they do not already live on the land and can be barred 
from entering. Thus tenant is a facilitating variable in the implementation of land reform 
while farmworker is a constraining one. (See Table 1.3) 
 
Table 1.3 Influence of the Tenurial Status on Two Key CARP Processes 
Tenurial Status Expected Landowner 
Resistance to the 
Process of 
Identification of ARBs 
Expected 
Landowner 
Resistance to the 
Process of 
Installation of ARBs 
Case Studies 
Farmworkers Strong Strong Kalimpak and Dalag 
Tenants Weak Weak Salacan and Manlayo 
 
Our first specific research question then reads as follows: how do the type of crop and the 
tenurial status of peasants influence the strength of landowner resistance to key CARP 
processes? Our first hypothesis is that landowner resistance will be strong to the 
processes of identification of land for coverage and land compensation in cases involving 
sugar while it will be weak in cases involving corn. Our second hypothesis is that 
landowner resistance will be strong to the processes of identification and installation of 
ARBs in cases involving tenants while it will be weak in cases involving tenants. (See 
Table 1.4) 
 
Table 1.4 Conceptual Model A - Structural Features and the Four Key CARP Processes   
Combination of 
structural 
features 
Expected Landowner Resistance to Key CARP 
Processes 
Case 
Studies 
Land 
Coverage 
Identification 
of ARBs 
Land 
Compensation 
Installation 
of ARBs 
Sugar 
Farmworkers 
Strong Strong Strong Strong Dalag 
Sugar 
Tenants 
Strong Weak Strong Weak Manlayo 
Corn 
Farmworkers 
Weak* Strong Weak Strong Kalimpak 
Corn 
Tenants 
Weak Weak Weak Weak Salacan 
* In Kalimpak, landowner resistance was actually stronger than expected to the process of land coverage. We 
discuss this issue in details in Chapter Four. 
 
1.3.3 Typology of Structural Settings based on Landowner’s Resistance 
This first research question, in addition to deal with the influence of structural features on 
landowner resistance to key CARP processes, allows us to create a typology of structural 
settings based on their level of contentiousness. Table 1.4 shows that our two structural 
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features can be combined in four different ways. The sugar-farmworkers combination is 
expected to lead to strong landowner resistance to four CARP processes, creating a highly 
contentious structural setting. The sugar-tenants and corn-farmworkers combinations are 
expected to lead to strong landowner resistance to two CARP processes, making them 
moderately contentious. And the corn-tenants combination is expected to lead to only 
weak landowner resistance to all four processes, making it only somewhat contentious. 
Structural settings are based on the number of processes to which landowners oppose 
strong resistance and are thus greatly influenced by structural features. 
 
A typology based only on the combination of our two structural features however would 
be incomplete since it would not allow for the possibility of strong landowner resistance 
to either one or three CARP processes. Although we argue that the type of crop and the 
tenurial status are the two most influential structural features at the local level, we do not 
exclude the possibility that other structural features could also have an impact on 
landowner resistance to key CARP processes, altering the anticipated strength presented 
in Table 1.4 To ensure that our typology includes all possible variations, we will thus 
categorize the three structural settings based on the number of CARP processes to which 
landowners put up strong resistance rather than according to the combination of structural 
features. Therefore the structural setting of cases involving strong landowner resistance  
to three or four CARP processes are considered highly contentious; those involving 
strong landowner resistance to two CARP processes are considered moderately 
contentious; and those involving strong landowner resistance to none or one CARP 
process are considered somewhat contentious. (See Table 1.5) This typology allows for 
small variations in patterns of landowner resistance without compromising the relevance 
of structural settings as an independent variable to predict implementation outcomes. This 
is discussed in our second research question. 
 
Table 1.5 Typology of Structural Settings based on Landowner Resistance 
Structural Settings Landowner Resistance Case Studies 
Highly   
Contentious 
Strong resistance to 3 or 4 key CARP 
processes 
Dalag and 
Kalimpak* 
Moderately 
Contentious 
Strong resistance to 2 key CARP processes Manlayo 
Somewhat 
Contentious 
Strong resistance to 0 or 1 key CARP process Salacan 
* The strength of landowner resistance to key CARP processes in Kalimpak has been stronger than 
anticipated based on the combination of structural features of the case. The cause of this unanticipated result 
will be discussed in Chapter Four.  
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1.3.4 Second Research Question 
Our second research question looks at how structural settings and peasant strategies 
combine to influence the implementation outcome of land reform under CARP. It 
involves a structural variable (the structural setting) and a process variable (the peasant 
strategy). The dependent variable in this question is the implementation outcome of land 
reform in a particular case. We suggest that the structural setting has a considerable 
influence on the implementation outcome of a case but that this outcome can also be 
altered by peasant strategies. To explain the rationale behind our second research 
question, we will thus look first at the influence of the structural setting on the 
implementation outcome of land reform. Then we will look at how peasant strategies can 
alter this outcome.  
 
Structural Setting. In our discussion around the first research question, we presented a 
typology of three structural settings based on the strength of landowners’ resistance to 
key CARP processes. (See Table 1.5). Here we argue that these structural settings 
influence the implementation outcome of specific land struggles. As shown in Table 1.6, 
we have identified three possible outcomes: weak, partial and full implementation. These 
outcomes vary in terms of the delay of implementation and the amount of land received 
by the peasants. We consider the delay of implementation to be reasonable when the 
installation of ARBs occurs within five years after the land has been identified for 
coverage. As for the amount of land received, we consider the outcome reasonable only if 
peasants receive the total amount of land they were entitled to at the beginning of the land 
redistribution process. When peasants receive less than what they were entitled to and are 
installed more than five years after the issuance of a Notice of Coverage (NOC), we 
consider the outcome to be a weak implementation. When peasants receive all the land 
they were entitled to and are installed within five years, we consider the outcome to be a 
full implementation. When only one of the two criteria is met, then we consider the 
outcome to be a partial implementation. 
 
Thus in highly contentious structural settings, we expect the outcome to be a weak 
implementation because of the strong resistance of landowners to three or all four key 
CARP processes. In moderately contentious structural settings, the outcome is expected 
to be a partial implementation because of the strong resistance of landowners to two key 
CARP processes Finally a full implementation is expected in somewhat contentious 
structural settings because of the weak resistance of landowners to most or all of the key 
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CARP processes. (See Table 1.6)  But while structural settings influence the expected 
outcome of specific cases of land struggles, so do peasant strategies.  
 
Table 1.6 Structural Settings and Expected Outcomes 
Structural Settings Expected Outcomes Case Studies 
Highly  Contentious 
Strong landowner 
resistance to  
3 or 4 CARP 
processes 
Weak Implementation 
Installation delay of more than 5 years 
Land received is less than what peasants were 
entitled to 
Dalag and 
Kalimpak 
Moderately 
Contentious 
Strong landowner 
resistance to  
2 CARP processes 
Partial Implementation 
a) Installation delay of more than 5 years 
     Land received is what peasants were entitled 
to 
b) Installation delay of less than 5 years 
     Land received is less than what peasants were 
entitled  
Manlayo 
Somewhat 
Contentious 
Strong landowner 
resistance to  
0 or 1 CARP process 
Full Implementation 
Installation delay of less than 5 years 
Land received is less than what peasants were 
entitled  
Salacan 
 
Peasant Strategies. In the four case studies presented in this thesis, two peasant strategies 
have been used: the bibingka strategy in three cases (Dalag, Kalimpak, and Manlayo) and 
the risk avoidance strategy in one case (Salacan).  We suggest here that the use of the 
bibingka strategy will strengthen the expected outcome of a land struggle while the risk 
avoidance strategy will weaken it. The rationale behind this hypothesis is that, as many 
authors have argued, in the Filipino state/society-driven model of land reform, peasant 
mobilization is necessary to ensure the success of land reform. Thus we consider peasant 
mobilization to be the basic condition for an implementation to proceed as expected, i.e. 
that the outcome of land struggle can be predicted from the structural setting in which it 
takes place without being altered by peasant strategies.  The absence of mobilization in 
the risk avoidance strategy however will weaken the expected outcome while a strategy 
that goes beyond simple mobilization, as in the bibingka strategy, will strengthen the 
outcome. (See Table 1.7) 
 
The second specific question of this research thus reads as follows: how do peasant 
strategies influence the implementation outcome of land reform in specific structural 
settings? The first independent variable is the structural setting which can be highly, 
moderately, or somewhat contentious. The dependent variable is the implementation 
outcome of land reform which can be weak, partial or full. The process variable, and 
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second independent variable, is the peasant strategy which can be the bibingka strategy or 
the risk avoidance strategy.  
 
Table 1.7 Conceptual Model B – Structural Settings, Peasant Strategies and Outcomes 
Structural Settings Peasant Strategies Implementation 
Outcome 
Case Study 
Highly  Contentious Bibingka Strategy Partial Dalag and Kalimpak 
Peasant Mobilization  Weak  
Risk Avoidance Weak  
Moderately Contentious Bibingka Strategy Full Manlayo 
Peasant Mobilization  Partial  
Risk Avoidance Weak  
Somewhat Contentious Bibingka Strategy Full  
Peasant Mobilization  Full  
Risk Avoidance Partial Salacan 
 
1.4 Methodology 
1.4.1 Case Study Approach and Selection 
This research is based on a case study approach which will provide in-depth information 
on a limited number of cases. Four communities were selected for the case studies, all of 
them located in the province of Cebu, Philippines. For each, we gathered substantial 
qualitative and quantitative data that provide details and texture to the understanding of 
the land reform implementation under CARP. The case study approach does not lend 
itself easily to generalizations however, and we are conscious of its limits. Our objective 
is not to discover irrefutable laws but to identify patterns and issues which could be 
further studied. 
 
In finding case studies of land reform struggles in the Philippines, the first choice we had 
to make was to identify a specific region where we would encounter both corn lands and 
sugar lands, tenanted lands and lands cultivated by farmworkers. We were also looking to 
find an area which had not been well documented already. In the end, the choice of the 
province of Cebu fit all of our criteria. The province provided many ‘middle-range’ cases 
of land struggles which, while being contentious, had not reached ‘stardom’ status in the 
national media, like the MAPALAD farmers of Sumilao, Hacienda Luisita in Luzon, or 
the huge sugarcane plantations of Negros. Cases in Cebu are not ‘exceptional’ and we 
hoped they could provide us with a better understanding of CARP implementation in 
general.  
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Map 1.2 Cebu in the Philippines 
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Source: Adapted from John Bresnan, ed. 1986. Crisis in the Philippines: The Marcos Era and Beyond. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
The specific case studies were identified following conversations with NGO members 
and DAR officials during the first two weeks after our arrival in Cebu in April 2008. In 
these conversations, about ten potential cases involving corn or sugar lands emerged. In 
the end, the four cases we picked for this research were those which presented the best 
access to peasants and documentation, and which allowed us to compare the influence of 
different types of crop, tenurial status, and peasant strategies. In these four cases, the first 
contact with the farmers was organized by either NGOs or DAR officials. Subsequent 
visits to the four areas were the same way but  also sometimes through direct contact with 
local peasant leaders. Most of the peasants we interviewed spoke only Cebuano thus we 
often relied on the help of interpreters and translators during the research.  
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Map 1.3 The Four Case Studies in Cebu 
 
Source: Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Province of Cebu. 2008. 
 
The first case study is located in barangay Salacan, in the municipality of Asturias. The 
main crop grown in this barangay is corn and it involves a group of tenants. These tenants 
opted for a risk avoidance strategy in their land struggle. The second case study is located 
in barangay Kalimpak, in the municipality of Minglanilla. These peasants were 
farmworkers and mainly grew corn. They relied on the bibingka strategy during their 
struggle. The third case study is located in barangay Manlayo, in Bogo. In Manlayo, the 
peasants were tenants on a small area planted with sugarcane and they used the bibingka 
strategy. The fourth case study is located in barangay Dalag, in Medellin. These peasants 
were farmworkers on a sugarcane landholding. They also opted for the bibingka strategy 
during their struggle. The four cases are located on the map of Cebu. (See Map 1.3: The 
Case Studies are Highlighted in Bold)    
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1.4.2 Methods and Data Analysis 
In the context of this case study approach, we address our research questions with a 
combination of two methods: within-case analysis and cross-case analysis. The purpose 
of the within-case analysis is to describe in details the influence of independent variables 
on the land reform processes and outcome in a specific case. To address our first research 
question, we will look at the influence of the type of crop on the strength of landowner 
resistance to the key CARP processes of land coverage and land compensation; and at the 
influence of the tenurial status on the key CARP processes of identification of ARBs and 
installation of ARBs. To address our second research question, we will analyze the 
influence of the structural setting and the peasant strategy on the implementation outcome 
of land reform struggles. The within-case analysis will be provided for each case study in 
Chapters Three (Salacan), Four (Kalimpak), Five (Manlayo), and Six (Dalag). 
 
In Chapter Seven we use a cross-case analysis to push the analysis of our two research 
questions further. In relation to our first research question, we compare the strength of 
landowner resistance to the processes of land coverage and land compensation between 
corn and sugar lands; and the strength of landowner resistance to the processes of 
identification of ARBs and installation of ARBs between cases involving tenants and 
those involving farmworkers. In relation to our second research question, we compare the 
influence of the bibingka strategy and the risk avoidance strategy on the implementation 
outcomes; and also the influence of the structural setting in cases where peasants have all 
opted for the bibingka strategy but ended with different implementation outcomes. 
 
1.4.3 Data Collection and Sources 
The data gathering for the case studies took place mainly between April and August 
2008. A total 45 informants were interviewed to provide information about the case 
studies and issues related to this research. Most of the respondents were peasants 
involved in the case studies. Other respondents included officials of the DAR from the 
municipal, provincial and regional levels in Cebu; members of PhilNet, a national NGO 
with a regional office in the Visayas; members of FARDEC, a peasant organization 
located in the Visayas and linked to KMP; members of KMP, a leftist organization 
advocating for genuine agrarian reform; as well as members of ANGOC, a regional NGO 
involved in land issues, and PHILDHRRA, an NGO involved in rural development. 
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Material sources of information include scientific books and articles, official documents 
and statistics provided by the DAR, NGO publications, and newspaper articles.109  
 
1.4.4 Division of the thesis 
In this Introduction, we presented the literature review and the analytical framework of 
the thesis. The rest of the thesis is divided as follows. In Chapter Two, we present a 
contextual background which includes a short history of land reform in the Philippines, 
an overview of CARP processes and implementation, and a description of the 
particularities of the province of Cebu. The four subsequent chapters present the case 
studies: Chapter Three presents the case of Salacan; Chapter Four, the case of Kalimpak; 
Chapter Five, the case of Manlayo; and Chapter Six, the case of Dalag. Each case study 
provides an introduction and a contextual background, the story of the land struggle, the 
within-case analysis, and a summary. Chapter Seven will present a comparative analysis 
of the influence of structural features on key CARP processes of land reform, as well as a 
comparison of the influence of peasant strategies on the implementation outcome of land 
reform in particular structural settings. The Conclusion will present a summary of our 
main findings and locate the particular contribution of the thesis
    CHAPTER 2: 
HISTORY OF LAND REFORM IN THE PHILIPPINES AND THE 
CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND OF CEBU 
 
2.1 History of Land Reform in the Philippines 
2.1.1 Overview of Land Reform History Before Marcos 
Before the arrival of the Spaniards in the 16th century, the people living in what is now 
known as the Philippines were dispersed on the coastal areas of a highly fragmented 
territory.110 The population was scarce, the land was abundant, and communities were 
small and independent.111 The land was owned communally by the barangay and 
subdivided between families of the community who enjoyed usufruct rights.112 Back then 
the source of wealth and power was not control over land but control over labour.  
 
Things changed under Spanish colonization (1565-1898). Although Spain had little 
interest at first to develop agricultural production113, the introduction of the encomienda 
system - the Spanish colonial version of the feudal economy of medieval Europe – 
established property rights for the Spanish Crown over all lands in the country except 
those officially proved to be private or communal possessions. Under this system, vast 
tracks of land were dispensed by the Crown to those it favoured, such as the friars who 
acquired and accumulated large haciendas in that period.114 This change was significant 
because in pre-colonial Philippines, if the product of the land could be owned, the land 
itself could not.115 This shift from communal to private ownership is at the origin, for 
some, of the landlessness problem in the Philippines.116 In the late 18th century, the 
Spaniards also operated a shift towards the large-scale production of cash crops.117 This 
provided a strong incentive for the local elite to accumulate land, leading to the creation 
of a wealthy landowning class known as the principalia.118  Isolated peasant-based 
rebellions in the country eventually culminated with the 1896 Philippine Revolution and 
the end of the Spanish regime in 1898.119 The legacy of the Spaniards was the creation of 
a highly unequal system of land tenure dominated by a powerful landowning class.120   
 
The United States took over as colonial rulers of the Philippines in 1898.121 Through the 
Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Friars Land Act of 1903, the Americans bought several 
friar estates at commercial price only to resell them in the market. Without surprise, 
peasants did not have the means to purchase lands at market price and these ended up in 
the hands of the landed elite and American corporations.122 In 1913, the Americans 
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introduced the Torrens land-titling system which consisted in the systematization of 
private property ownership, and signed the Underwood-Simmons Act which lifted all 
prohibitions on the volume of sugar entering the U.S. market and initiated free trade 
between the two countries.123 These initiatives led to wholesale land-grabbing and 
stimulated the rise of large sugar haciendas. As a result, tenancy incidence multiplied and 
the number of landless peasants increased.124   
 
In the 1930s, the Americans adopted more reforms125 which, according to the DAR, 
further worsened the land ownership situation, concentrating even more landholdings in 
the hands of a few, and increasing tenancy.126 Consequently peasant unrest grew around 
the country in the 1920s and 1930s and, although sporadic uprisings were suppressed 
easily by the police and the military127, peasant movements started growing stronger.128 In 
the end, the legacy of the Americans in the Philippines was the formation of a governance 
model replicating their own where a weak central authority is combined with a strong 
society in the hope of preventing tyranny.129 In terms of agrarian issues, the Americans 
contributed to land concentration through the open market distribution of former friar 
estates, the introduction of the Torrens system, and free trade incentives.  
 
Following the country’s independence in 1946, Philippine governments faced increasing 
rural unrest and initiated a series of unsuccessful land reforms aimed at stabilizing the 
countryside. The Huk rebellion, which peaked between 1949 and 1951, was fuelled by 
peasant grievances and pursued land reform through communist ideals.130 From 1946 to 
1965, the successive administrations of Presidents Roxas,131 Magsaysay,132 and 
Macapagal133 adopted limited and inefficient land reforms which led to an increase in 
tenancy rates despite the country’s high annual economic growth.134 In this context, land 
reform was still a predominant issue, one which increasingly became the focus of 
organized protests by labour and student movements.135  
 
2.2.1 Marcos and PD 27 
In his first term as President between 1965 and 1969, Marcos pursued economic 
liberalization136 and relied on a rural strategy focused more on agricultural productivity 
than redistribution of land.137 In his second term as elected President, between 1969 and 
1972, Marcos saw the country’s economic situation worsen and activism grow in urban 
and rural areas alike.138 Student protests became frequent and, after a decade or so of 
silence following the Huk debacle, the communist movement started picking up steam 
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again through the active militancy of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP).139 
The CPP and its military arm, the New People’s Army (NPA), would be at the center of 
much of the agrarian unrest which followed in the 1970s and 1980s.140 In September 
1972, confronted to growing discontent from the Left and the Right, Marcos declared a 
state of emergency and arrested thousands of opponents to his regime.141  
 
Marcos initially justified the imposition of Martial Law by the need to address the 
communist threat posed by the CPP and the NPA; to take the state power away from the 
traditional landed elite; and to impose land reform.142 If many peasants at the time were 
optimistic that a genuine land reform might finally be forthcoming,143 the Marcos era 
proved to be symbolic not of the state imposing its discipline on the economic elite but of 
a simple takeover of the state apparatus by a faction of that elite.  
 
The new land reform program proposed by Marcos, known as PD 27, was meant to 
address the structural problems of the countryside and to free the peasants from the 
bondage of the soil. As of October 21, 1972, all tenant farmers were to be emancipated. 
Two mechanisms were put in place to achieve this objective. The first and most important 
mechanism was called Operation Land Transfer (OLT). Under OLT, all tenanted 
agricultural lands cultivated with rice or corn were to be divided in small lots (varying 
between 3 and 5 hectares), and their ownership was to be transferred to the tenants. The 
retention limit was set at seven hectares; joining a farmers’ cooperative became 
mandatory; land titles were transferable by hereditary succession only; and amortizations 
were to be paid on a 15-year period. The second mechanism, Operation Leasehold, was 
designed to elevate the status of tenants from sharecropper to leaseholder on lands of 
seven hectares or less. Falling within the retention limit, these lands were not subjected to 
redistribution under the OLT mechanism.144  
 
Although it initially generated hope, PD 27 offered disappointing results. First, land 
reform was limited in scope to rice and corn lands only. This left export-crop plantations 
untouched and became an incentive for landowners to plant their lands to other crops to 
avoid coverage.145 Second, even on the rice and corn lands, the land distribution was not 
significant.146 Between 1972 and 1986, the reform benefited about 45,000 farmers and 
covered approximately 750,000 hectares of land. If we take into account that about one 
third of the beneficiaries never actually received their legal titles147, PD 27 really 
benefited about 30,000 farmers and covered 500,000 hectares of land.148  
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Past land reforms, from the market distribution of friar lands to PD 27, have in common 
that they were driven more by the necessity of preventing unrest in the countryside than 
by a concrete will to address peasants’ needs. Ultimately, they resulted in both an 
increased number of landless farmers and a consolidation of land ownership in the hands 
of a few.149 To be sure, in the late 1980s, 83% of all farms still belonged to only 5% of 
Filipino families.150 
 
2.2 The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (1988-2008) 
In this section, we look first at the origins, the objectives and the targets of the 
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Then we look at the processes of 
land reform under CARP by describing the official process of the DAR, the four key 
processes that we have identified for our thesis, and the distribution and redistribution 
mechanisms. Finally, we provide an overview of CARP implementation between 1988 
and 2008 by looking at the performance of the four government administrations of 
Aquino, Ramos, Estrada, and Arroyo. 
 
2.2.1 Origins, Objectives and Targets 
In 1984-85, the Philippines were hit by an economic crisis which, combined with the loss 
of political credibility of the Marcos regime, led to the People Power Revolution of 1986 
and a return to formal democracy under the government of Cory Aquino.151 Two years 
later, the CARP was enacted by President Aquino as the result of the struggle between the 
supporters of a liberal approach and a state-led model of implementation, and the 
supporters of a conservative approach and a market-led model of implementation. The 
final version of the program, while mainly reflecting the conservative approach of a 
landlord-dominated Congress in its reliance upon market mechanisms, also featured an 
aspect of the state-led model in its inclusion of a confiscatory mechanism. This hybrid 
model of land reform is best described as a state/society-driven model because, despite its 
loopholes and market orientation, it represents a change in the political opportunity 
structure and an unprecedented opening for peasants and their pro-reform allies to 
influence the implementation process.  
 
CARP aims to promote social justice as well as rural development and industrialization 
based on the establishment of owner cultivatorship of economic-size farms as the basis of 
Philippine agriculture.152 CARP is a program of agrarian reform which includes both the 
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redistribution of land to peasants (land reform) and the provision of support services. It is 
also comprehensive in that it covers all public and private agricultural lands regardless of 
tenurial arrangements and commodity produced.153 The redistribution of land to peasants 
is based on the principle of just compensation, which means that landowners receive a 
financial compensation for their land based on market value.  
 
The original target of the CARP was the redistribution of 11.28 million hectares of land 
in ten years. A first revision in 1996 brought the target down to 8 million hectares in 
1996.154 After undergoing more revisions, the latest official target was set at 9 million 
hectares.155 The two main government agencies involved in the redistribution of land 
under CARP are the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the Department of 
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The DAR’s mandate is mainly to 
redistribute private lands while the DENR distributes public lands. The DAR’s target was 
set at 5.2 million hectares and the DENR’s target was set at 3.8 million hectares.156 
 
2.2.2 Processes of Land Reform Implementation under CARP 
Official DAR Process. The CARP is an agrarian reform program which includes the 
redistribution of land to landless or near landless farmers as well as the provision of 
support services. In this thesis, we focus specifically on land reform and thus on the land 
acquisition and distribution process. The official DAR process is divided in four phases: 
identification, documentation and survey; review and completion of documents; land 
valuation and compensation; and distribution. In the identification, documentation and 
survey phase, the land identified for coverage is surveyed by DAR personnel; the 
potential ARBs are screened; all the necessary documentation is put together in a Claim 
Folder (CF); and the landowner is notified of the land coverage through a Notice of 
Coverage (NOC). In the second phase, the CF is reviewed by DAR officials to ensure that 
all the documentation has been gathered and that nothing is missing. In the third phase, 
the CF is sent to the Land Bank; the land value is determined by the DAR; the landowner 
compensation is determined; and the Land Bank proceeds to the compensation payment 
to the landowner. In the fourth and final phase of the process, the DAR issues to the 
ARBs a collective legal title to the land called CLOA, and the ARBs are installed on the 
land. 
 
Four Key CARP Processes. In this thesis, we will not look at all the 21 steps of land 
acquisition and distribution (See Annex 1) but only at the key processes which have the 
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greatest impact on the success or the failure of land reform implementation. In the 
Introduction, we identified these four key CARP processes: land coverage, identification 
of ARBs, land compensation, and installation of ARBs.  
 
The process of land coverage refers to the initial phase of land reform when landholdings 
are identified for redistribution. Landowner resistance to land coverage may include 
petitions for exclusion from coverage and/or for the deferment of coverage, land 
conversions, asking or forcing the peasants to forfeit their rights to the land -   sometimes 
in exchange for money - and intimidating peasants to have them leave the land without 
claiming their rights to ownership under CARP.   
 
The process of identification of ARBs is the second key process of land reform and 
consists in identifying who are the legitimate beneficiaries of the land redistribution. 
Landowners can resist this process by providing alternative lists of potential beneficiaries 
or by including additional peasants on the list. Such strategies force the DAR to 
investigate and therefore delay the implementation. By including beneficiaries that are 
loyal to them and who have agreed to lease them back the land once the land reform 
implementation is completed, landowners can even use the process to regain their land. 
Landowners may also use intimidation tactics to convince potential beneficiaries not to 
register as ARBs. 
 
The process of land compensation is the third key process and refers to the payment of a 
‘just’ compensation to the landowner. When we speak of landowner resistance in this 
case, obviously we do not imply that landowners are trying to avoid being compensated. 
At this point of the implementation, avoiding coverage is unlikely. Thus resistance aims 
mainly at delaying the process and securing the highest possible financial compensation. 
This can be done by refusing the land valuation of the Land Bank and filing a petition for 
higher compensation. Because the land can only be redistributed to peasants after the 
Land Bank has made the compensation payment, the legal cases filed by the landowner 
may also delay the process long enough for him to continue reaping the benefits of the 
land for years. 
 
The last key CARP process is the installation of ARBs. This is the process by which the 
ARBs take the physical control of the land and it comes after the issuance of the 
collective Certificate Land Ownership Award, commonly referred to as the mother 
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CLOA. In cases involving tenants, there is generally no landowner resistance to this 
process since the ARBs are already occupying the land. Often they have been cultivating 
the land and living on determined lots for generations. Landowner resistance to that 
process may be strong however when farmworkers are involved. Because farmworkers 
cultivate the land sporadically and have homes located outside of the landholding itself, 
they can be barred from entering the land by landowners despite owning legal titles. In 
such cases, resistance often takes extra-legal forms such as threats, intimidation and 
violence against the ARBs.  
 
Mechanisms of Land Acquisition and Distribution. The DAR uses four types of 
mechanisms to distribute and redistribute land under CARP. The first mechanism 
involves the distribution of non private agricultural lands to qualified beneficiaries. In the 
case of the more contentious private agricultural lands (PALs), two types of mechanisms 
can be used. One is the Compulsory Acquisition (CA) mechanism which is described in 
Section 16 of RA 6657. Under the CA mechanism, once the land is identified and the 
ARBs are registered, the DAR sends a NOC to the landowner to inform him that his 
landholding has been placed under CARP coverage. The value of the land is then 
determined by the Land Bank and court procedures are often required to settle a final 
agreement if the landowner rejects the initial Land Bank offer. Once the payment is made 
by the Land Bank to the landowner, the land is officially acquired by the state and can be 
redistributed to ARBs. The other type of mechanism that can be used to redistribute PALs 
is market-based and can take two forms:  Voluntary Offers to Sell (VOS) and Voluntary 
Land Transfer (VLT). The VOS is described in Section 19 of RA 6657 and represents an 
incentive for landowners to voluntary sell their land in exchange for an additional 5% 
cash payment as part of the land compensation. The VLT is described in Section 20 of 
RA 657 and is an invitation to landowners and ARBs to negotiate the terms of the land 
redistribution between each other. The failure to use these market mechanisms will result 
in the land being placed under Compulsory Acquisition by the state. Finally a fourth type 
of mechanism of non-land transfer schemes has been developed specifically for retention 
areas and the redistribution of corporate farms. These include Stocks Distribution Option 
(SDO), Production and Profit Sharing (PPS) and Leasehold Operation.157 The SDO is 
designed to offer ARBs the right to purchase capital stocks, equities or shares of the 
corporation instead of redistributing the land. The PPS is similar to the SDO mechanism 
but also gives peasants management rights in the corporation.158 The Leasehold Operation 
applies to lands that fall under the retention limit of the landowners. It serves to ensure 
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tenure security of tenants and farmworkers on these lands and sets the sharing 
arrangement at 75-25 in favour of the peasants.159 
 
2.2.3 CARP Implementation by Administration 
Administration of Cory Aquino (1988-1992). Under Cory Aquino, the political will to 
implement CARP thoroughly unfortunately did not match the political rhetoric. Bello 
notes that although « Aquino recognized the importance of land reform in correcting 
social inequalities, the economic and social policies told a different story ».160 The 
decision of Aquino to allow full-market value compensation and generous retention limits 
for landowners demonstrated from the start her commitment to the interests of the 
traditional landed elite to which she belonged.161 And the efforts she made to exempt 
from coverage her own 6,000 hectare family property of Hacienda Luisita only confirmed 
this impression and further emasculated CARP.162 Under pressure from the World Bank 
and the IMF to repay a largely illegitimate debt contracted under the military rule of 
Marcos, Aquino also made economic policy choices that crippled land reform. The 
earmarking of about half of the government’s budget for debt servicing, coupled with the 
commitment to pay full market value to landowners, left the CARP with very limited 
funds to acquire lands.163 The Aquino administration focused primarily on distributing 
non-contentious lands and the DAR, charged with redistributing the more contentious 
private lands, had redistributed only 16% of its 5.2 million hectare target by 1993.164 The 
poor performance of President Aquino at the time seemed to validate CPAR’s rejection of 
the program.165   
 
 Administration of Fidel Ramos (1992-1998). The implementation of land reform really 
took off under the administration of Fidel Ramos. For many, the main explanation for this 
sudden change of pace was the presence of a new, progressive DAR Secretary in the 
person of Ernesto Garilao, an ex-director of a mainstream NGO. During his mandate, 
Garilao initiated a clean-up of both DAR data and DAR personnel. He reduced CARP’s 
target for redistribution from ten to eight million hectares and introduced a significant 
number of pro-reform activists in the bureaucracy.166 Garilao was also responsible for « 
setting a standard for collaboration among government agencies, nongovernment 
organizations (NGOs), and peasant organizations in expediting CARP implementation 
».167 This context allowed the bibingka strategy to produce significant gains for the 
peasants. To be sure, within these six years, the Ramos administration redistributed a total 
of 4.5 million hectares of land (DAR and DENR combined).168 The distribution of private 
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landholdings also increased significantly as the DAR under Garilao redistributed 1.9 
million hectares - more than twice the amount redistributed under Aquino - and 37% of 
the total target of the DAR.169 These impressive figures must however be nuanced for two 
reasons. The first one is that the statistics of successful distribution are padded: they 
include instances of double and triple titling, cases which are still pending in court, and 
cases where the actual installation of beneficiaries never occurred despite the issuance of 
a legal title.170 The other reason is that most of the redistributed lands were considered 
non contentious landholdings.171 If numbers do not tell the whole story, it is safe to say 
that land reform had finally taken off. Therefore the program was extended for another 
ten years with the hope of achieving its target by 2008.    
 
Administration of Joseph Estrada (1998-2001). When the Estrada administration took 
over in 1998, the DAR still had 2.3 million hectares left to redistribute, or 45% of its 5.1 
million-hectare target.172 At the time, hopes for a swift implementation were high because 
Estrada committed himself to reach CARP’s target in just four years, and also because he 
hired a highly qualified DAR secretary in Horacio Morales.173 The promise of Estrada 
however would be far from fulfilled. Borras and Franco argue that « to a large extent, the 
previously established pattern of reform-oriented state society interaction continued to 
exist » under the Estrada-Morales administration.174 The two authors also note that 
Morales was responsible for important policy reforms, such as the inclusion of plantation 
farmworkers among CARP beneficiaries, and for some daring installations on 
landholdings held by despotic local landlords.175 However, the administration had set an 
unrealistic target for itself. In the remaining balance of land to redistribute, 1.6 million 
hectares were considered contentious landholdings on which landowners would put up 
strong resistance in terms both of peasant harassment and legal manoeuvrings.176 The 
administration was also unable to counter rampant land reversals and land conversions; it 
approved the cancellation of large numbers of land titles; and it championed a joint-
ventured agreement model put forward by former Marcos crony Danding Cojuangco, as 
well as a World Bank-inspired model of market-assisted land reform which wanted to do 
away with the expropriation power of the Compulsory Acquisition mechanism.177 In the 
end, Morales redistributed just a little more than 330,000 hectares, or 6% only of the 
DAR’s total target, during the short-lived two-year rule of Estrada.178 
 
Administration of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (2001-2008). The term ‘Gloria Gridlock’ 
has been used by Franco and Borras to describe the state of land reform paralysis under 
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President Arroyo between 2001 and 2008.179 Arroyo appointed a series of conservative 
and pro-landlord DAR Secretaries who approved numerous applications of land 
conversions, excluded hundreds of agrarian cases from CARP coverage, and made 
decisions which were blatantly favourable to landlords.180 The administration also 
weakened CARP by misusing over US600$ million which should have been allocated to 
land acquisition but were illegally disbursed on other projects.181 Under Arroyo, the 
market friendly mechanisms for land distribution were given a bigger role, the 
Compulsory Acquisition mechanism was sidelined, and the number of victorious land 
struggles radically decreased.182  In seven years, Arroyo redistributed about 18% of the 
DAR’s total target, a poor performance similar to that of Aquino.183  
 
Table 2.1 DAR Land Distribution Accomplishment 
Administrations Years Hectares Percentage 
Marcos* 1972-1986          70,178  2% 
Aquino 1987-1993         848,515  16% 
Ramos 1993-1998      1,900,039   37% 
Estrada 1998-2000         333,389 6% 
Arroyo 2001-2008         954,407 18% 
Balance ------      1,057,223 22% 
Total Target 1972-2008      5,163,751   100% 
* The rice and corn land covered under PD 27 were included under CARP and thus Marcos figures in this 
implementation list for his implementation of the program between 1972 and 1986.  
** This table is based on the 2008 figures of the DAR. See Annex 2. 
 
Thus after 20 years of implementation, a total of 7.4 million hectares of land out of the 9 
million hectare scope has been redistributed under the CARP for an accomplishment rate 
of 82%.  The DENR redistributed 3.3 million hectares of land, achieving 86% of its 
target, while the DAR redistributed 4.1 million hectares of land, achieving 80% of its 
target. (See Annex 2) In these 20 years, the bulk of the redistribution occurred under the 
administration of Fidel Ramos and his progressive DAR Secretary, Ernesto Garilao. In 
just five years under this administration, the DAR redistributed more land than in the 
combined Aquino and Arroyo administrations which ruled the country for more than 12 
years. These numbers highlight the importance of political will and political opportunity 
to achieve successful land reform implementation in the Philippines. There is no doubt 
that the President and the DAR Secretary have a great influence over the implementation 
process. But despite a lack of political will at the national level since 2001, and weaker 
political opportunities for land reform as a result, some peasants still succeeded in forcing 
the implementation of the CARP in that period. With 1.6 million hectares of land still to 
redistribute and over 1.3 million peasants left to install, there is still a need to look at 
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other conditions which may influence the implementation outcomes of land reform.184 In 
the third section of Chapter Two, we present the geographical context and the political 
dynamics of the province of Cebu where our case studies are located.  
 
2.3 Cebu: Geographical and Political Context 
The previous overview of land reform in the Philippines provided us with some historical 
background on the issue. This next section aims at further contextualizing our case 
studies by providing information on the specific geographic region in which our four 
cases are located, i.e. in the province of Cebu. The archipelagic nature of the Philippines 
contributes to the highly fragmented character not only of its territory but also of its 
people, making the contextualization of the local dynamics of Cebu, in which our case 
studies unfold, essential.   
 
Map 2.1 The Province of Cebu: Cebu, Mactan, Camotes, and Bantayan Islands 
 
Source: Google Earth 
 
The term Cebu however refers to different geographical realities: an island, a province, a 
metropolitan area, and a city. More precisely Cebu city is part of the larger metropolitan 
area of Metro Cebu, which is located on the island of Cebu, and which is the capital of 
the province of Cebu. The province of Cebu, aside from the island of Cebu itself, also 
comprises the islands of Mactan, Bantayan, and Camotes. (See Map 2.1) The case studies 
discussed further are all located on the island of Cebu thus also in the province of Cebu. 
To avoid any confusion, we will use ‘Cebu’ to mean the province. Specific references to 
the island, the metropolitan area or the city will be indicated clearly. The first part of this 
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section presents the geographic characteristics of Cebu and of the wider Central Visayas 
region. The second part presents some of the main political dynamics and land reform 
actors in the province. 
 
2.3.1 Geographical Context 
The Central Visayas Region. The territory of the Philippines is physically divided into 
three main island groups: Luzon in the North, the Visayas in the center, and Mindanao in 
the South.  Administratively the country is also subdivided in 17 regions, 81 provinces, 
136 cities, 1,495 municipalities and 41, 995 barangays.185 The province of Cebu is located 
in the Central Visayas, also known as Region VII, which also comprises the provinces of 
Negros Oriental, Bohol and Siquijor. (See Map 2.2) The Central Visayas region includes 
16 cities, over 100 municipalities, and more than 3,000 barangays.186 The Central Visayas 
covers close to 15,000 km², or 6% of the total land area of the Philippines.187 The largest 
province, Negros Oriental, covers 36.1% of the region. It is followed by Cebu (34.1%), 
Bohol (27.5%) and Siquijor (2.3%).188 The Central Visayas also has the fifth largest 
population of the country with over six million inhabitants.189 More than 60% of the 
region’s population lives in Cebu province while Negros Oriental and Bohol account each 
for 19% of the population. Only 2% live in Siquijor.190   
 
In the Philippines, deforestation is a serious problem. It is caused largely by demographic 
pressures, which resulted in the ‘agrarian colonization’ of the country - particularly since 
the late 1940s - and by the extensive use of the slash and burn technique. Between 1946 
and 2000, the forest covered area of the country declined from 50% of the total land area 
to only 20%.191 The effects of that deforestation are particularly visible in the Central 
Visayas where soil erosion is causing a decline in agricultural production.192 The region is 
also the site of frequent typhoons combined with periods of drought which can last 
several months, generally between February and April.193 For the farmers, these typhoons 
often jeopardize their livelihoods, destroying their crops and homes.   
 
The Central Visayas are the second largest producer of sugarcane in the country. In 2007, 
the volume of production reached close to 3 million metric tons. This is seven times more 
than the region’s second agricultural product in importance: coconut. The region also 
produces fairly large amounts of bananas, cassava, mangoes, and camote (sweet 
potatoes)194 but it ranks last in the country for the production of rice.195 The four 
provinces actually engage in quite different agricultural activities. Negros Oriental is 
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known for its sugarcane production which amounts to 88% of the region’s total.196 Cebu’s 
main agriculture products are sugarcane and corn. It is the biggest corn producer of the 
region and its northern area produces yearly more than 300,000 mt of sugarcane, the other 
12% of the region’s total. Cebu also grows coconut, bananas, and mangoes.197 Bohol is 
mainly known for its tourist attractions such as the Chocolate Hills and the tarsiers but it 
is also the biggest rice producer of the region.198 Siquijor’s agricultural production in 
general is quite small and is mainly focused on bananas and coconuts.199   
 
Map 2.2 Cebu in the Central Visayas 
 
Source: Adapted from John Bresnan, ed. 1986. Crisis in the Philippines: The Marcos Era and Beyond. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
In sum, the Central Visayas is divided in four provinces: Negros Oriental, Cebu, Bohol, 
and Siquijor. The region is facing a decline in agricultural productivity because, in part, 
of deforestation. Typhoons are frequent and droughts often occur between February and 
April. The region is densely populated and most of its inhabitants live in Cebu. 
Sugarcane, which is mainly cultivated in Negros Oriental but also in northern Cebu, is the 
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main agricultural product of the region. In terms of subsistence crops, the Central Visayas 
in general and Cebu in particular rely heavily on corn. 
  
The Province of Cebu. Long before the arrival of the Spaniards in the 16th century, Cebu 
city was already a central port of sea trade in the region.  Thus it is no accident if the area 
was visited by Magellan in 1521 and if Spain made it its colonial capital between 1565 
and 1571.200  Cebu city was the first city established in the Philippines and Metro Cebu is 
today the second largest metropolitan area of the country after Manila. It is the 
commercial, industrial, cultural, religious, and educational center of the Central Visayas 
and northern Mindanao.201  The province of Cebu covers the whole Cebu island, as well 
as the adjacent islands of Mactan, Bantayan, and Camotes. (See Map 2.1) The province 
holds 6 cities, 44 municipalities and over 1,000 barangays.202 It is divided into two main 
areas: a highly urbanized area called Metro Cebu, and a more rural countryside. Metro 
Cebu lies at heart of the whole Visayas and spreads around Cebu City, the biggest city 
and capital of the province. It is highly urbanized and has a population of about 800,000 
inhabitants. Metro Cebu covers about 20% of the land area in the province and is host to 
more than 60% of its population. The development of industries around Metro Cebu is 
dynamic but insufficient to absorb the surplus of man power coming from the rural areas.  
 
The island of Cebu stretches 220 kilometers long and only 41 kilometers large at its 
widest point, covering a land area of over 500,000 hectares. The province has a 
mountainous backbone running on 160 kilometers of its length203, surrounded by narrow 
coastal lowlands, a common characteristic of most Philippine islands.204 On the island the 
largest lowlands are located in the north, which explains why all of Cebu’s sugar lands - 
which require extensive agriculture - are located in the area. The soil of coastal areas in 
Cebu is mainly made of limestone and is relatively fertile for most agricultural crops 
except rice.205 However, the degree of erosion caused by deforestation is severe on about 
60% of the land.206 A large portion of the land under cultivation is also located on very 
steep slopes both because of the islands geographical features and population increase.207 
The population distribution pattern in Cebu is essentially peripheral, with people settling 
mostly in the lowland coastal area rather than in the central mountainous region.208 Cebu 
is the country’s most densely populated province and the population pressure has reached 
serious proportion.209 
 
43 
 
 
 
The droughty nature of the soil in Cebu makes it difficult to grow rice. Thus most 
Cebuanos favor the cultivation of corn, which is planted on more than 50% of the 
cultivated area even if its productivity is low.210  In 2007, Cebu produced over 100,000 
mt of corn compared to a little more than 14,000 mt of rice.211  This trend is particular to 
Cebu since rice production at the national level is almost three times higher than corn 
production.212 Cebu is also known for its sugarcane production in the north of the 
island213, its export-quality mangoes and huge copra processing factories.214  
 
2.3.2 Political Context 
DAR’s Accomplishment in Cebu. The land distribution accomplishment of the DAR in the 
region of the Central Visayas in general and in the province of Cebu in particular may not 
tell the whole story of what is happening on the ground. These numbers however do 
indicate certain trends and patterns when compared geographically. Thus it is interesting 
to note that, while the DAR’s rate of accomplishment at the national level was at 80% in 
December 2008, it was only at 64% in the Central Visayas.215   
 
The first explanation that comes to mind to explain this result is that the bulk of 
landholdings yet to redistribute in the region are the large and highly contentious sugar 
haciendas of Negros Oriental. In terms of hectares, this assumption is correct. In Negros 
Oriental, the balance of hectares to redistribute covers more than 40,000 hectares while it 
covers a little more than 30,000 hectares in Cebu, 10,000 hectares in Bohol, and less than 
1,000 hectares in Siquijor.216 In terms of percentage however, it is a different story. 
Negros Oriental actually has a 70% rate of accomplishment while Cebu’s rate is only 
44%: the third worst among the 8l provinces of the country.217 This is not to say that the 
implementation of land reform faces less resistance in Negros Oriental than in Cebu. A 
closer look at the statistics shows that while legal titles have been issued for 70% of the 
lands covered by the CARP in Negros Oriental, the actual physical installation the ARBs 
has been problematic. The low accomplishment rate in Cebu however is a clear indication 
of strong landowner resistance in the province. 
 
The Traditional Elite of Cebu. The ability of landowners to resist land reform generally 
stems from their economic and political power, and the traditional landed elite in the 
Philippines has dominated the economic sphere and controlled state power ever since the 
colonial days. As McCoy argues, the way politics unfold in the Philippines is largely the 
result of a « paradoxical relationship between a weak state and a strong society ».218 The 
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fundamental role attributed to kinship in Filipino culture, combined with the development 
of a bureaucratic apparatus based on foreign (Spanish and American) laws and 
practices219, created a system in which elite families often enjoy more legitimacy than the 
state, and in which they use the latter for their own profit and patronage.  
 
Thus in Cebu, politics are dominated by the landed elite. This dominance is epitomized 
by the almost uninterrupted rule of the Osmeña family in the province ever since Sergio 
Osmeña Sr. won the Cebu governorship in 1906 and became President between 1944 and 
1946.220 In 1961, Osmeña Sr. owned 1,700 hectares of land in Cebu.221 But aside from the 
Osmeñas, other landed families have also traditionally dominated small-town politics 
around the province: the Escarios in Bantayan, the Pepitos in Consolacion, the Almagros 
in Dalaguete, the Ursals in San Remigio, the Gantuangcos in Carcar and Aloguinsan, 
etc.222 According to Sidel, the preeminence of these landed dynasties in Cebu reflects the 
fact that, historically, the province has largely fell outside the control of the central state 
and was left in the hands of private capitalists with roots in Cebu City.223   
 
Two of these landed families are represented in our case studies.224 In Salacan, the 
contentious landholding belonged to Vicente Cantong. Although not a politician himself, 
Cantong married in 1964 the daughter of José Briones, former provincial governor of 
Cebu and two time congressman, as well as a close ally of the Osmeñas.225 Cantong’s 
father was also a congressman in Mindanao until 1992.226 The Cantongs diversified their 
interests over the years and now own an interisland shipping company, a paper mill, two 
fishing companies, a food-processing conglomerate, plantations, cattle ranches, prawn 
farms and piggeries in Cebu and Mindanao.227  
 
In Dalag and Kalimpak, the land struggles described in our case studies took place on 
landholdings which belonged to Graciela Vergara. The Vergaras are a prominent family 
of Cebu and own land in several parts of the province, including in Toledo, Balamban, 
Minglanilla, Medellin, and Cebu City. Doña Graciela was the grand-daughter of Nicasio 
Chiong Veloso, one of the wealthiest Chinese residents of Cebu at the turn of the 20th 
century and a relative of Sergio Osmeña Sr., President of the Philippines.228 Her grand-
children have inherited her landholdings and two of them, Armando and Marisa, now 
operate a corporation named after her. Since 2006, this corporation has been involved in 
the development of an upscale residential project on a 214-hectare property inherited 
from Graciela near Cebu City.229   
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Landowner Resistance in the North. The north of the province of Cebu is host to vast 
tracks of land planted with sugarcane. The powerful landowners of this region are 
opposing strong resistance to the implementation of land reform by trying to have their 
landholdings exempted from CARP coverage or by delaying the process as much as they 
possibly can through legal and extra-legal means. Many of these landowners have even 
forged an unofficial alliance called the United Cebu Landowners Association (UCLA).230 
In the political arena, they could also count on a Cebu Congressman, who was also the 
legal counsel of sugarcane planters’ groups, to question the inclusion of sugar lands in the 
CARP through a petition to the Supreme Court. After the petition was rejected in 2007, 
the Congressman filed a Motion for Reconsideration and said he would campaign against 
the extension of the CARP after it expires in 2008.231   
 
Land Conversions. Another problem which constrains CARP implementation in Cebu, 
along with landowner resistance, is the issue of land conversions. Between 1991 and 
2002 alone, Cebu lost about 10% of its total farm land - more than 15,000 hectares - 
largely as a result of these conversions.232 And according to rural advocates in the region, 
the trend has been growing significantly in the last few years, in particular around Cebu 
City.233 The rapid industrialization of Cebu City and the enlargement of its urban area 
have led to numerous conversions of farm land into fancy subdivisions, golf courses and 
commercial areas. But although Metro Cebu is depicted as a rapidly industrializing 
region, the fact remains that most peasants of the province still relies on agricultural 
production for their subsistence. New commercial establishments and export-processing 
zones already fail to absorb the numerous landless peasants migrating to the city in search 
of employment, contributing to an increasing mass of urban poor. It is doubtful that more 
land conversion will remedy the situation.  
 
Civil Society Organizations in Cebu. In their struggle for land reform, the Cebu peasants 
unfortunately have a limited number of resources to turn to. In the mid-1990s, when the 
government decided to put together the Task Force Sugarland to facilitate the 
implementation of land reform on sugar lands, a dozen CSOs were established in the 
northern part of Cebu. The government funding for these CSOs however lasted only one 
year and, consequently, most CSOs disappeared as quickly as the funds.234 Some of them 
also reoriented their work away from redistribution of land toward the provision of 
support services and credit for the farmers. Thus the only CSOs still involved in land 
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reform struggles to this day in Cebu are PhilNet and FARDEC. In the North, farmers 
have also created an alliance called ASUCAR.  
 
The Philippine Network of Rural Development Institutes, Inc. or PhilNet-RDI is a 
network of rural development NGOs and individuals working for rural democratization 
and development at the barangay, municipal, provincial, regional and national levels. Its 
original members are provincial rural development institutes (RDIs). PhiNet started its 
operations in 1997 and has received financial support through the years from international 
agencies such as the Interchurch Cooperation for Development Cooperation (ICCO), 
Christian Aid, Oxfam, and others.235  PhilNet focuses on self-determination for local 
communities, equity, ecological sustainability, gender equality, respect for human rights 
and cultures, as well as on the empowerment of marginalized rural sectors and peoples.236 
PhilNet has a Regional Office in the Visayas, based in Cebu City, which is involved in 
land reform struggles. It is particularly active in the north, in sugar land areas.  
 
The Central Visayas Farmers' Development Centre (FARDEC) was established in 1989 
to act as the voice of poor farmers in the region. It has offices in Cebu, Bohol, and Negros 
Oriental. FARDEC is committed to complement and strengthen the collective efforts and 
capabilities of the peasantry to address local problems, protect their rights, uplift their 
socio-economic well-being, and sustain their political gains.237 The organization conducts 
a research and advocacy program on agriculture and is involved in land reform struggles. 
The focus of FARDEC is broader than land redistribution and includes issues of 
sustainable development and food security. The organization hosts two radio broadcasts 
aired in the Visayas and Mindanao, providing farmers with a tribune to discuss issues of 
concern. FARDEC works closely with the leftist organization KMP and believes in the 
necessity to engage DAR officials as part of their strategy to implement land reform.238 
The organization is involved in land reform struggles in Cebu but not on the sugar lands. 
 
The Alliance of Sugarland Communities of Agrarian Reform (ASUCAR) is an alliance of 
eight People Organizations representing farming communities in Bogo-Medellin, in the 
northern part of Cebu. ASUCAR was established in 1996 and has for mandate to provide 
technical help to its members, as well as help its CARP beneficiaries to prepare their 
installation. They are in close contact with PhilNet which provide them with legal and 
leadership training. Thus they are involved in both facilitating the implementation of land 
reform for their members and improving their livelihoods through various initiatives. In 
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2008 for example, ASUCAR launched the ASUCAR Savings and Credit Micro-Fund, a 
micro-credit initiative in Bogo-Medellin.239  
 
2.3 Summary of Chapter Two 
In summary, the issue of land reform in the Philippines has been on the agenda ever since 
the introduction of the encomienda system under Spanish colonization initiated a process 
of massive land concentration in the hands of a few. Free trade and the switch to an 
export-oriented agriculture created new incentives for land accumulation under the 
colonial regimes of both Spain and the United States. Since the country’s independence, 
agrarian unrest continued to grow and successive administrations have failed to 
implement anything more than inefficient land reforms. Under Martial Law in the early 
1970s, Marcos introduced the PD 27 land reform program which targeted the 
redistribution of rice and corn lands. The program did not live up to its expectations and 
was replaced by the CARP in 1988 after the ousting of Marcos and the return to 
democracy.  
 
The CARP is an agrarian reform program which covers all lands regardless of crops and 
tenurial arrangements, and its objectives are to promote social justice and rural 
development through the redistribution of 9 million hectares of farm land to landless 
peasants. The land reform aspect of the program can be divided into four key processes: 
land coverage, identification of ARBs, land compensation, and installation of ARBs. 
Between 1988 and 2008, four administrations have been implementing the CARP and 
redistributed 82% of the target in hectares.  
 
Cebu is a province located in the Central Visayas and it is geographically divided 
between a mountainous backbone and coastal areas. It is also divided between the 
industrialized area of Metro Cebu and the rural countryside where farmers grow mainly 
corn, all around the province, and sugar in the northern area.  The DAR’s land reform 
accomplishments in Cebu have been among the worst in the country, underscoring the 
strong opposition to land reform of the traditional landed elite of the province. In a 
state/society-driven land reform program such as CARP, this landowner resistance to key 
CARP processes in contentious structural settings can however be countered in part by 
peasants using the bibingka strategy.   And in their struggle for land, the peasants of Cebu 
have been able to rely over the years on the help of PhilNet and FARDEC, two CSOs 
involved in land redistribution cases. 
             CHAPTER THREE: 
CASE STUDY OF SALACAN, ASTURIAS 
 
This case study is the only one in which peasants have opted for a risk avoidance strategy 
during their land reform struggle. It shows that although a case involving a corn land and 
tenants may lead to only weak landowner resistance to all four key CARP processes of 
land reform, the use of a risk avoidance strategy weakens the expected implementation 
outcome. This reinforces the idea that peasant mobilization is a necessary condition for a 
full implementation of land reform, even in cases that are only somewhat contentious. 
 
In Chapter Three, we present the case study of the Salacan farmers in Asturias. In Section 
3.1, we introduce the case study by showing how it relates to our two research questions 
and by describing the contextual background of Salacan and Asturias. In Section 3.2,  we 
tell the story of the peasants’ struggle for land from the time of Martial Law and PD 27 
under Marcos in the 1970s to the inclusion and installation of farmworkers from an 
adjacent landholding on the tenants’ land in 2008. In Section 3.3, we address our two 
research questions through a within-case analysis by looking first at the influence of the 
type of crop and the tenurial status on the four key CARP processes of land reform; and 
second at the combined influence of the structural setting and the peasant strategy on the 
implementation outcome. In Section 3.4, we end with a . 
 
Map 3.1 Asturias in the Province of Cebu 
 
Source: Adapted from Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Province of Cebu. 2008. 
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3.1 Introduction to the Case Study 
3.1.1 First Research Question 
The case of Salacan features a group of 91 tenants and a 130-hectare corn land. The fact 
that farmers cultivate corn, which has little market value, is a facilitating structural 
feature. Therefore we expect landowner resistance to be weak during the processes of 
land coverage and land compensation. The presence of tenants is also a facilitating 
structural feature and is expected to lead to weak landowner resistance to the processes of 
ARB identification and ARB installation. (See Table 1.4) According to our typology of 
structural settings, when landowner resistance is weak to all four key CARP processes, 
the structural setting in which the land struggle takes place is considered only somewhat 
contentious. (See Table 1.5) This structural setting is then used as an independent 
variable in the second research question. 
 
3.1.2 Second Research Question 
In the somewhat structural setting of Salacan, our conceptual model predicts that a 
minimum of peasant mobilization will lead to a full implementation of land reform. The 
peasants of Salacan however have opted for a risk avoidance strategy by which they 
chose not to mobilize and not to seek allies among CSOs. Their decision not to get 
involved with CSOs was based on the peasant leaders’ fear that it would create tensions 
with the landowner and thus delay the implementation further.240 The lack of peasant 
mobilization itself can be explained in two ways: most peasants of Salacan had very little 
knowledge of the details surrounding their own case, leaving their leaders responsible for 
dealing with the land reform implementation; and those peasant leaders chose to avoid 
any possible conflict with the landowner because they feared retribution. As a process 
variable, the peasant strategy affects the implementation outcome. In this specific case, 
because the minimum of peasant mobilization has not been met, the outcome of the land 
reform process is expected to be weakened. Thus rather than a full implementation, the 
outcome of the land struggle in Salacan is expected to be a partial implementation. (See 
Table 1.7) 
 
3.1.3 Contextual Background 
This case study is set in Salacan, a barangay that covers 575 hectares of agricultural land 
and a total land area of 822 hectares.241 Salacan has a population of less than 3,000 
inhabitants242 and is one of the 27 barangays of Asturias, a municipality of about 40,000 
people located in the northwest part of the island of Cebu.243 In Salacan, 186 farmers 
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were working as tenants or farmworkers on two adjacent landholdings. The first 
landholding covered 130 hectares and was tenanted by 91 farmers who planted corn as 
well as a few other vegetables on individual lots of one or two hectares. The second 
landholding covered 337 hectares of land classified as commercial and on which 95 
farmworkers were planting different fruit crops (mangoes, coconuts, and pineapples) 
and/or working in the piggery. These two adjacent landholdings belonged to Vicente 
Cantong, president of an agro-food corporation and prominent member of Cebu’s landed 
elite. The 130-hectare landholding was supposed to be covered under PD 27 since the 
1970s and was put under CARP coverage because it had not been redistributed yet. The 
337-hectare commercial landholding was to be put under CARP coverage but was 
granted a 10-year deferment because of its commercial status, making it available for 
coverage and redistribution in 1998. We include the 337-hectare in our discussion of the 
land struggle because it had a significant impact on the implementation outcome for the 
tenants of the corn land.  
 
The tenants of the 130-hectare landholding practiced subsistence farming and grew 
mainly corn which they could plant three times a year and harvest after only 90 days.244 
During the rainy season, around October and November, they planted vegetables such as 
camote (sweet potato), eggplants, okra and cassava instead because corn does not grow 
well with too much rain.245 They also grew saging (bananas) and other fruits. When there 
were surpluses, these were sold in the local market.246 But with individual lots of more or 
less one hectare, surpluses were rare.247 In fact, tenants often joined the farmworkers of 
the area – most of whom are their relatives – to look for part-time employment on the 
larger commercial landholding of Cantong, harvesting fruits or working in the piggery, to 
make a little extra income. Tenants and farmworkers alike also found part-time jobs on 
nearby farms or in carpentry.248 
 
3.2 The Land Struggle of Salacan Peasants 
Barangay Salacan is located about 7 km away from the Poblacion and the main road that 
goes around the island of Cebu. To reach the barangay from there, those who can afford it 
share a tricycle; others walk or use bicycles. But what can be a pleasant and bumpy ride 
on sunny days can rapidly turn into a muddy and dirty one when rain comes. In this 
peasant community however, people do not complain much about dirt or mud. 
Translating the words of Rodolfo Bardalosa - a peasant leader of Salacan - a DAR official 
had this to say about the farmer’s expectations: 
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He just wants to be developed equally and normally. He doesn’t need to be a millionaire: just to 
have a standard quality of life. That they can eat three times a day, two snacks and three meals. 
And the children can go to school. And the family will improve.249  
 
It is the hope of Mr. Bardalosa but also of Timong Hernandez, Efren Tamayo, Joseph 
Caraig, Bartolome Signo, Felipe Sagoy, Emanuel Saladaga and the other new small 
owners of Salacan that CARP can help them fulfill these aspirations.250   
 
In the 1970s, the 130-hectare corn land had already been targeted for land distribution 
under the OLT mechanism of Marcos’ PD 27. As in many other cases however, the 
program fell short of redistributing the land during that period and the peasants remained 
tenants with a sharecropping arrangement under which they had to give 1/3 of their 
harvest to the landowner.251 A first positive change brought about by the introduction of 
CARP in 1988 was the improvement of the sharecropping arrangement in favour of the 
farmers: tenants now had to give their landowner 1/4 of their harvest rather than 1/3. In 
1989, farmers were told by DAR officials that their land would be covered under 
CARP.252 However most peasants of Salacan did not follow the issue closely and the land 
was officially covered by the DAR only eleven years later.  
 
Adjacent to the 130-hectare corn land was a much bigger 337-hectare land belonging to 
the landowner and which was also identified by the CARP as a landholding to be 
redistributed. Cantong however asked that it be exempted from coverage on the basis that 
it was a commercial farm. At the time, the 337-hectare was mainly planted with fruits 
crops but also comprised a 5-hectare piggery and a 20-hectare prawn farm.253 The 95 
farmworkers who were employed on that land were mainly relatives of the corn tenants 
and would have qualified as ARBs under the terms of Section 22 of RA 6657.254 Due to a 
combination of legal procedures initiated by the landowner and the lack of mobilization 
of the farmworkers and tenants throughout the implementation however, that land was 
never redistributed. 
 
In March 1990 the landowner secured an Order of Deferment of ten years from the DAR 
for the 337-hectare commercial lot, covering the period between 1988 and 1998.255 It 
should be noted that this was an Order of Deferment and not an Exemption from 
Coverage, which means that the 337 hectares were still supposed to be redistributed to the 
farmers of the area in 1998. Not satisfied with having his commercial land simply 
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deferred however, Cantong filed a Letter for Reconsideration with the DAR in June 1990 
to have it completely exempted from CARP coverage. In November 1990, the Regional 
Director dismissed Cantong’s claim for lack of merit. Cantong appealed the decision in 
January 1991 but the appeal was dismissed as well in February 1991 by the Regional 
Director: the Order of Deferment was officially affirmed but redistribution was to be 
enforced in 1998.256  
 
Meanwhile in 1992, the corn tenants of Salacan created their own farmer organization, 
POMAG, to conform with CARP’s requirements. 257 POMAG initially included only the 
tenants and it is only years later, in 2007, that farmworkers like Joseph Caraig would join 
them.258 The organization was never very active in terms of peasant mobilization to push 
for land reform implementation however. It was used mainly by the DAR and the DA to 
convey information about the land distribution process, hold seminars, introduce farmers 
to organic fertilizers, and distribute seeds.259  It served as a vehicle for the government 
agencies to provide technical help to the farmers but not as an instrument of mobilization 
for land redistribution. 
 
The absence of peasant mobilization was also accompanied by the farmers’ rejection of 
CSO involvement in their case. In the 1990s, members of Anakpawis, a leftist political 
organization, protested against the deferment accorded to Cantong during their annual 
CARP-focused rallies in Cebu City and warned against an eventual exemption of the 
land. 260 The farmers themselves however were not involved in these rallies and declined 
Anakpawis’ offer to help them secure the redistribution not only of the 130-hectare corn 
land but also of the 337-hectare deferred commercial land.261 Peasants thus followed the 
advice of DAR officials in the area not to involve Leftist organizations in the process as 
this could generate conflicts with the landowner and delay the redistribution process 
further. Asked what they did to ensure they would receive the land, Felipe Sagoy had this 
answer: « Nothing. When they said they will distribute it to us, we just accepted it. It’s 
fine with us: we don’t want chaos ».262 Similar answers were given by other peasants, 
illustrating their lack of mobilization in the case, as well as their fear of getting involved 
with civil society groups which could bring ‘chaos’ to the area.  As the implementing 
agency, the DAR was viewed by peasants as the only ally they needed.263 Thus the 
peasant leaders of Salacan consciously opted for a risk avoidance strategy.  
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In 1998, with the Order of Deferment coming to an end, Cantong renewed its legal efforts 
to avoid land coverage. In August 1998, he sent a letter to the Regional Director of 
Region VII to indicate his intention to apply for labour administration and profit sharing 
as an alternative to physical land distribution.264 This land reform mechanism is designed 
to avoid physical land distribution by offering ARBs equities and management rights in a 
corporation rather than the land itself. When the application was dismissed by the 
Regional Director in January 1999, Cantong filed a Motion for Reconsideration of that 
decision in April 1999. The motion was dismissed as well in November for lack of merit 
and an Order of Finality was issued in July 2002.265 The fact that Cantong applied for 
labour administration and profit sharing to avoid physical land redistribution was a tacit 
but strong acknowledgement that the commercial land was up for redistribution.266 
 
In May 2000 the MARO of Asturias sent a NOC to Cantong, informing him that the 130-
hectare corn land was covered under CARP and that the Land Bank was about to produce 
a Memorandum of Valuation for the land.267 It is not clear exactly what took so long for 
the corn land to finally be identified for coverage268 but the issuance of the NOC for the 
130-hectare coincided with the end of the deferment period for the 337-hectare in 1998 
and the dismissal of the landowner’s application for the profit-sharing scheme in 1999. 
Thus there seemed to have been no resistance of the landowner to the land coverage 
process itself for the corn lot but the legal actions he took to have the 337-hectare 
exempted or deferred may have interfered with the process. After the reception of the 
NOC, Mr. Bardalosa said that Cantong expressed his will to place the corn lot under the 
VOS mechanism.269 By doing so, the landowner would see the cash portion of his 
compensation payment increased by 5%. 
 
During the identification of the ARBs for the corn land, peasants said that far from 
interfering with the process, Cantong facilitated it by preparing the list and consulting 
with the tenants.270 There was no mention however of a list of ARBs for the 337-hectare 
landholding. Consistent with their risk avoidance strategy for some – or unaware of the 
issue for others - the Salacan peasants did not ask for ARBs to be listed for the 
redistribution of the commercial lot.    
 
Regarding the land compensation process for the 130-hectare landholding, Cantong did 
put up some legal resistance by challenging the Land Bank’s initial valuation of the land, 
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which was set at P8 million and filed a petition to increase the compensation payment.271 
The peasants had a dialogue with the landowner and tried, without success, to convince 
him to lower his price.272 The case lingered until August 2006 when the Regional 
Adjudication Board of Region VII finally issued a decision setting the compensation 
price at P10 million.273 This legal manoeuvre delayed the process for six years. However, 
despite the fact that CARP regulations normally authorize the installation of ARBs only 
after the former landowner has been compensated by the Land Bank, Cantong did not use 
this delay to prevent the installation of the ARBs. The installation actually occurred three 
years before the final decision was made regarding the compensation. Thus although 
there was some resistance from the landowner to that process, it cannot be described as 
strong. 
 
In August 2003, the mother CLOA was issued for the 91 tenants tilling the 130-hectare 
corn land, granting them ownership over a little more than a hectare each.274 Because they 
were already living on the land they tilled, the tenants were automatically installed, 
becoming small landowners and starting the amortization payments to the Land Bank. 
There was no resistance to this process by the landowner. On the other hand, the 
farmworkers of the adjacent 337-hectare remained landless. After complaining to the 
MARO and discussing the situation with the new smallholders, it was agreed that the 
former tenants would give away a part of their land to accommodate the farmworkers. 
Asked by the DAR if the farmworkers should remain excluded from the list of ARBs, a 
leader of the Salacan peasants had this reply: « I told them they can’t do that. It will be a 
big chaos. There might even be killings. »275 Thus a procedure of inclusion was initiated 
to identify the potential ARBs among the farmworkers and a raffle was organized by the 
BARC Chairman to lead to the re-redistribution the 130 hectares between the 91 former 
tenants and 95 farmworkers. 
 
Meanwhile Cantong was still trying to get his 337-hectare landholding exempted from 
coverage and filed a petition claiming an exemption from land coverage based on the 
following arguments: 206 hectares were used for the piggery, 39 hectares for cattle, 38 
hectares for a residential area, 31 hectares for a prawn farm, and 23 hectares for an 
airport. A special committee was put together to examine Cantong’s claims and, in June 
2004, a team of DAR officials conducted an on-site investigation and an ocular inspection 
of the land.276 Their conclusion was clear: « Viewed from the foregoing, it can be clearly 
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inferred that applicant corporation has deliberately violated the Order of Deferment 
issued by the Regional Director on March 15, 1990. »277 The foregoing in question was 
the fact that Cantong had increased the size of his piggery from 5 to 206 hectares since 
1988 and that he could not prove that he was into cattle-raising before that year.278 CARP 
regulations stipulate the following:  
 
Any act of the landowner to change or convert his agricultural land to livestock, poultry and 
swine raising after 15 June 1988, with the intent to avoid application from RA No.6657 to his 
landholdings, shall be considered invalid and illegal and shall not affect the coverage of his 
landholding under CARP.279   
 
In September 2004, following the recommendations of the special committee, the 
Regional Director thus decided to grant only a 40-hectare exemption to Cantong for his 
piggery - based on the number of pigs present before 1988 - and to examine the exact size 
of the prawn farm before granting the 31 hectare exemption that was applied for. All in 
all, between 40 and 71 hectares was to be exempted, leaving at least 266 hectares to be 
redistributed by CARP. The Regional Director also recommended that proper legal action 
be taken against Cantong for violating the terms of the Order of Deferment.  
 
Cantong was not deterred and immediately filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Just a few 
months later, in February 2005, the Regional Director made a surprising move by 
reversing his own decision, granting the exemption for the whole 337 hectares to Cantong 
on the basis that the landholding « has never been tenanted or worked by any tenant, but 
only by season farmworkers ».280 The decision puzzled the legal division of the DAR 
which sent a letter to the Regional Director asking for explanation.281 The argument of the 
Regional Director was illegitimate for two reasons. First, peasants do not need to be 
tenants or regular farmworkers to be eligible ARBs: seasonal farmworkers are clearly 
identified as potential ARBs under CARP. And even if there were no farmworkers, the 
law requires finding other potential ARBs living in the municipality.282 Second, people in 
the legal office are questioning the jurisdiction of the Regional Director to issue an Order 
of Exemption on a landholding larger than 5 hectares.283 The issue has triggered an 
internal investigation and the Regional Director has since been transferred to 
Mindanao.284  
 
The 186 ARBs who ended up sharing the corn land and individually owning a meagre 0.7 
hectare of land285 would clearly have benefited from the redistribution of these 329 
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hectares. Added to the corn land and divided equally, it would have provided the 
smallholders with about 2.5 hectares each, just about enough land to ensure the 
subsistence of their families, and closer the three-hectare ceiling ARBs are entitled to 
individually. Instead, they are confined to their minuscule lots and forced to find second 
jobs. As of January 2006, there was still a window of opportunity for the peasants to seize 
as they could have appealed the decision which granted the 337-hectare exemption to 
Cantong. People within the DAR even said that they would have supported the peasants’ 
appeal but that unfortunately they « didn’t hear any complaints from the farmers in that 
area ».286 Thus on May 15, 2006, because no appeal had been formulated after the 
decision of the Regional Director to exempt the 337-hectare landholding from CARP 
coverage, an Order of Finality was issued.287 This order prevented any future appeal of 
the decision and sealed the deal for Cantong.  
 
In August 2007, the PARCCOM288 sent a letter to the Regional Director requesting a 
meeting to discuss the details of several cases of land redistribution, including the one of 
Salacan. The Regional Director did not bother to reply.289 Members of the PARCCOM 
then decided to investigate the case themselves by going to Salacan in October 2007. 
Although they announced their visit, they found the DAR office closed and empty upon 
their arrival. They did not have more luck in their attempt to visit the 337-hectare 
landholding as they were refused access by the security guards. The PARCCOM 
members however did meet with a few farmers of the area and learned that many were 
not aware that the 337 hectares had been exempted from coverage and that an Order of 
Finality was issued in May 2006.290 
 
Still in October 2007, the PARCCOM’s Chairman sent another letter to the Regional 
Director asking this time for written clarifications on the Salacan case, unconvinced that 
his decision to grant the exemption was legitimate.291 He also decided to write to the 
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC)292 to express his concerns about the 
persistent failure of the Regional Director to reply to the PARCCOM’s inquiries and to 
request an investigation of this and several other contentious cases in Cebu.293 Come 
December, neither the PARC nor the Regional Director had bothered to reply to the 
PARCCOM, prompting its Chairman to resign.294  
 
57 
 
 
 
It is in 2008 that the farmworkers were finally installed on the 130-hectare corn land, five 
years after the tenants. Most of them still work for Cantong on his commercial 
landholding. Asked why they did not mobilize against the 337-hectare exemption, a 
peasant who knew about the issue had this reply:  « No, we did not protest anymore. It 
should be the DAR: it’s their job. They did not. »295 Their risk avoidance strategy and 
exclusive reliance on the DAR in the end might have cost them the extra hectares they 
needed to be able to support their families without having to find part-time jobs. They are 
not bitter though. Former tenants say that since they were granted ownership, their 
income has increased and they can now afford to send their children to high school.296 
Lightheartedly, Mr. Bardalosa said they even expect to become millionaire now that they 
have legal titles.297 The reality is that these farmers still suffer from economic hardship 
despite the relative improvement of their situation.298 Now that their struggle for land 
redistribution is over however, they are hoping to receive the support services that they 
need to improve their condition. In the meantime, the Salacan farmers are developing a 
cooperative and have been recognized as a Special Agrarian Reform Community (ARC) 
in 2008. 299 They are hopeful that this will help them secure foreign funding for their 
development projects.  
 
3.3 Within-Case Analysis 
In this section, we apply our two research questions to the case study of Salacan. The first 
question asks: how do the type of crop and the tenurial status influence key processes of 
CARP implementation? In Salacan, the presence of corn had an influence on the 
processes of land coverage and land compensation while the presence of tenants had an 
influence on the processes of identification of the ARBs and the installation of the ARBs. 
The second questions asks: how does the peasant strategy influence the outcome of 
CARP implementation in particular structural settings? In this case, we look at the 
influence of the risk avoidance strategy chosen by the Salacan peasants in a somewhat 
contentious structural setting.  
 
3.3.1 Influence of Structural Features on Landowner Resistance.  
In Salacan, the presence of corn as the type of crop led to weak landowner resistance to 
two key CARP processes: land coverage and land compensation. The tenant status of the 
peasants also led to weak landowner resistance to the processes of identification of ARBs 
and installation. 
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 The Type of Crop and Landowner Resistance. The fact that the 130-hectare landholding 
was planted mainly with corn had a clear impact on the process of land coverage. When 
the DAR sent the NOC to Cantong in 2000, the landowner made no attempt to have it 
exempted from coverage, opting right away for a voluntary mechanism of redistribution, 
the VOS. There is some concern regarding the unusually long delay between the 
inauguration of CARP in 1988 and the issuance of a NOC in 2000 especially for a corn 
land that was already identified for redistribution under PD 27 in the 1970. The legal 
procedures initiated by the landowner to exempt his 337-hectare adjacent landholding 
seem to have delayed the beginning of the implementation process on the corn land 
although peasants and DAR officials did not confirm this assumption during the 
interviews. In any case, the strong landowner resistance was clearly directed at the land 
coverage process of the 337-hectare and not at that of the 130-hectare corn land. The 
decision of the landowner to place the corn landholding under the VOS mechanism, and 
the absence of a petition for exemption or deferment concerning that specific 
landholding, are signs of weak resistance on the part of the landowner to the land 
coverage process. This weak resistance is all the more obvious when compared to the 
energy deployed by Cantong to have the 337-hectare commercial landholding exempted 
from land coverage.  
 
The presence of corn as the type of crop also had an influence on the land compensation 
process. The Land Bank of the Philippines produced a Memorandum of Valuation for the 
130-hectare corn lot which established its value at P8 million. The immediate reaction of 
the landowner was to file a petition to increase the land compensation. Subsequent 
discussions between the peasant leaders of Salacan and the landowner failed to lead to an 
agreement on the value and the case lingered in court for six years. At first, this could be 
seen as strong resistance on the part of the landowner. However despite the legal 
challenge of Cantong regarding land compensation, the ARBs were installed in 2003, 
three years before the final court decision finally came and set the compensation at P10 
million. Under CARP, a landholding can only be acquired and redistributed to the ARBs 
after the Land Bank has made the compensation payment to the former landowner. In this 
case, we argue that landowner resistance was weak because although the landowner could 
have delayed the implementation process while he was waiting for his compensation, he 
decided not to. This decision may have been made by the landowner because he is ‘a 
good man’, as Joseph Caraig believes. We would argue that the low value of the corn 
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landholding compared to the adjacent commercial landholding was the main incentive for 
the weak resistance. By using a voluntary mechanism for redistribution and helping the 
corn tenants with the implementation process, Cantong was able to project the image of 
‘a good man’ and managed to avoid opposition from the peasants to the exemption of the 
337-hectare. 
 
The Tenurial Status and Landowner Resistance. The group of tenants faced no resistance 
from Cantong during the process of identification of the ARBs. The fact that these tenants 
had been cultivating and living on the same lots for years made the identification process 
an easy one. The relevance of the tenurial status as an independent variable which 
influences landowner resistance to the identification process can be seen in this case by 
looking at the situation of the farmworkers of the adjacent commercial landholding. 
These farmworkers were denied their right to the 337-hectare and were never identified 
as ARBs for that landholding. Instead, a procedure of inclusion was initiated to have them 
join the corn tenants on the 130-hectare landholding. An interesting feature of this case 
study is also that, according to the tenants themselves, the landowner not only opposed no 
resistance to their identification as ARBs but even helped them with the process.  
Considering that the landowner was trying to have his larger 337-hectare commercial 
landholding exempted from CARP coverage, facilitating the identification of the tenants 
and including the farmworkers on the corn lot may have been strategic: it gave a parcel of 
land to all potential ARBs of the area and left no one to claim rights over the commercial 
landholding. 
 
Because the tenants were already living on the land they tilled, their installation was a 
simple formality after their mother CLOA was issued in 2003. This installation came 
three years after the NOC was sent to the landowner, a reasonable delay by CARP 
standards. After it was decided to include the farmworkers on the corn land as well, a 
procedure to subdivide the lots between the 186 ARBs was initiated and it is only in 2008 
that everyone was installed for good. This however did not affect the ability of the former 
tenants to occupy the land and till it for their own benefit since 2003. There was no 
landowner resistance to that process.  
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3.3.2 Structural Setting, Peasant Strategy and Implementation Outcome  
The Salacan case study took place in a somewhat contentious structural setting because it 
combined two facilitating variables for the implementation process of land reform - the 
corn land and the tenant status – which led the landowner to oppose only weak resistance 
to all four key processes of land redistribution under CARP. In this somewhat contentious 
structural setting, the expected outcome of land reform implementation, provided a 
minimum of peasant mobilization, would have been a full implementation. In this case 
however, peasants chose a risk avoidance strategy which, as an process variable, weakens 
the outcome to a partial implementation.  
 
It took three years for the farmers of Salacan to receive their mother CLOA following the 
issuance of the NOC - a reasonable delay by CARP standards – and they were 
automatically installed upon its issuance in 2003. A full implementation however would 
have also meant the attribution of about 1.5 hectare of corn land per beneficiary: the 
amount to which they were entitled to when subdividing the 130 hectares between the 91 
tenants. To be sure, this was already too small for self-sufficiency. But because they 
chose not to engage with CSOs or put pressure on the DAR through mobilization, 
agreeing without protest to have the farmworkers installed on their corn land, their lots 
were further reduced to a meagre 0.7 hectare in 2008. The result of the risk avoidance 
strategy in Salacan is that the outcome of the land struggle was a partial implementation, 
rather than a full one, the former tenants ending up with smaller lots than what they were 
entitled to.  
 
The Salacan case study shows that although a case involving a corn land and tenants may 
lead to only weak landowner resistance to the four land reform processes aforementioned, 
the use of a risk avoidance strategy weakens the expected implementation outcome. As 
Jennifer Franco writes: « The avoidance of conflict is likely to result in poor claimants’ 
dispossession of land resources coveted by elite claim makers. »300  
 
The Choice of the Risk Avoidance Strategy. The support of tenants and farmworkers for 
that strategy was based on two things: the fear of clashes with Cantong for some, and the 
lack of information about the situation for others. Cantong has been described by certain 
DAR officials as a much more cooperative landowner than the majority.301 To be sure, 
the farmers themselves speak highly of Cantong, partly because he did not oppose the 
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redistribution of the 122-hectare corn lot. Joseph Caraig said: « He is a good man. He 
donated the land to the farmers so he must be a good man ».302 Since the livelihood of 
peasants in the area - farmworkers but also tenants - also largely depends on being hired 
by Cantong to work on the commercial lot, putting up a fight seemed too risky for many. 
So while farmers only expressed good words for their landowners during the interviews, 
some from the NGO community argue that the real reason behind the peasants’ lack of 
mobilization was the fear of retribution.303 Other farmers simply had no knowledge that 
the 337-hectare land was covered by CARP and that they were entitled to it as ARBs. A 
DAR official admitted that the farmers learned about the exemption process for the 
commercial farm only a few years ago and were angry at the former MARO for not 
telling them about it.304 Many of the farmers knew little about the land redistribution issue 
and seemed to rely on their peasant leaders rather than being involved themselves as these 
comments from two farmers show: 
 
We don’t know about that anymore. It’s just them who did the negotiation…we don’t know 
about it.305  
 
 It’s manong Roger and the others who received their lands earlier: they know about it. I 
just rely on them. They have more knowledge about it.306  
 
This lack of mobilization of the farmers and the absence of linkages with civil society 
allies seems all the more unfortunate that, as we mentioned earlier, their claim would 
have been supported by DAR officials. This suggests that, had farmers been informed, 
organized and willing to mobilize, an additional 258 hectares would have been distributed 
to them. 
 
3.4 Summary of the Salacan Case Study 
The Salacan case study showed that facilitating structural features such as the presence of 
a corn land and the tenant status of potential ARBs led, as expected, to only weak 
resistance from the landowner to all four key CARP processes. The presence of a land 
planted with a low-value subsistence crop such as corn led the landowner to voluntarily 
offer his landholding after it was covered by CARP and, although the landowner did try 
to secure the maximum profit from the sale of his landholding, he opposed only weak 
resistance to the land compensation process as well since he did not use the pending legal 
procedures to delay the implementation. The tenant status of the ARBs, on the other 
hand, made it very difficult for the landowner to oppose strong resistance to the processes 
of identification and installation of the ARBs as the farmers had been tilling and living on 
62 
 
 
 
the land for generations. Their installation was a formality and their identification was 
facilitated by the landowner. In the somewhat contentious case of Salacan, a minimum of 
peasant mobilization should have led to a full implementation of land reform. However, 
the peasants chose a risk avoidance strategy which in the end led to only a partial 
implementation in which each tenant received less than the 1.5 hectare they were entitled 
to initially. Because they were scared of the possible reaction of the landowner if they 
mobilized or involved a CSO in their case, the peasants relied solely on the DAR and 
were forced to accommodate the farmworkers of the adjacent commercial land, reducing 
the size of their individual lot to 0.7 hectare. The 337-hectare commercial landholding 
should have been redistributed to the farmworkers but the lack of peasant mobilization on 
both lands allowed the landowner to avoid land coverage and cost peasants the possibility 
of becoming self-sufficient.  
CHAPTER FOUR: 
CASE STUDYOF KALIMPAK, MINGLANILLA 
 
The case of Kalimpak shows that in a highly contentious structural setting where 
landowner resistance is strong to three of the four key CARP processes, the use of the 
bibingka strategy strengthens the implementation outcome of land reform. According to 
our conceptual model, in a highly contentious structural setting, simple peasant 
mobilization would have been expected to lead to a weak implementation. By using the 
bibingka strategy, peasants strengthened the implementation outcome which turned out to 
be a partial implementation. This case is the most challenging one for the conceptual 
model of our first research question because the landowner resistance has been stronger 
than expected to the process of land coverage. The presence of corn, according to our 
model, should have led to only weak resistance to that specific process. We argue that the 
unexpected strength of landowner resistance was caused by the prospect of land 
conversion which made this corn lot more valuable than it would have been under usual 
circumstances. This case underscores the need to take additional structural features into 
account in our model to predict the strength of landowner resistance.  
 
Map 4.1Minglanilla in the Province of Cebu 
 
Source: Adapted from Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Province of Cebu. 
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In Chapter Four, we present the case study of the Kalimpak farmers in Minglanilla. The 
Introduction to the Case Study in Section 4.1 shows how our two research questions 
apply to this case, and provides a contextual background of Kalimpak and Minglanilla. 
We follow with the presentation of the peasants’ land struggle story, in Section 4.2, 
starting in the 1950s when their land was grabbed until 2008 when the last ARBs were 
still waiting to be installed. Then in Section 4.3, we analyze our two research questions 
by looking first at the influence of the type of crop and the tenurial status on the four key 
CARP processes of land reform; and second at the combined influence of the structural 
setting in which the Kalimpak case takes place, and the peasant strategy used by peasants, 
on the implementation outcome. We conclude in Section 4.4. with a brief summary of our 
main findings. 
 
4.1 Introduction to the Case Study  
In this Introduction, we recall our two research questions and explain how our main 
hypothesises apply to this specific case. We also present the contextual background of 
Kalimpak and Minglanilla by providing some information about the geography, the 
demography and the economy of the area.  
 
4.1.1 First Research Question 
The case of the Kalimpak farmers concerns a 113-hectare landholding which is divided 
into two adjacent lots which we will refer to as Lot A (58 hectares) and Lot B (55 
hectares). The land was planted mainly with corn and the peasants had a farmworker 
status.  These farmworkers actually had an informal sharecropping arrangement with the 
landowner prior to CARP. For reasons that will be explained further, however, they were 
never granted the tenant status legally and thus fall into the farmworker category in the 
context of this research. The fact that the land was planted mainly with corn should lead, 
according to our conceptual model, to weak resistance from the landowner to the 
processes of land coverage and land compensation. The farmworker status of the peasants 
should lead to strong landowner resistance to the processes of identification of the ARBs 
and installation of the ARBs. 
 
4.1.2 Second Research Question 
The structural features (corn and farmworkers) identified in our first research question 
should lead, as mentioned above, to strong landowner resistance to two of the four key 
CARP processes of land reform. In this case however, the unexpected strength of 
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landowner resistance to the process of land coverage resulted in strong resistance to three 
key CARP processes rather than two, making the structural setting of Kalimpak highly 
contentious rather than moderately contentious. This is a challenge to the conceptual 
model we use for our first research question and an issue that will be discussed further in 
the within-case analysis (Section 4.3). As far as our second research question is 
concerned however, this does not represent a problem. As Table 1.5 shows, we identify 
the structural setting of a case based on the number of key CARP processes to which a 
landowner opposes strong resistance, and not in direct connection with the structural 
features.  
 
In a highly contentious structural setting such as in Kalimpak, the expected outcome of 
land reform implementation –based on a minimum of mobilization on the part of the 
peasants - is a weak implementation.  In this case however, the farmworkers chose to use 
the bibingka strategy in order to secure their rights over the 113-hectare landholding. The 
bibingka strategy involves the mobilization of peasants, the participation of a CSO - in 
this case FARDEC - and the engagement with DAR officials. As a process variable, the 
bibingka strategy used by the farmers should strengthen the expected implementation 
outcome. Thus rather than a weak implementation, the expected outcome of this case 
study should be a partial implementation in which beneficiaries should receive less land 
than entitled to or experience significant delay in their installation.   
 
4.1.3 Contextual Background 
This case study involves a land of 113 hectares, mainly planted with corn, located in the 
barangay of Kalimpak.307 In 2007, the population of Kalimpak was around 10,000 
inhabitants.308 Although Kalimpak has been classified as an urban area by the National 
Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB), a significant number of peasants still live and 
practice agriculture in the surrounding mountains. Kalimpak is part of Minglanilla, a 
municipality renamed by Father Sanchez - the first priest of the area in 1858 - in honor of 
his home town in Spain.309 The municipality is part of the Metro Cebu area and is located 
only 15 kilometres south of Cebu City, with the Bohol Strait to its east side. Minglanilla 
has a population rising above 100,000 inhabitants, is divided between 19 barangays, and 
covers over 6,560 hectares.310   
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On the economic level, Minglanilla benefits from Cebu City’s industrialization and is 
mainly a mixture of small and medium scale industries geared towards the production of 
handicrafts and other products for the local and domestic markets. Its proximity to Cebu 
City and Mactan Island’s international airport could help Minglanilla develop a tourism 
industry but for the moment only a few beach resorts cater to the local population and 
tourist facilities are non-existent. Because Metro Cebu’s growth also translates into 
increased waste dumping in the Bohol Strait, the municipality aims to move its tourism 
activities towards its cool highlands where recreation and vacation activities could be 
developed.311  
 
The municipality is mainly urbanized but some areas are still devoted to agriculture. 
Because of their geographical features these areas are difficult to farm. The region is 
mountainous and slopes of 25% or higher cover more than 85% of the land area. The 
terrain is generally rolling and hilly and, while this ensures that nearly 75% of the total 
land area is safe from flooding, it also makes the same area highly susceptible to soil 
erosion.312  
 
More than 100 families are currently living on the 113-hectare landholding.313 And 
despite its mountainous location, its rocky soils, and its slopes the land has been made 
productive over the years by hard-working farmers. These famers grow corn as well as a 
variety of fruits, vegetables and roots: coconut trees, mani (peanuts), pineapple, jackfruit, 
mangoes, saging (bananas), ube (a root crop), camote (sweet potato), cassava, malungay 
(small leaves), okra and others.314 Because the area does not hold much water, planting 
rice on a large scale is not a viable option for the farmers.315 Most of the products 
harvested are intended for family consumption but whatever surplus they have is sold in 
the local market. The little money that they make out of this trade is then used to purchase 
other basic necessities such as gas, salt, and dried fish.316 The coconuts are mainly 
destined to be sold outside the barangay.317 As Timoteo Sinag, the peasant leader of 
Kalimpak, sums it up: « We plant varieties of crops but corn is our number one priority 
».318   
 
4.2 The Land Struggle of Kalimpak Peasants 
Kalimpak sits in a mountainous area  surrounded by hills, cliffs, slopes and tortuous 
roads. From the only sari-sari store319 in the area, the coastline of the Bohol Strait is 
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visible between the coconut trees and the sparse houses of the farmers. The sari-sari is 
the local farmers main rendezvous point and, even more importantly for many, is host to 
the only videoke machine of the barangay. Timoteo Sinag, the owner of the sari-sari and 
long-time peasant leader of the area, owns a small house nearby which was being 
renovated during our visit, a sign that his financial situation had slightly improved since 
he became a small landowner. The peaceful surroundings of Kalimpak however do not 
echo only the hammering sounds of the farmers’ financial progress and the cheerful 
performances of local singing ‘stars’: they also resonate with the harsh and sometimes 
violent land struggle of the farmers which started well before CARP and lasted over 50 
years.  
 
The older farmers of the area still remember a time when only a few families were 
scattered over this land, growing corn, a few fruits and vegetables. The land had no 
official owner and these families lived free and were self-sufficient, unaware of the 
evolving rules and regulations pertaining to land ownership.320 In the 1950s however, the 
sheriff of Talisay City, Vergilio Sutarez, learned about this 113-hectare land and the fact 
that no one had claimed it legally.321 Working at the City Hall and aware of the legal 
procedures, he proceeded to claim the land title for himself. According to Manolita 
Alegria, a farmer, Sutarez easily fooled their grandparents who were ‘innocent’, 
‘illiterate’ and ‘ignorant’.322 They protested in vain when they heard that ownership had 
been awarded to Sutarez and they became tenants on their own land.323 Farmers who 
remember Sutarez - or what their grandparents told them about him - said that he was a 
rich and oppressive landowner who had controlled over the farmers.324  
 
After Sutarez died, the land was auctioned for sale to the highest bidder.325 Farmers were 
called to participate in the auction but having only farm products and no money, their 
chances of acquiring the land were less than good. The land was bought by Graciela 
Vergara and, for the second time, farmers were denied ownership of their land.326 With 
Vergara, farmers had an informal tenancy arrangement in which they were required to 
give her 1/3 of their harvest. This applied not only to corn but also to other crops such as 
saging and jackfruits.327 According to Damien Sinag, a farmer of Kalimpak,Vergara also 
forced the farmers to plant more profitable crops such as sugarcane, mangoes and 
coconuts.328 The farmers, instructed by Vergara’s overseer, thus planted coconut trees and 
were paid a meager 10 centavos per tree planted, and only when it had grown.329 Timoteo 
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Sinag say they had to collect the coconuts by climbing in the trees and were not even 
given a share. Some were especially angered by the fact that the landowner always 
received her share of the harvests but never invested in the land or in the farmers.330  
 
When PD 27 came along in the 1970s, the Vergaras feared they would lose the land if 
their farmers were identified as tenants of the corn land.  They first tried to delay the 
process by presenting an alternative list of beneficiaries. As a member of FARDEC says: 
 
There was another group being organized by another man who is very close to the 
landowner, to counter the legitimate farmers. So now the Land Bank was confused about 
whom, among these farmers who wanted to be beneficiaries, are the ones legitimately 
recognized by the Land Bank to have all their names be processed.331  
 
Then, Damien Sinag say the landowner made the farmers sign a document stating that 
they were paid to plant coconut trees and nothing more. The document could then be used 
legally to show that the farmers were farmworkers harvesting coconuts and not tenants of 
a corn land, making them ineligible beneficiaries under Marcos’ land reform. To make 
sure farmers would not cause any problems by claiming their rights, the landowner also 
tried to scare them away from the land.332 To do so, Vergara hired a former military man 
by the name of Amatorio Gutierez to visit the area and harass the farmers. This even 
resulted in the death of a farmer. 
 
And there is also a farmer who was killed by the hired goons of Aligato. I think it was 
also the tactics of the Villalon so that the farmers will be scared and driven away from the 
land. So the farmers became so frightened and they never could resist the harassment 
made by this military man, Aligato, they left their farm lands, leaving all their products 
behind. And then, they just lived in the periphery.333 
 
Gutierez would show up from time to time, accompanied by goons, and intimidated the 
farmers.334 This harassment was the most intense from the mid-1970s to the early 
1980s.335 After a few years, the tactic worked so well that the farmers left their land and 
houses behind to find refuge in the surrounding mountains. From then on, they lived on 
the periphery and were scared away by Gutierez and his men whenever they tried to till 
the land again.336 PD 27 being limited to tenanted land, the Vergaras did like many other 
landowners at the time and opted to keep their land idle rather than let tenants cultivate it 
by fear of losing their landholding if tenants could be identified.337  
 
When CARP came along in 1988, the farmers who were entitled to benefit from the 
coverage and redistribution of the 113-hectare landholding were still hiding to avoid 
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Gutierez’s harassment and knew next to nothing about the new land reform program. The 
land was left unproductive.  In the early 1990s, the peasants received visits from two 
CSOs: CREATE and KMP. CREATE was an NGO funded by the Philippine government 
to organize farmers and help them with the land reform process but it was active only for 
a short period of time due to lack of funding. KMP is the biggest farmer organization of 
the Philippines and pursues a genuine land reform program, often outside the legal 
framework of the CARP. It is also a member of the international peasant movement of La 
Via Campesina338 and is identified by the government as a leftist insurgent organization. 
KMP led an information campaign about CARP and the rights of the farmers under this 
program. In Kalimpak, farmers say that without KMP, they would not have known about 
CARP’s existence and mechanisms.339   
 
To avoid land coverage, the Vergaras carried on with their harassment tactics. The 
surprise attacks led by Gutierez and his men made peasants uneasy about trying to till 
their land again and kept them at a safe distance from their old farms. Police forces have 
even been posted in the area for some time to prevent farmers to live or plant on 
Vergaras’ land.340 The landowner legally recognized no tenants on the 113 hectares and 
thus successfully delayed the process of identification of ARBs.341   
 
While most of the peasants were scared and surely not about to engage in a struggle with 
the powerful landowner and her overseer at that time, a few leaders of the community 
sought advice from KMP on strategies to help them get their land back.342 In the mid-
1990s, the leadership from civil society actually came from FARDEC, an organization 
close to KMP, which joined the struggle and helped the farmers put together the legal 
requirements to process their claim to the land. FARDEC members first went door to 
door in the mountainous barangay to list the potential ARBs. Because farmers feared the 
landowner and the police, FARDEC had a lot of explaining and convincing to do. But 
eventually, farmers signed the official documents and applied as ARBs for the 113-
hectare landholding.343 Aside from being identified as potential ARBs, peasants were also 
required to form their own organization before the DAR could survey the landholding to 
be covered. So in 1995, FARDEC helped peasants set-up an organization called the 
United Farmers of Kalimpak.344 Farmers say the PO helped them to have the land 
surveyed345, to gain knowledge about the CARP implementation processes346, and to be 
able to make collective claims to the DAR.347  
70 
 
 
 
In the late 1990s, with the help of FARDEC and KMP, the peasants presented their list of 
potential ARBs and had a PO which was growing in strength. They were more organized 
and were pushing forward the land reform process despite the non-recognition of the 
tenants by Vergara and the harassment of Gutierez.  The landowner however came up 
with another tactic to delay the process: presenting an alternative list of potential ARBs. 
This list was filled with names of peasants who had never worked on the contentious land 
and who were not legitimate ARBs. These people agreed to have their names listed by 
Gutierez because they were promised that the landowner would buy back the land back 
from them after the redstribution, and that they would make an easy profit. Legally, the 
DAR had to take it into consideration and investigate. This further delayed the processing 
of the CLOA of the legitimate ARBs.348   
 
To push the land reform process forward, FARDEC and KMP started to mobilize support 
in favour of the farmers: professionals and industry workers expressed their support 
publicly; seminary students came to the area and assisted the farmers in their work; and 
nuns even came with presents around Christmas time.349 FARDEC also spread 
information about the land struggle on its two radio stations in the Visayas and invited 
radio and TV journalists of the major networks in Cebu to cover the story and interview 
the farmers. This created a public opinion favourable to the demands of the farmers.350 
Farmers themselves believe that the media attention forced the landowner and his allies to 
show some restraint and deterred them from resorting to harassment again.351  
 
Empowered by the support of FARDEC and KMP, half of the peasants participated in a 
land occupation in 1999, going back to their old farms and tilling the land again.352 
Having no official title to the land yet, some still feared harassment and would go back to 
their homes on the periphery at the end of the day.353 To pressure the DAR into avoiding 
further delays for the issuance of the CLOA, the peasants also mobilized by organizing a 
rally in front of the Regional Office of DAR in Cebu. This rally was important as it led 
the way to a direct encounter with the National Secretary of the DAR in 1998354 and to a 
series of dialogues between the DAR and FARDEC in 2000 and 2001.355 
 
These dialogues concerning land redistribution involved the municipal, provincial, and 
regional offices of the DAR. So while FARDEC was engaging the DAR officials, the 
farmers mobilized to support the dialogues and to pressure the DAR at various levels. 
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Manolito Alegria described his involvement in the mobilization at the municipal level in 
these terms: « We almost lived in the municipal hall of Minglanilla just to ensure that we 
will be identified as tenants ».356 At the provincial level, the farmers went to the DAR 
office during the dialogues with FARDEC, bringing along two sacks of rice and camping 
there to force the hands of the government officials.357   
 
A first mother CLOA was finally issued in 2001 for LOT A. A legal dispute over the 
ownership of the 55-hectare Lot B however was initiated by a businessman who claimed 
he had acquired it from the Vergaras and resulted in an additional implementation delay 
for the majority of peasants in Kalimpak. Although such a legal dispute cannot be 
identified as an act of resistance by the landowners, it shows once again the way in which 
DAR processes can impede land reform implementation. FARDEC argues that the fact 
that this protest was entertained well after the grace period within which such a complaint 
may be formulated had long expired is in itself suspicious.358    
 
The mother CLOA issued in 2001 allowed 27 beneficiaries and their families to settle 
permanently on the 58-hectare Lot A, and start building their houses. These 27 families 
are the children and grandchildren of the original farmers of the area, those who saw their 
land claimed by Sutarez in the late 1950s and bought by the Vergara family later on. The 
farmers were already physically on the land in 2001 because they had staged a land 
occupation since 1999. 
 
However, the legal procedures were not over on Lot B as a petition for inclusion was 
made, which forced the MARO to survey the area and re-identify the eligible ARBs for 
the 55-hectare lot.359 The DAR also had to wait for the court’s decision regarding the 
ownership of the lot in order to proceed with the compensation payment. Under CARP, a 
private landholding cannot be redistributed as long as the just compensation payment has 
not been made by the Land Bank to the former owner. In 2005, FARDEC and many of 
the farmers of Lot B launched a new land occupation, this time on the 55-hectare lot. The 
farmers thus started tilling the land but continued to leave the farm at the end of the day 
to spend the night in the periphery. In 2008, they had not started to build their houses yet 
and used only nipa huts360 to rest during the day.361 That year, it was ruled that the 
Vergaras were the legitimate owners of the lot and that they would be the ones to receive 
the compensation from the Land Bank. The MARO of Minglanilla was confident that the 
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mother CLOA would finally be emitted in 2009 for the 50 beneficiaries listed for the 55-
hectare Lot B.362 In August 2008, however, the revision of the list of ARBs had yet to be 
finalized.363  
 
4.3 Within-Case Analysis 
In this section, we analyze the case of Kalimpak through our two research questions to 
the case study of Kalimpak. The first question asks: how do the type of crop and the 
tenurial status influence key processes of CARP implementation? These structural 
features influence four key CARP processes: land coverage, identification of ARBs, land 
compensation, and installation of ARBs. The second question asks: how does the peasant 
strategy influence the outcome of CARP implementation in particular structural settings? 
This question allows us to see how the independent variable of structural setting interacts 
with the process variable of peasant strategy to influence the implementation outcome of 
the land reform struggle.  
 
4.3.1 The Influence of Structural Features on Landowner Resistance 
In Kalimpak, the presence of a corn land led, as anticipated, to weak landowner resistance 
to the process of land compensation. However it also led to strong resistance to the 
process of land coverage. This unexpectedly strong resistance may be linked to the 
prospect of land conversion which increased the potential value of the land. The presence 
of farmworkers in turn had an influence on the processes of identification of the ARBs 
and the installation of the ARBs which were strongly opposed by the landowner. 
 
The Type of Crop and Landowner Resistance. The fact that the 113-hectare landholding 
was mainly planted with corn led as expected to only weak landowner resistance to the 
process of land compensation. The peasants, NGO members and DAR officials 
interviewed made no allusion to such resistance and the legal dispute over the ownership 
of the Lot B cannot be identified as resistance to this specific process because it was not 
initiated by the landowner the dispute was not initiated to secure a higher compensation 
but by a third-party to dispute ownership rights.  
 
However the strong resistance put up by the Vergaras to avoid land for coverage under 
CARP runs counter to our hypothesis that cases involving corn lands should experience 
only weak resistance to this process. We believe that this can be explained in two ways. 
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The first argument we used to support our hypothesis for weak resistance rests on the fact 
that corn lands have often previously been identified under PD 27, which made it more 
difficult to seek an exemption from coverage under CARP. This argument does not hold 
in the Kalimpak case because the Vergaras had evicted their tenants from their 
landholding and were successful in avoiding coverage under the OLT mechanism of PD 
27. The second argument we used to support our hypothesis is that the limited financial 
benefits which can be derived from a corn land provide only little incentive for the 
landowner to orchestrate strong resistance to the processes of land coverage and land 
compensation. This argument however has downplayed the possibility of land 
conversion. To be sure, we did not find evidence that the Vergaras were going to convert 
their 113-hectare to another use. But three elements suggest that the prospect of land 
conversion in that case was very real and that it most probably constituted a strong 
incentive to resist land coverage. First, the Vergaras did not hesitate to pressure the 
farmers into planting coconut trees and other more profitable crops in the 1960s and 
1970s, and preferred to leave their land idle rather than have it cultivated with corn by 
tenants in the 1980s and early 1990s. In a nutshell, the landowner had already tried to 
change the crops cultivated on the landholding. Second, the location of the landholding 
within Metro Cebu - an area where fancy subdivisions are burgeoning and where the 
municipality explicitly expressed its desire to develop tourist facilities in its mountainous 
surrounding - considerably increases its potential value. Third, the Vergaras have been 
actively involved in recent years in developing upscale housing projects on some of their 
properties around Cebu City, suggesting that a similar project could have been envisaged 
in Kalimpak had they remained owners.      
 
If the strong possibility of land conversion in this case increased the potential value of the 
land and, consequently, the strength of landowner resistance, why did the landowner 
oppose only weak resistance to the land compensation process? We would argue that 
while the land had great potential value in terms of development, the land compensation 
process was concerned with the value of the corn land, not with the hypothetical value of 
an eventual subdivision or golf course. Without an actual conversion, the compensation 
amount that the landowner could hope to receive would still be relatively small compared 
to lands planted with more profitable crops. This may explain the difference in the 
strength of landowner resistance to the processes of land coverage and land 
compensation. The land conversion issue however suggests that the integration of 
74 
 
 
 
additional structural features to our conceptual model could improve its ability to predict 
the strength of landowner resistance. 
 
The Tenurial Status and Landowner Resistance. Although they had been tenants on the 
land since the 1950s, farmers were tricked by the landowner in the 1970s into signing a 
document which stated that they were paid as farmworkers to plant coconut trees. Being 
legally labelled as farmworkers rather than tenants has affected the ARB identification 
process. Resistance to that process had started before CARP when the landowner, in 
addition to having the farmers branded as farmworkers rather than tenants, also hired an 
overseer to harass, intimidate and chase the farmers away from the 113-hectare 
landholding. Under CARP, the harassment and intimidation continued, forcing the 
farmers to hide in the surrounding mountain areas and making the identification process 
extremely difficult. Even after FARDEC got involved and started listing the potential 
ARBs, the landowner continued to resist that process by submitting an alternative list of 
ARBs which the DAR was forced to investigate and which considerably delayed the 
implementation process. In this case, landowner resistance was strong. 
 
Regarding the installation of ARBs, the resistance was strong as the harassment and 
intimidation tactics used by the overseer were specifically aimed at preventing the 
farmers from being physically installed on the land. These tactics even led to the murder 
of one of the peasants.364 In fact it took the orchestration of two land occupations, one in 
1999 and one in 2005, as well as media coverage and public support to ensure that the 
extra-legal tactics would stop and that farmers could feel relatively safe to till the land 
and build their homes. In 2008, while the ARBs of Lot B were still waiting for their 
mother CLOA, many farmers still left at night for the surrounding mountain areas. This 
fear of harassment and violence that will not subside is a sign of the strength with which 
the landowner opposed the installation of the peasants on the land.   
 
4.3.2 Structural Setting, Peasant Strategy and Implementation Outcome 
The Kalimpak case study took place in a highly contentious structural setting because the 
landowner put up strong resistance to three land reform processes out of the four we 
focus on. The fact that the landholding was a corn land led to only weak resistance to the 
financial compensation process but the resistance to the identification of land for 
coverage was much stronger than what our hypothesis suggested. We have argued that 
75 
 
 
 
the strong possibility of a land conversion in that case may have distorted our 
expectations. As expected however, the farmworker status of the ARBs led to strong 
resistance to the processes of ARB identification and installation. Much of that resistance 
took an extra-legal form as the farmers were harassed and intimidated by the overseer of 
the 113-hectare. In terms of legal actions, the provision of an alternative list of ARBs by 
the landowner considerably delayed the process by forcing DAR to initiate revision 
procedures. 
 
In such a structural setting, with a minimum of peasant mobilization, the implementation 
outcome should have been a weak implementation. However after avoiding any 
engagement and hiding in the mountains in the early years of CARP, the farmers opted 
for the bibingka strategy in the 1990s following the visits of members of KMP and 
FARDEC. To secure the redistribution of the 113-hectare corn landholding which 
belonged to the powerful Vergara family, peasants participated in strong collective 
actions such as rallies and land occupations. This mobilization was supported by 
FARDEC which provided them with information about their rights as potential ARBs, 
trained them in understanding CARP processes, strategized with them on the appropriate 
actions to take to speed up the implementation, and secured public support and media 
coverage for their case. FARDEC and peasant leaders also engaged in a dialogue with 
DAR officials at the municipal, provincial and national levels between 1998 and 2001. 
These dialogues were supported by the mobilization of the peasants who did not hesitate 
to camp in front of DAR offices to show their commitment.   
 
As a process variable, the use of the bibingka strategy in this highly contentious structural 
setting strengthened the outcome of the land struggle and led to a partial implementation. 
This partial implementation was characterized by the ARBs receiving all the land which 
they were entitled to on one hand, and by significant implementation delays on the other 
hand. The landowner had officially been informed that the land was up for redistribution 
even before 1988 since they presented an alternative list of beneficiaries under PD 27 
before forcing the farmers to leave by harassing them. This means that ARBs of Lot A 
had to wait more than 13 years to be installed while those of Lot B have been waiting for 
20 years.  
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4.4 Summary of the Kalimpak Case Study 
The case study of Kalimpak challenged the conceptual model of our first research 
question and highlighted its limits. While our model, based on the structural features of 
the landholding, has correctly predicted the landowner’s strong resistance to the processes 
of identification and installation of ARBs, and the weak resistance to the process of land 
compensation, the strong resistance to the process of land coverage was unexpected. In 
our analysis, we have identified the issue of land conversion as the probable explanation 
for the unexpected variation and suggested that it might eventually be integrated in our 
conceptual model to improve its ability to predict the strength of landowner resistance in 
other cases. This issue of land conversion however did not have an influence on the 
resistance to the process of land compensation. In the highly contentious structural setting 
of Kalimpak, the decision of the peasants to rely on the bibingka strategy helped them 
improve the implementation outcome of their land struggle. In the end, they experienced 
long delays and suffered much hardship before their installation but they were able to 
own all the land they were entitled to. This was made possible by the involvement of 
FARDEC, which informed, trained, and guided the peasants in their land struggle against 
the powerful Vergara family. The mobilization of peasants, the involvement of FARDEC, 
and the dialogues initiated with DAR officials at the municipal, regional, and national 
level were key factors which allowed the peasants of Kalimpak to overcome the strong 
resistance of the Vergaras. 
CHAPTER FIVE: 
CASE STUDY OF MANLAYO, BOGO 
 
This case study shows that sugar lands are not necessarily highly contentious. In this case, 
the presence of tenants on the sugarcane landholding of Manlayo contributed to make the 
case less contentious because it led to weak landowner resistance to two of the key CARP 
processes of land reform. This case also shows that within a moderately contentious 
structural setting, the use of the bibingka strategy can lead to a full implementation. These 
farmers were the first batch of ARBs installed in the sugarcane area of northern Cebu and 
are often showcased by NGOs and DAR officials as the first success story of CARP 
implementation on sugar lands in the province.365 
 
In Chapter Five, we present the case study of the Manlayo farmers of Bogo. We introduce 
the case study by showing how it relates to our two research questions and by describing 
the contextual background of Manlayo and Bogo. Then we tell the story of the peasants’ 
struggle for land from their years as tenants of Hospicio San Miguel to their installation 
as smallholders on their sugar landholding. After the story, we address our two research 
questions through a within-case analysis by looking first at the influence of the type of 
crop and the tenurial status on the four key CARP processes of land reform; and second at 
the combined influence of the structural setting and the peasant strategy on the 
implementation outcome in Salacan. A brief summary of our findings will close the 
Chapter. 
 
Map 5.1 Bogo in the Province of Cebu 
 
Source: Adapted from Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Province of Cebu. 
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5.1 Introduction to the Case Study  
In this Introduction to the Case Study of Manlayao, we recall our two research questions 
and we explain how our hypotheses apply to this specific case. Then we present the 
contextual background of Manlayao and Bogo. 
 
5.1.1 First Research Question 
The case of Manlayo involves 24 tenants involved in a struggle to secure ownership over 
a small 30-hectare sugarcane landholding in the northern part of Cebu. The type of crop 
produced in Salacan is a constraining variable or the implementation of land reform. 
Unlike corn, sugarcane can be a considerable source of profit for landowners who are 
expected to put up strong resistance to the processes of land coverage and land 
compensation. However, the unusual fact that the farmers of this sugarcane landholding 
are tenants rather than farmworkers is a facilitating variable.  
 
The tenurial status of the Salacan farmers is expected to lead to weak resistance to the 
process of identification and installation of the ARBs. Thus overall, we expect strong 
landowner resistance to two of the four key CARP processes of land reform. In our 
typology our structural settings, this would make the case of Salacan moderately 
contentious. 
 
5.1.2 Second Research Question 
In a moderately contentious structural setting, we expect that a minimum of peasant 
mobilization should lead to a partial implementation of land reform where farmers will 
either receive a smaller amount of land than what they were entitled to or experience 
unreasonable delays of installation. The peasant strategy however acts as a process 
variable and can change the expected implementation outcome. In this case, the Manlayo 
farmers relied on the bibingka strategy to secure ownership of the 30-hectare sugarcane 
landholding. Because the use of this strategy is expected to deliver better results than 
peasant mobilization alone, the expected outcome in this case is a full implementation 
where ARBs will receive the land they were entitled to within reasonable delays.  
 
5.1.3 Contextual Background 
This 30-hectare landholding planted with sugarcane is located in barangay Manlayo, in 
the municipality of Bogo. Bogo was founded in 1890 and received its name from the 
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bogo tree which stood on the shore of its wharf. It is under that single tree - because of 
the shadow its leaves provided - that the locals would meet the sailors and exchange 
goods. It became a meeting point for merchants and traders, many of whom stayed and 
married local women.366 Bogo is located in the north of the island of Cebu and is part of 
the sugar haven of the province. Its population reached around 70,000 inhabitants in 2007 
and its land area covers more than 10,000 hectares which are administratively divided in 
29 barangays. The main products of the municipality are sugarcane, corn, and coconut .367  
 
The barangay of Manlayo itself is located 7 km away from Bogo City. It covers 800 
hectares, of which 560 hectares are identified as agricultural lands, and is home to a little 
more than 500 households and about 3,000 inhabitants.368 The 30-hectare sugarcane 
landholding is thus located within the realm of the rich and powerful landed families such 
as the Villalon, Martinez, Miranda, and others who own most of the sugarcane plantations 
of the area.369 The Manlayo case stands out however because its landholding did not 
directly belong to one of these prominent families. In fact, the small landholding 
belonged to Hospicio San Miguel, a Catholic Welfare institution which serves as a home 
for orphans, abandoned and special children, as well as elderly people. Founded in 
Manila in 1778, it was the first Social Welfare Agency in the Philippines.370 The farmers 
themselves have never met the people of Hospicio San Miguel but they say they used to 
come and visit the area during the time of their grandparents.371 For as far as the farmers 
can remember, Hospicio San Miguel had been renting that land to different Cebu 
landowners: these were the people that the tenants made their arrangements with.  
 
Being tenants rather than farmworkers also gave the farmers a little more control over 
what they planted. Thus in addition to the sugarcane, they also planted a little corn and a 
few vegetables for their own needs.  
 
5.2 The Land Struggle of Manlayo Peasants 
The tenants of Manlayo had an unusual tenurial status for farmers working on a sugar 
landholding. The farmers themselves cannot quite explain how that arrangement came to 
be although the fact that the land belonged to a charitable organization such as Hospicio 
San Miguel rather than to one of the powerful landed families of the area probably played 
a role in that arrangement. Farmers simply say that their parents and grandparents were 
tenants and that when they became old enough to work on the land, they just became 
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tenants too. Those who live in Manlayo today never had any direct encounter with 
Hospicio San Miguel however. For a long time, the 30-hectare landholding was leased by 
Perliciana Villaluz, a woman for who farmers such as Lorena Legaspi had only good 
words: « She was good. She was good to the farmers ».372 Villaluz and the farmers had an 
agreement in which they shared the income derived from the sugarcane 50-50. 373 
 
In 1995 however, Villaluz passed away and Hospicio San Miguel leased the 30-hectare 
landholding to two members of Cebu’s landed elite: Mr. Escobar and Mr. Germano. 
Escobar leased the biggest share (24 hectares), while Germano was leasing only six 
hectares. Germano however already owned a much larger adjacent landholding and was 
entrusted by Escobar as the overseer for the whole 30-hectare.374 The farmers knew about 
what happened to Villaluz but were unaware of the new arrangement of Hospicio San 
Miguel with Escobar and Germano. Meanwhile, 1995 also marked the year when the 
state began targeting the sugar lands for land distribution. Anticipating a difficult 
confrontation with the powerful sugar barons of the country, the DAR had called on the 
NGOs and their organizing capacities at the time to help them implement CARP on these 
contentious lands. This resulted in the creation nationwide of the Task Force 
Sugarland.375 During that year, the DAR allocated funds to NGOs so that they would go 
to the sugar lands targeted for coverage by CARP to explain the program to the farmers, 
help them organize their PO and prepare them for ownership. Lorenan Legaspi said that 
as soon as Manlayo farmers heard about the land reform program, they went straight to 
the DAR office:  
 
Through our struggle, we have known that there are laws about land reform. The workers of 
the hacienda became the immediate beneficiaries. So when we heard about that we came to 
the office of agrarian reform to consult with this law.376   
 
Thus in 1995, the land was identified for coverage by the DAR. The landowner, Hospicio 
San Miguel, did not contest the decision of the DAR to cover the 30-hectare under the 
Compulsory Acquisition scheme.377 Legaspi, who was present during the hearings had 
this to say about the role of Hospicio San Miguel: « During the hearings, it seems they 
were reluctant at first. But when we showed them the receipts of our payments to DAR - 
because we gave them copies of it - it seems they have become ok. »378 However the new 
lessees, Escobar and Germano, were not as agreeable and tried to resist the process of 
land coverage.  
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It was successful because the landowner was not really interested in the land. It was only the 
one who was leasing the area who was trying to block the implementation. But the landowner 
was Hospicio San Miguel, a religious group. But it was the one who had been renting the 
place who was trying to prevent the implementation.379 
 
Their first tactic was to delay the process by filing a legal case, arguing that since they 
had just leased the land from Hospicio San Miguel, the transfer should not be effective 
until such time that their contract had expired.380 Another farmer, Rosalia Calipe, 
explained that Escobar then tried to have the farmers sign a paper stating that they would 
let him buy the land: the farmers refused.381 Members of PhilNet described Escobar as a 
man carrying this old Spanish hacienda mentality where farmers are considered more like 
slaves than like tenants or farmworkers.382 After the peaceful years that farmers enjoyed 
under Villaluz, the attitude of the new lessees was bound to create tensions and conflicts 
in the short-term.  
 
In 1996, a quarrel over the price paid for the sugarcane and the profit sharing arrangement 
erupted between the farmers and Germano, who was representing Escobar as the 
overseer. The initial problem was that Germano tried to enforce a new sharing 
arrangement in which he would keep 75% of the profits derived from the sale of 
sugarcane while the farmers would keep only 25%.383 Accustomed to the 50-50 sharing 
arrangement they had with Villaluz, the farmers protested against this new scheme. 
Another problem erupted when Germano decided to give the farmers only P2.50 per tonil 
for their part of harvested sugarcane when farmers knew they would easily get twice as 
much if they sold it on the market themselves.384 Farmers asked Germano to be paid at 
least P3.00 per tonil but Germano stubbornly refused to increase their wage.385  When 
farmers said they would find another buyer, Germano threatened them: if they did not sell 
him the sugarcane at his own price, they would be fined and jailed. 386  
 
Many farmers were scared and sold their sugarcane to Germano for the price he wanted. 
Others however decided not to comply despite the threats. These ‘unruly’ farmers then 
went back to the field to harvest the sugarcane, looking to sell it to another buyer. But as 
the truck they had hired to pick up the sugarcane tried to enter the barangay, the police - 
alerted by Germano and Escobar- prevented it from entering.387 This happened twice. 388 
Escobar then turned to other tactics such as having the farmers pay checks frozen at the 
Central Office389, and filing a criminal case for theft in 1997 against the farmers who 
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were harvesting the sugarcane without his prior approval.390 These manoeuvres were 
aimed at evicting the tenants from the land.  
 
In this increasingly hostile situation, the farmers took steps to strengthen their case for 
land reform. Because of the information they received from the DAR and NGOs of the 
Task Force Sugarland in 1995, they knew that the implementation process required them 
to create their own Peasant Organization (PO).391 Thus in 1996, the farmers established 
an organization called the United Farmer Workers towards Agrarian Reform. 392 The 
attempt to change the sharing scheme, the freezing of the farmers pay checks,  and the 
theft accusations eventually led the farmers’ to mobilize against the Escobar and 
Germano. Shortly after the creation of their PO, the framers hired a lawyer to represent 
them in the cases filed by Escobar.393 The move was successful as the lawyer rapidly got 
the Central Office to release the farmers’ pay checks. 394 
 
In 1997, the Manlayo farmers further solidified their position by seeking the help of 
PhilNet.395 PhilNet was a newly founded NGO at the time but the farmers had met its 
members when they were working within the Task Force Sugarland. Once the Task Force 
was disbanded and funding stopped coming from the national government, PhilNet was 
also the only NGO left who worked on land reform struggles in the sugar haven of Bogo-
Medellin.396 In the Visayas, their activities were concentrated in Negros Oriental, Negros 
Occidental, Ormoc and Cebu.397 PhilNet was able to strengthen the farmers through 
paralegal training and funding. They held seminars regarding the CARP implementation 
process and their rights as ARBs. 398 They also offered leadership training and advocated 
to the farmers that they had to stand up for their rights to make land reform happen. 
PhilNet could assist them but it was up to the farmers in the end to assert their rights. On 
the legal side, PhilNet also secured funding to share the cost of the lawyer during the 
hearings. 399 Legaspi said farmers were thankful for PhilNet’s help: 
 
They really helped a lot because once, during the times that we are still facing hearings, they 
gave us trainings. They have given us many training which made us stand for what we 
believe in because through trainings we've come to learn our rights as farmers. We've opened 
our eyes knowing we, as farmers, had the greatest responsibility in defending our rights. It's 
like we had been sleeping and they opened our eyes. They really have helped us a lot.400 
 
The Manlayo case was actually the first case taken up by PhilNet and their first 
installation of a group of ARBs. It was part of PhilNet’s strategy to concentrate first on 
‘soft targets’.401  
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The Manlayo farmers, through their PO, also became members of a network of peasant 
organizations called the Alliance of Sugarland Community for Agrarian Reform 
(ASUCAR). ASUCAR helped the farmers by exposing their struggles in the media 
through multiple radio appearances and by contacting newspapers.402 Thus the farmers 
were organized, they had their own PO, and they could count on the help of both PhilNet 
and ASUCAR in their struggle against Germano and Española. But although the 
resistance of Germano and Escobarto to the process of  land coverage had been mainly of 
a legal nature until then, the use of intimidation tactics to chase tenants away from the 
land was on the rise. Legaspi recalls:  
 
I could really say that the struggle we've been through wasn't really an easy one. There 
were even threats. They threatened that they would throw dynamites under our house. 
Whenever I would think of it, I could not sleep. Thinking of those now, I could say that was 
the most difficult part of our struggle.403  
 
Legaspi was the leader of the PO and the lessees had previously attempted to bribe her 
into forfeiting the farmers claim to the landholding under CARP.404 After she refused, she 
was specifically targeted by some of the threats.405 Calipe says these were reported to the 
police by the people of the PO and fortunately never materialized, although they were 
successful in scaring many farmers away from the area. 406 Due to their perseverance in 
resisting intimidation and to their mobilization behind their PO, the farmers won their 
case regarding the theft accusations made by Germano and Española and were declared 
innocent.407 As their attempt to have the land exempted from CARP coverage had failed, 
Germano and Escobar filed another legal case, this time to request a higher compensation 
for the land on which they were lessees.408 Just to be represented in court during all these 
legal manoeuvrings, the farmers paid more than P250,000 in litigation expenses and 
transportation.409 
 
In 1999, PhilNet initiated a series of dialogues with the DAR, both at the municipal, 
regional and national level, which led to the installation of the farmers the same year.410 
The mother CLOA was issued to the 24 ARBs of Manlayo in November 1999.411 Three 
weeks later, the farmers were installed on the 30 hectares by Horacio Morales, the 
Secretary of the DAR at the time. 412  The individual CLOAs, which always take a longer 
time to process, were finally distributed to the farmers in March 2007. 413   
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Since they became smallholders in 1999, the Manlayo farmers are bringing their 
sugarcane directly to the mill, and they reap all the benefits of their sales.414 Their average 
annual income jumped from P5,000 in the late 1990s to P42,000 in 2001.415 And despite 
the fact that they are entirely responsible now to pay for the fertilizers, the trucking and 
the milling, they still earn much more as small landowners then they did as tenants.416 
Alonita Bamparo, one of these new small landowners, says that now they even hire 
farmworkers to help them harvest the sugarcane.417 For those who live in the area, the 
most visible improvement of the farmers’ situation can be seen in their housing facilities 
as the nipa huts of their tenancy days have been replaced by bungalows made of 
concrete.418 Many can also afford to send their children to school now.419 And not to be 
totally dependent on the sale of sugarcane, the farmers have also started to intercrop with 
corn, mongo beans, saging (bananas) and vegetables. Corn is only for the farmers’ own 
consumption while the surpluses of other crops are sold in the market. 420 So they now 
have their cash crop and their subsistence crop. Many have also stopped using chemical 
fertilizers, which are very expensive, and started to switch to sustainable agriculture. 
They are getting support services also from the Department of Labour and Employment 
(DLE) and they are working on ways to improve transportation of water to the barangay, 
and the transportation of their sugarcane to the market.421 The farmers have also started 
paying their 30 years amortization of about P3,600 a year in 2000.422 PhilNet continues to 
be involved with the farmers of Manlayo but has moved its focus on sustainable farming 
and the use of organic fertilizers.423 
 
All is not great for the farmers though as new challenges relative to their small owner 
status have cropped up since 1999. The main challenge which the Manlayo farmers are 
facing now is capitalization: the lack of money to pay for fertilizers and to pay for 
planting ‘equipment’, such as carabaos and tractors. This is generally the argument that 
landowners use with the DAR in trying to avoid coverage of their plantations: the farmers 
do not have the necessary capital to make the land productive. Technically, the CARP 
includes provisions about support services that should be delivered to the farmers, such as 
credit facilities to buy equipment (find a reference). However because of a lack of funds, 
these support services often do not materialize. To palliate to the absence of support 
services coming from the DAR, two solutions were put forward by farmers and their 
allies. First, the move towards sustainable farming and the use of organic fertilizers is one 
solution which can counter the high price of chemical fertilizers. Second, ASUCAR and 
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Philnet launched in 2008 the ASUCAR Savings and Credit Micro-Fund project in Bogo-
Medellin, a micro-finance project which aims to provide low interest loans to the 
farmers.424 On sugar lands, it is not enough to distribute land to the farmers: you also 
have to provide them with support services so that they can be able to reap the benefits of 
cultivating sugarcane. Otherwise, the land will just be sold back to the previous 
landowners.425 
 
5.3 Within-Case Analysis 
In this section, we apply our two research questions to the case study of Manlayo. The 
first question asks: how do the type of crop and the tenurial status influence key processes 
of CARP implementation? These structural features influence four key CARP processes: 
land coverage, identification of ARBs, land compensation, and installation of ARBs. The 
second question asks: how does the peasant strategy influence the outcome of CARP 
implementation in particular structural settings? This question allows us to see how the 
independent variable of structural setting interacts with the process variable of peasant 
strategy to influence the implementation outcome of the land reform struggle. 
 
5.3.1 Influence of Structural Features on Landowner Resistance 
In Manlayo, the cultivation of sugarcane led to strong landowner resistance to the 
processes of land coverage and land compensation. The tenant status of the peasants 
however led to only weak resistance from the landowner to the processes of identification 
and installation of the ARBs. 
 
The Type of Crop and Landowner Resistance. One of our hypotheses concerning the type 
of crop variable is that when a case involves a landholding planted with sugarcane, 
resistance from the landowner and its allies to the processes of land coverage and land 
compensation is strong. That was certainly the case in Manlayo. However an unusual 
aspect of that case study is that the resistance did not come from the legitimate 
landowner, Hospicio San Miguel, but from the lessees of the 30-hectare landholding: 
MM. Germano and Escobar. The lessees tried to delay the land coverage process by filing 
a legal case, arguing that the land should not be redistributed until their contract with 
Hospicio San Miguel had not expired. Then they attempted to buy the land from the 
farmers and, when that did not work, they tried to bribe the leader of the PO into 
forfeiting the land rights of her members. When that did not work either, Germano and 
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Escobar resorted to threats and filed bogus theft cases against the farmers to try and chase 
them away from the land. 
 
As for the process of land compensation, the lessees - despite not being the legitimate 
landowners -filed a legal case to demand higher compensation and changed the sharing 
arrangements they had with the farmers in an attempt to wring as much money as 
possible out of the landholding before its redistribution to the tenants in 1999. Thus 
although it did not come directly from the landowner, the resistance was strong to those 
two processes from the landowner’s side.  
 
The Tenurial Status and Landowner Resistance. The tenant status of the farmers in 
Manlayo led to only weak resistance from the landowners and its allies to the processes 
of ARB identification and installation. It is unusual for farmers to have a tenant status on 
sugar lands and this may well explain why the case has been showcased by NGOs and 
DAR officials of the province as an early success of CARP implementation. Even the 
lessees, who were so prompt in taking legal and extra-legal actions to have land exempted 
from coverage and to increase their financial compensation made no attempt at 
preventing the identification and the installation of ARBs in Manlayo. The identification 
process was greatly facilitated by the fact that tenants already had specific lots and that 
their families had been established there for generations. It was facilitated by the fact that 
farmers had official documents confirming their tenant status and describing the location 
of their lots.426 As for the installation process, it was a mere formality since the tenants 
already occupied specific lots. But the DAR Secretary himself came for an official 
installation ceremony three weeks after the mother CLOA had been issued. Members of 
PhilNet agreed that the farmers tenurial status did play an important role in making this 
case a successful one. Their argument was that the Manlayo farmers, because they were 
tenants rather than farmworkers, « were unique in the sense that they were not enslaved 
by their landowner unlike in other estates ».427  
 
5.3.2 Structural Setting, Peasant Strategy and Implementation Outcome 
The Manlayo case study was taking place in a moderately contentious structural setting 
because the landowner resistance was strong to two out of the four key CARP processes. 
The combination of a facilitating variable (tenant status) and a constraining variable 
87 
 
 
 
(sugar land) led that specific pattern of resistance in accordance with the conceptual 
model for our first research question.  
 
In a moderately structural setting, a minimum of peasant implementation is expected to 
lead to a partial implementation of land reform in which farmers would receive less land 
than entitled or experience long delays in their installation. The Manlayo farmers 
however chose to rely on the bibingka strategy during their land struggle, strengthening 
the implementation outcome. They quickly mobilized after the threats made by Germano 
and Escobarby by organizing their own PO, hiring a lawyer, and seeking help in the CSO 
community. PhilNet helped them increase their knowledge of the CARP processes 
through paralegal and leadership trainings while supporting them financially to defend 
themselves against the legal actions initiated by the lessees. As PhilNet members told the 
Manlayo farmers: « Your role is to assert. The NGO’s role is only to assist. »428 PhilNet 
also initiated a series of dialogue with the DAR at the municipal, regional and national 
levels in 1999. The combined peasant mobilization, CSO involvement, and engagement 
with DAR officials in the end led to a swift implementation of the CARP in Manlayo. 
Acting as a process variable, the bibingka strategy changed the expected outcome of that 
particular land reform struggle to a full implementation where farmers received all the 
land they were entitled to in a timely manner.  
 
Although it serves as a model of success for CARP implementation on sugar lands, the 
case of the Manlayo farmers should not be romanticized. In fact when we speak of 
peasant mobilization, it should be noted that not all the peasants participated in collective 
actions and many were afraid to stand up for their rights: it took the leadership of Lorena 
Legaspi and a handful of other peasants to push through with the land transfer.429 So 
although the bibingka strategy was chosen by these five or six farmers, and led to a very 
successful implementation, most peasants actually chose a strategy of risk avoidance. We 
believe it is legitimate to associate the Manlayo case to the bibingka strategy anyway 
because that is the strategy that led to the involvement of PhilNet and to subsequent 
dialogues with DAR officials. But peasants, even in a small landholding, should not be 
seen as an homogeneous group. 
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5.4 Summary of the Manlayo Case Study 
The case of the Manlayo farmers is presented by DAR officials and the CSO community 
as a great success story. Indeed, CARP implementation on sugarcane landholdings are 
generally a lot more difficult. To be sure, the farmers did face some strong resistance 
from the landowner’s side during the processes of land coverage and land compensation. 
This resistance came from the lessees, Escobar and Germano, rather than from the real 
landowner, Hospicio the San Jose. However the farmers have never dealt directly with 
Hospicio San Miguel in their lifetime and the fact that resistance came from the lessees 
did not make it easier for the farmers who were threatened and brought to court. What did 
help the farmers though was their tenurial status, and their decision to use the bibingka 
strategy. Tenants are rarely found on sugar lands and this case is interesting because it 
demonstrates that on these lands which are famous in the Philippines  for being difficult 
to redistribute, structural features other than the type of crop need to be considered when 
assessing the contentiousness of a case. The tenant status of the farmers led to weak 
resistance to the processes of identification and installation of the ARBs and in the end 
had a major impact on the implementation outcome. The use of the bibingka strategy also 
helped the farmers to secure the best outcome possible within their moderately 
contentious structural setting: a full implementation.  
CHAPTER SIX: 
CASE STUDY OF DALAG, MEDELLIN 
 
The case of Dalag shows that a landholding planted with sugar and worked by 
farmworkers creates a highly contentious structural setting. The presence of sugar and 
farmworkers lead to strong landowner resistance to the four key CARP processes of land 
coverage, identification of ARBs, land compensation, and installation of ARBs.  It also 
demonstrates that although using the bibingka strategy can strengthen the implementation 
outcome of land reform, the highly contentious structural setting of Dalag limits the 
potential success of that strategy to a partial implementation.   
 
In Section 6.1, we introduce the case study of Dalag by describing how our two research 
questions and our hypotheses apply to this specific case, and by presenting the contextual 
information about the barangay and the municipality within which the land struggle takes 
place. Then in Section 6.2, we tell the story of the Dalag farmers from the inauguration of 
the CARP until their installation in 2008 and their new life as small owners. In Section 
6.3 we proceed with the within-case analysis to see how the type of crop and the tenurial 
status influenced the strength of landowner resistance, and how the peasant strategy 
influenced the outcome of implementation. Finally, Section 6.4 presents a short summary 
of our main findings. 
 
Map 6.1 Medellin in the Province of Cebu 
 
Source: Adapted from Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Province of Cebu. 
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6.1 Introduction to the Case Study  
This case study involves 34 farmworkers located on a 51-hectare landholding planted 
with sugarcane and located in the barangay of Dalag, in the municipality of Medellin. 
Because of the presence of sugar and farmworkers, the landowner resistance in this case 
was strong to all four key processes of land reform under CARP, creating a highly 
contentious structural setting. The peasants decided to use the bibingka strategy during 
their struggle and this strategy, within a highly contentious structural setting, led to a 
partial implementation of land reform. 
 
6.1.1 First Research Question 
The fact that the landholding is planted with sugarcane is likely to translate into strong 
landowner resistance to the processes of land coverage and land compensation. The 
farmworker status of the peasants is expected to lead to strong landowner resistance as 
well, this time to the processes of identification and installation of the ARBs. In our 
typology of structural settings, when landowner resistance is strong to all four key CARP 
processes, we are in the presence of a highly contentious structural setting. It is within 
this structural setting, used as an independent variable in the next research question, that 
agency comes into play.   
 
6.1.2 Second Research Question 
In a highly contentious structural setting, the expected outcome of land reform, with a 
minimum of peasant mobilization, is a weak implementation in which the ARBs will 
receive less land than what they were entitled to and will experience long delays before 
their installation. In this case, the farmers chose to rely on the bibingka strategy to secure 
their rights over the 51-hectare landholding. This peasant strategy is a process variable 
which can change the expected outcome of land reform implementation. In a highly 
contentious structural setting, which is the case of Dalag, the bibingka strategy is 
expected to lead to a partial implementation of land reform rather than a weak one. Our 
assumption within this framework is that even when using the best strategy available to 
force a successful implementation, cases involving highly contentious landholdings are 
unlikely to ever lead to a full implementation.  
 
 
 
91 
 
 
 
6.1.3 Contextual Background 
The land struggle took place in the barangay of Dalag, which is located in the 
municipality of Medellin, in the northern part of Cebu province. The total land area of 
Medellin covers a little more than 7,300 hectares, including more than 6,000 hectares 
which are considered arable land. In the area, the land is generally flat and mostly planted 
with sugarcane. Medellin has a population of about 45,000 inhabitants and is divided 
between 19 barangays.430  The main products of the municipality, aside from sugarcane, 
are corn and coconut. 
 
Dalag has the second smallest population among the barangays of Medellin with just a 
little over 1,000 inhabitants.431 However it is part of the only Agrarian Reform 
Community (ARC) of Medellin, which was launched in 1994 and includes the adjacent 
barangay of Capuluan. Being granted ARC status gives more chance to the community of 
receiving services and investments. This ARC covers over 1,000 hectares of land, almost 
all of it agricultural, and is one of 13 ARCs in the province of Cebu.432 When CARP 
came into being in 1988, the farmworkers of Dalag were paid 5 pesos per day of work on 
the sugar hacienda. Twenty years later - just before they became small owners – Felita 
Pruna, a Dalag farmer, said their daily salary was still below the Philippine minimum 
wage, at around 60 pesos a day.433  
 
The 51-hectare landholding in Medellin, as well as a larger 152-hectare landholding in the 
adjacent barangay of Capuluan, belonged to the Vergara family. The Vergaras, as we 
mentioned in Chapter Two and in the Kalimpak case study, are a powerful landed family of the 
Cebu province. Graciela Vergara, the landowner, was a descendant of a powerful family of 
Chinese merchants, the Chiong Veloso, and a relative of the Osmeñas.  
 
6.3 The Land Struggle of the Dalag Farmers 
We left Cebu City early morning on that day of May 2008 to attend the installation ceremony 
of the Medellin farmers. Upon our arrival in the barangay, between the sugarcane and the 
coastal area, the leader of the local peasant organization was waiting for us and invited us to 
her house as the ceremony would start only a few hours later. In a large bahay kubo (a small 
hut where people sit to eat, drink, and chat), I sat with several farmers and NGO members, 
eating seaweed and other local pulutan (snacks) while women were preparing the food for the 
special meal to be served later in the afternoon. Although these farmers had already started 
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tilling the sugarcane they now owned following a land occupation staged a few months earlier, 
this installation organized by DAR officials was an official recognition of their right to the 
land, and a matter of pride. Pointing to a few fishermen unloading their small boat about 200 
meters away, a farmer pointed out that people of his community generally had two or three 
different occupations, including fishing, doing whatever they had to in order to get by. Coming 
into their later years, the farmers did not expect their new sugarcane landholding to make them 
rich. But it could mean a little extra income and more time to rest. 
    
The sugarcane landholding in Dalag was part of the larger estate of the Vergara family which 
also included an adjacent lot of 152 hectare in barangay Capuluan. The farmworkers hired by 
Vergara to plant and harvest the sugarcane came from the surrounding area. Some of them 
were actually tenants on other nearby estates, like the corn lot which belonged to F but had so 
little land that they needed to work on the Vergara estate as well to make a living..434 On their 
small tenanted lands, they planted corn, saging (banana), cassava, kangkong, camote (sweet 
potato), mongo beans and other vegetables.435 They generally plant corn in May and harvest it 
three months later while the sugarcane is planted on the other lot around January and harvested 
around November or December.436  Because the barangay is located close to the sea, some also 
practice fishing.437 
 
In 1991-92, knowing that their landholding could soon be covered by CARP, the landowners 
tried to ensure that no farmworker would be recognized as a potential ARB for the 51-hectare, 
by temporarily securing the land with barbed wire and making it a ‘No Trespassing Zone’ 
where farmworkers were not allowed to enter.438 A first attempt to avoid land coverage. 
 
According to a DAR official, it is in 1993 that Vergaras were sent a NOC for the sugarcane 
landholding of Dalag which was placed under the Compulsory Acquisition mechanism.439 The 
landowner was quick to react and asked their farmworkers to sign an agreement in which they 
would waive their right to the land as ARBs under CARP in exchange for P50,000. According 
to Marisa Calampang, a farmer of a nearby barangay who was involved in ASUCAR and knew 
about the Dalag case, many farmers agreed to those terms and signed the waiver, and those 
who did not were evicted.440  Dalag farmers such as Herman Linsangan however claim that 
they did not have any problem with the landowners but rather with the overseers of the land. 
About the landowner, a Linsangan said: 
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He had a nice attitude, good treatment. Like if you want to borrow money, he has no problem 
about that. He will ask: « How much? » I was afraid to have a big loan. I would just say: « Sir, can 
I borrow P1000? Because I will buy rice. » He would immediately give.441 
 
When the DAR tried to list the potential ARBs of the area in 1994, they were confronted to a 
peculiar problem. While some legitimate ARBs were evicted, others who were still working 
for Vergara actually refused to be listed: 
 
There was questions regarding these farmer beneficiaries who were identified and now included in 
the 1994 CLOA. What happened there is that at that time, there was a lot of farmers who should 
have been included in the CLOA but they were afraid because of the so many years of loyalty to 
the previous landowner. And they didn’t want this landowner to get mad at them because of the 
Filipino trait of loyalty to your so-called ‘employer’ because they provide the land for you to work. 
So this is what happened. There were many qualified farmers but during the posting, the invitation, 
the posting of the notices in the barangay asking them to apply, they didn’t apply.442 
 
Thus in addition to the landowner resistance itself, it seems like the particular social relation 
between some peasants of the area and the landowner acted as an impediment to the 
identification of ARBs. 
 
In 1995, the farmworkers of Dalag who had applied to be listed as ARBs were issued a mother 
CLOA by the DAR for the 51-hectare landholding. However a procedural problem in the way 
the CLOA was issued led to its cancellation before the farmworkers could be installed. The 
normal process of the CARP is that after a landholding is identified for coverage, it is acquired 
by the state through the payment of a just compensation to the former landowner. Once the 
state owns the title to the land, it can issue a mother CLOA to redistribute that land to ARBs. 
In this case, it seems that the DAR skipped a step by not having it listed with the Register of 
Deeds and thus provided sufficient grounds for the landowner to have the CLOA cancelled and 
retain control over the land.443 
 
During the legal process which led to the cancellation of the CLOA, the farmers had decided to 
assert their rights by staging a land occupation of the 51-hectare landholding. The landowner 
answered the move by sending their goons to the area. When the CLOA was cancelled, the 
farmers retreated since they knew they lacked the legal basis to back their claim to the land at 
that point. 
 
To further delay the process, the landowner also opposed strong resistance to the identification 
of ARBs process. In the 1995 CLOA, the landowner had deliberately introduced the name of 
ARBs which came from other estates around Cebu province while taking off the list some of 
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the legitimate ARBs in order to create more legal problems and delays. The PO leader of 
Dalag, Nelia Macapar, said that these beneficiaries whom the landowner was trying to add to 
the list were from Minglanilla, and that some of them were not even farmers because « they do 
not have calluses in their hands ».444 She added that the landowner’s tactics were clear: « Those 
people that were not included. They only registered now. It seems like a tactic to delay the 
process. »445 In addition to delaying the process, the inclusion of additional beneficiaries, who 
were loyal to the landowner, was a strategy aimed at reacquiring the land through leaseback 
after the redistribution. In the words of Macapar: 
 
The landowner tried to have his people included [in the CLOA]. They really tried to have them 
included so that they would have the majority. When they have the majority, they would now 
campaign for a leaseback.446 
 
In Dalag, the farmers have learned through their PO and through PhilNet what a leaseback 
would mean for them and decided not to discard the option. The PO leader explained the 
leaseback issue in these terms: 
 
The beneficiaries won’t even get a share of the rent because the landowner would pay it directly to 
Land Bank. That is a tactic they use with the beneficiaries. And there are beneficiaries who 
passionately try to trouble us. They do not think that this leaseback is to the detriment of the 
farmers. However the landowner has been taking care of those farmers and gave them jobs, 
presumably to confuse us. Anyway, we won’t be bothered by it. We have already been organized. 
We already know the end of that. We know already the detriment it causes to the farmers.447  
 
Conscious of the landowner’s tactics, the farmers however did not protest against the absence 
from the list of some of their fellow farmworkers at that point because they did not want to 
have the process delayed further. The landowners thus decided to file a petition for inclusion 
with the DAR to have more of the farmers she favoured introduced on the list. The DAR then 
began a revision of the ARBs list, a move which according to some farmer leaders shows the 
connivance between the landowners and the state officials.  Macapar described the 
landowners’ attitude in these terms: 
 
They attempted to form corporations and make the beneficiaries as members. They also tried to 
manipulate the list of beneficiaries. They put names of people who are not righteous awardees. They buy 
off the lands that were awarded to the ignorant beneficiaries who cannot afford to pay the monthly 
amortization. They fired other farmers who were vocal and active in the struggle. They made threats to 
the farmers and peasant leaders.448 
 
Once the CLOA was cancelled however, the farmworkers decided to submit a petition in the 
name of the farmers that were absent from the 1995 list so that they would be added to the 
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ARB list of the adjacent 152-hectare landholding in Capuluan, which was also covered by 
CARP.  
 
Farmers say that they received several threats, not from the landowner herself but from the 
people who worked for him. 
 
We experienced several threats. We would not just be scared since we known we are on the right 
track of the law. We're not going against the law, in any case, since we only follow the law of the 
government. Most of the time there were threats during our PO meetings here. Some wanted to see 
who was attending and some would really try to disrupt the process. They wanted to break our 
organization. It was often done. Then someone would report immediately to their boss. If there 
were new people working in the hacienda seen participating in the meeting, they would 
immediately de fired. That's why the situation is really bitter here.449 
 
The farmworkers of Dalag had been in touch with activists from different CSOs around 1995, 
when the Task Force Sugarland was launched. But it was only after a peasant leader of Dalag 
was told by Manlayo farmers about the help PhilNet was providing them in their land struggle 
that a meeting was organized with the NGO. PhilNet thus got involved with the farmers of 
Dalag in 1998, providing them with paralegal training and advice, building their capacity and 
leadership. 450Empowered and more aware of their rights, the farmers mobilized and sent 
petitions every year to pressure the DAR into delivering a new CLOA and installing them. 
PhilNet and the peasant leaders also initiated dialogues with DAR officials in 1999.451 
 
The farmers have only good words for the members of PhilNet who helped them in their 
struggle. Collaborating with NGOs however can also have a perverse effect sometimes. Due 
partly to the long history of communist insurgency in the Philippines, NGOs are sometimes 
identified by the government as Leftist organizations which create unrest in the countryside. 
The involvement of an NGO in land reform cases can thus raise suspicions on the 
government’s side. In Dalag, Ramonlito Pedrezuela said that working with PhilNet, although it 
was worth the risk, raised such suspicions and led the state to send militaries to the area:  « 
That's why we were targeted by the military: because we have lots of NGO people. But if they 
[PhilNet] weren't here, who would have accompanied us to where we're going? »452 
 
On the importance of building an alliance to assert their rights, Pedrezuela added: « It's really 
important because you cannot own the land if you work alone: you need to have a group to 
strengthen your claim. »453 The farmers of Dalag and the members of PhilNet thus combined 
their efforts to ensure media coverage of their land struggle in the local media and scaled-up 
their dialogue efforts by speaking directly with the DAR’s Undersecretary at the national level. 
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The PO of Dalag also became a member of ASUCAR upon its establishment in 1996. The 
strength and dedication of Dalag’s farmers continued to grow over the years as they even 
participated in pickets organized at the DAR’s regional office in Cebu City to support fellow 
farmworkers from Lamintak in their own struggle against a powerful landowner.   
 
In 2003, a new CLOA had yet to be issued to the farmworkers of Dalag but the CARP 
implementation process was unfolding behind the scene: that year, the Land Bank of the 
Philippines made a full compensation payment to the landowner for the 51-hectare sugarcane 
landholding of Dalag. This signalled that the state had officially acquired the land and that it 
could be redistributed to the farmworkers. However, the farmers were not informed of that new 
development. By hiding the fact that the payment was made, the DAR paved the way for the 
continued control of the landowner over the land although he had already been compensated 
for it. It took two years before the word about that compensation payment came out. Two years 
during which the landowner continued to reap the profits from the land. Members of PhilNet - 
who exposed documented proof that the Land Bank had already paid in full the compensation 
to the landowner in 2003 - argued that this can only have been made possible by collusion 
between the landowner and DAR officials.454   
 
In 2005, the new mother CLOA was finally issued by the DAR to the ARBs. Three years after 
the CLOA was issued however, the farmers had yet to be installed by the DAR and the 
farmers’ patience was growing thin. Farmers spoke of the DAR in these terms:  
 
Their organization is slow.455  
 
They are my enemy.456 
 
Honestly, I think there’s a lot of red tape in DAR. They favour the landlords who give them 
money. They helped us in a little with give legal advices and seminars on the process of land 
reform. But most of the time, they just make it difficult for us. So we basically help ourselves with 
the aid of the NGO.457  
 
With the help of PhilNet, they decided to take the matter into their own hands and they staged 
a land occupation of 51-hectare early in 2008. As the rightful owners of the land, they felt it 
was only legitimate that they could physically take possession of the area after waiting for so 
long. It was a few months later, in May 2008, that the DAR finally organized the ‘official’ 
installation of the landowners. At that point, the ARBs had already taken over the area 
physically and the installation was purely ceremonial. Despite that, the DAR had taken the 
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precaution to invite police officers to the event to ensure that the landowner would not be 
tempted to physically or intimidate the farmers as they did in the past. 
 
The landowners however have not yet given up on the land. They have been proposing 
leaseback arrangements to the farmers, arguing that only they have the necessary capital and 
equipment to make the land productive. Thus they proposed to pay the farmers P5000/ha per 
year. PhilNet argued that this offer is a bad one for the farmers and has been encouraging 
farmers to decline it. So far, only three of the 34 farmers expressed interest in the scheme. 
PhilNet also blaming the MARO for campaigning in favour of the leaseback option without 
explaining to the farmers the details of such an arrangement.  
 
The farmers are now free of harassment and free to cultivate the land how they want and they 
manage the landholding collectively through a cooperative. PhilNet and the DAR are now 
encouraging the ARBs to diversify their production to develop organic farming instead of 
using chemicals. They have already started intercropping with eggplants, mongo, bananas and 
corn and they sell some of their vegetables in the local market. Because the 51-hectare is near 
the sea coast, farmers also have public access to the water and they are trying to develop 
aquaculture as well.  
 
6.3 Within-Case Analysis 
In this section, we apply our two research questions to the case study of Dalag. The first 
question asks: how do the type of crop and the tenurial status influence key processes of CARP 
implementation? These structural features influence four key CARP processes: land coverage, 
identification of ARBs, land compensation, and installation of ARBs. The second question 
asks: how does the peasant strategy influence the outcome of CARP implementation in 
particular structural settings? This question allows us to see how the independent variable of 
structural setting interacts with the process variable of peasant strategy to influence the 
implementation outcome of the land reform struggle.  
 
6.3.1 The Influence of Structural Features on Landowner Resistance 
As expected, the presence of a land planted with sugar in Dalag led to strong landowner 
resistance to the processes of land coverage and land compensation. The presence of 
farmworkers also led to strong landowner resistance to the processes of identification of ARBs 
and installation of the ARBs. 
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The Type of Crop and Landowner Resistance. To the process of land coverage, the landowner 
was quick to orchestrate resistance by asking the farmworkers of the 51-hectare landholding to 
sign agreements in which they waived their rights to the land as ARBs in exchange for a sum 
of money. The farmers who did not agree to the scheme were then evicted by the landowner 
and forbidden to work on the land which was secured as a ‘No Trespassing Zone’.   
 
In Dalag, Vergara was more than ‘justly’ compensated for the landholding. After filing legal 
cases to have its official financial compensation from the state increased, the landowner, in 
collusion with some DAR officials according to PhilNet, continued to reap the profits of the 
sugarcane landholding for more than two years after they had already been compensated for it.  
The landowner thus used this process not only to increase her financial compensation – with 
the legal delay this implies in terms of court procedures – but also to delay the installation of 
the ARBs. The landowner resistance to this process has thus been strong. 
 
The Type of Tenurial Status and Landowner Resistance. The landowner was very active in 
opposing and delaying the process of identification of the ARBs. Evicting farmers who refused 
to sign a waiver agreement for the rights to the land was a clear attempt at impeding the 
process. The petition for inclusion in which the landowner listed as ARBs farmers from his 
other estates in the province – not legitimate ARBs by CARP’s provisions – was also a 
successful resistance strategy which delayed the issuance of the second CLOA until 2005.  
 
The installation of the ARBs also saw strong landowner resistance. After the issuance of the 
first CLOA in 1995, the landowner sent hired thugs to the area to remove the ARBs from the 
landholding. Also it took three years after the second CLOA was issued for the farmers to be 
installed, mainly because they feared intimidation and harassment from the landowner. 
Moreover, the installation occurred through a land occupation staged in collaboration with 
PhilNet. And even then, when the DAR came and organized the official installation ceremony, 
they feared the landowner’s possible resistance enough to have police officers accompany 
them onsite.  Thus the resistance was strong to both processes. 
 
6.3.2 Structural Setting, Peasant Strategy and Implementation Outcome 
The combination of two constraining variables – being farmworkers on a sugar land – made 
the Dalag case a highly contentious one. As we have shown, the presence of sugarcane led to 
strong resistance from the landowner’s side to the processes of land coverage and land 
compensation while the farmworker status of the ARBs led to strong resistance as well to the 
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processes of ARB identification and installation. In a highly contentious structural setting such 
as this one, the expected implementation outcome of land reform with a minimum of peasant 
mobilization is a weak implementation.  
 
The Dalag farmers however chose to rely on the bibingka strategy to secure their rights over 
the 51-hectare landholding. They have mobilized by sending petitions to the DAR every year 
in order to receive their legal title and be installed, by participating in two land occupations, 
and by seeking the help of PhilNet. Their alliance with that NGO greatly contributed to their 
empowerment. They received from PhilNet paralegal training concerning the CARP’s land 
reform processes and information about their own rights as ARBs. A series of dialogues 
initiated by PhilNet with DAR officials at the municipal and the national levels also 
contributed to strengthen the implementation outcome. A DAR official described in its own 
words the struggle between landowner resistance and peasants using the bibingka strategy on 
the sugar lands of Cebu: 
 
I have observed that in the northern portion- because these are large tracts of lands owned by 
single persons- so there, the landowners are organized and they resist the coverage of the program. 
But we try really hard, the Office, to have these lands included under the program. Problems crop 
up because of the insistence of the landowners for their lands not to be covered. However, these 
are counter-acted by the presence of NGOs like Philnet, and the likes. They are also assisting the 
farmers to resist the actions of the landowners. So basically, in the northern portion of Cebu, this is 
the situation there.458 
 
In the end, the implementation led to the full ownership of the farmers over the land they were 
entitled to although they experienced a significant delay before their installation. Since the land 
coverage process had been initiated in 1993, it means they had to wait for 15 years before they 
were installed. Thus the use of the bibingka strategy in Dalag led to a partial implementation of 
land reform.  
 
6.4 Summary of the Dalag Case Study 
The case of Dalag involved a sugar landholding and farmworkers. These two constraining 
structural features have led to strong landowner resistance to the four key CARP processes of 
land reform as predicted by the conceptual model of our first research question. In our 
typology of structural settings, because the landowner resistance was strong to all four key 
processes, the case of Dalag was identified as highly contentious.  Within this structural 
setting, the peasants mobilized, collaborated with an NGO (PhilNet), and supported dialogues 
initiated by the NGO with DAR officials. The use of the bibingka strategy in the end led to a 
partial implementation in which farmers experienced significant delays before being installed 
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but received all the land they were entitled to. This case shows that land redistribution is 
possible even in highly contentious cases involving both sugar lands and farmworkers when 
using the bibingka strategy, but also that this structural setting does limit the possibility of a 
full implementation.  
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CHAPTER 7: 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CASE STUDIES 
 
In Chapters Three, Four, Five and Six we addressed our two research questions by analyzing 
them within the context of individual case studies. In Chapter Seven, we proceed to a series of 
comparisons to push our analysis of our research questions further. In Section 7.1, we look at 
our first research question and we compare the influence of the type of crop and tenurial status 
on landowner resistance to key processes of land reform. In Section 7.2, we look at our second 
research question and we compare the influence of the risk avoidance strategy and bibingka 
strategy on the implementation outcome of land reform, as well as the influence of the 
structural setting on the implementation outcome of cases in which peasants opted for the same 
strategy. In Section 7.3, we present a summary of our main findings. 
 
7.1 First Research Question 
Our first research question reads as follows: how do the type of crop and the tenurial status 
influence the strength of landowner resistance to key CARP processes? In the within-case 
analysis section of our four case studies, we showed that the type of crop had an influence on 
landowner resistance to the processes of land coverage and land compensation while the 
tenurial status had an influence on the processes of identification and installation of the ARBs. 
In this section, we first compare the strength of landowner resistance to the processes of land 
coverage and land compensation between two cases involving a corn land and two cases 
involving a sugar land. Then we compare the strength of landowner resistance to the processes 
of identification and installation of ARBs between two cases involving tenants and two cases 
involving farmworkers. 
 
7.1.1 The Type of Crop 
The first part of the question which we will address here is: how does the type of crop 
influence the strength of landowner resistance to key CARP processes? Our initial hypothesis 
was that crops which generate more profit would make cases more contentious by providing 
additional incentives for landowners to oppose strong resistance to CARP processes. We 
argued that this resistance would particularly affect two specific processes of the land reform 
implementation: the processes of land coverage and land compensation. To address this 
question, we chose two possible variations of our independent variable: corn lands and sugar 
lands. The choice of these two crops was based on the fact that sugar lands are more profitable 
than corn lands, an incentive for landowner resistance. We characterize the landowners’ 
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resistance as either weak or strong based on the narrative of the case studies. The results are 
discussed further below. 
   
The Influence of the Type of Crop on Land Coverage. The identification of a land for coverage 
is the first process in the implementation of land reform. The process consists in identifying a 
specific landholding to be covered by CARP and notifying both the landowner and the 
potential ARBs. Landowner resistance to this process can take legal forms, such as petitions 
for exemption from coverage or waiver agreements; or extra-legal forms, such as bribes, forced 
land evictions or harassment. In the case of corn lands, the resistance is expected to be minimal 
because most of these lands were already identified for coverage in the 1970s under the 
Operation Land Transfer (OLT) mechanism of PD 27. The land reform program of Marcos did 
not deliver many results but it did signify to landowners that redistribution might be 
forthcoming. Sugar lands however were granted a 10-year deferment from CARP and thus 
were up for redistribution only in 1998. This first deferment and the financial benefits derived 
from selling sugar - especially compared to corn which is mainly a subsistence crop – give 
landowners more incentives to have their landholdings exempted from coverage in the first 
place.  The comparative results from the case studies tend to support our hypothesis that corn 
lands lead to weak landowner resistance while sugar lands lead to strong landowner resistance. 
One case however highlights the limits of our arguments.   
 
Resistance to the Land Coverage Process: Sugar Lands versus Corn Lands. In the cases of 
Manlayo and Dalag, which involved sugar lands, the resistance was strong to the process of 
land coverage. In Manlayo, the two lessees who controlled the land tried to have the farmers 
sign an agreement waiving their rights over the land and letting the lessees purchase it. When 
they refused, the lessees filed a legal case to have the land redistribution delayed, tried to bribe 
the PO leader of Manlayo and in the end used threats to try to chase the farmers away from the 
land. In Dalag, the landowner also asked the farmers to sign a waiver. In this case, the strategy 
was partially successful as many farmers did forfeit their rights to the landholding. Those who 
refused however were also evicted from the land, as it was the case in Manlayo. By 
comparison, the landowner resistance on the corn land of Salacan was weak. The landowner 
offered no resistance to land coverage and even used a voluntary mechanism (VOS) to transfer 
the land, unlike the Manlayo and Dalag cases which had to be placed under the Compulsory 
Acquisition mechanism. The case of Kalimpak, which also involves a corn land, does not 
support our hypothesis and needs to be analyzed further. 
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The case of Kalimpak, although it involves a corn land, led to strong landowner resistance to 
the process of land coverage in contradiction of our hypothesis. The reason for this unexpected 
result is that our model did not take into account the possibility of land conversion. Our 
hypothesis that corn lands will lead to only weak resistance from the landowner to the process 
of land coverage is based on two arguments: 1) most corn lands in the country had already 
been identified for redistribution in the 1970s under PD27, making claims for exemption more 
difficult; and 2) little profit can be derived from corn, compared to sugar for example, 
providing less incentive for strong resistance on the part of the landowner. In the Kalimpak 
case, the landowner had already been successful in evicting the peasants and avoiding coverage 
under PD27. In addition to that, Kalimpak is located within Metro Cebu, an area known for its 
numerous land conversions. The prospect of converting a corn land into a housing project or 
tourist facility greatly increases the potential benefits that can be derived from the land. Thus 
both arguments supporting our hypothesis actually do not apply to the Kalimpak case and can 
explain why it doesn’t fit our model.  
 
The Influence of the Type of Crop on Land Compensation. The payment of a just compensation 
to the former landowner for the land that is to be redistributed is a process that must be 
completed before land titles can be transferred to ARBs. Delaying this process by filing a legal 
case to increase the compensation is a common strategy shared by owners of corn lands and 
sugar lands alike – although the compensation for a sugar land is more substantial. Thus in the 
case of financial compensation, we consider landowner resistance to be strong when it goes 
beyond the almost automatic legal case for compensation increase. This can include other legal 
processes initiated to delay redistribution and thus reap the benefits of the land over a longer 
period, as well as extra-legal means to wring the maximum benefit out of the land.  Our 
hypothesis is that because they generate more benefits, sugar lands provide a bigger incentive 
than corn land for landowners to put up strong resistance.  The comparative results from the 
case studies fully support our hypothesis. 
 
Resistance to the Land Compensation Process: Sugar Lands versus Corn Lands. In the cases 
involving sugar lands, the landowners have put up strong resistance in order to increase their 
financial compensation. In Manlayo, the real owners of the landholding made no attempt at 
increasing their financial compensation. The land however was under the control of two 
lessees who did mount a strong resistance. Aside from the usual legal case to increase their 
compensation, the lessees also tried to have redistribution delayed until the end of their 
contract with the owner in order to profit from more years of exploitation. They even changed 
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the sharing arrangement that was in place with the tenants in order to increase their own share 
of the profits. In Dalag, the landowner filed a legal case to increase his compensation but also 
colluded with DAR officials to continue reaping the profits from the production of sugarcane 
more than two years after the Land bank had already financially compensated the landowner 
for his ‘loss’. In the case of the corn lands, there was no resistance from the landowner aside 
from the expected legal case to increase compensation. In Salacan, the legal process to 
determine the just compensation of the landowner took several years to come to a close. 
However the farmers were installed on their land well before the end of that legal process. In 
Kalimpak, a legal battle took place between the owner and a businessman claiming his rights 
over part of the landholding but the case concerned ownership and not financial compensation 
per se.        
 
 Table 7.1 Type of Crop and Landowner Resistance in Case Studies 
CARP 
Processes 
Corn Sugar 
Salacan Kalimpak Manlayo Dalag 
Land 
Coverage 
Weak 
no resistance to 
coverage; land was 
transferred through 
a voluntary 
mechanism 
Strong* 
forced 
evictions; 
intimidation 
Strong 
waiver agreement, 
bribe and forced 
evictions) 
Strong 
waiver 
agreement; forced 
evictions 
Land 
Compensation 
Weak 
legal case filed to 
increase 
compensation but 
did not delay the 
installation process 
Weak 
no legal case 
filed for 
increasing the 
compensation 
Strong 
legal case to 
increase 
compensation; legal 
case to delay 
redistribution; 
change on the profit 
sharing 
arrangement with 
farmers 
Strong 
legal case to 
increase 
compensation; 
collusion with 
state officials to 
benefit from the 
land two years 
after payment 
from the Land 
Bank 
* The strong resistance in this case was not anticipated by our hypothesis 
 
So how does the type of crop influence the implementation process of land reform? Our 
hypothesis was that landowner resistance on sugar lands would be stronger than on corn lands 
because sugar provides more incentives to landowners to resist the processes of land coverage 
and land compensation. Comparing the resistance of landowners on corn lands and sugar lands 
105 
 
 
 
showed that our hypothesis was sound and that the type of crop does have an influence on the 
implementation process of land reform. The data also underscored the importance of taking 
into account the possibility of land conversion as a factor which might increase the resistance 
expected from landowners on corn lands.  
 
7.1.2 The Tenurial Status 
The second part of the question which we will address here is: how does the tenurial status 
influence the strength of landowner resistance to key CARP processes? Our hypothesis is that 
being a farmworker, rather than a tenant, leads to stronger resistance of the landowners and 
their allies to the implementation of land reform. We argued that this resistance will 
particularly affect the processes of ARB identification and installation. To address this 
question, we chose two possible variations of our independent variable: tenants and 
farmworkers. The tenurial status makes a difference within these two processes because 
tenants, who have contracts with landowners and live on a determined lot located in the 
landholding, are easier to identify and install than farmworkers whose relationship with the 
landowner is based simply on wage labour, who live outside the landholding and who do not 
have a specific lot to till.  Once again, we characterize the landowners’ resistance as either 
weak or strong based on the narrative of the case studies. The results are discussed further 
below. 
 
The Influence of the Tenurial Status on the Identification of ARBs. Once a landholding has 
been identified for coverage, the next important process in the implementation of land reform 
is the identification of the potential ARBs. The ARBs are identified by the DAR officials who 
consult with the farmers, the people living in the area and the landowner to establish a list. 
Resistance to that process on the part of the landowner may include such strategies as creating 
an alternative list of ARBs or filing a petition for inclusion of new ARBs in order to force 
DAR to revise the lists and thus significantly delay the process. The land title, or CLOA, 
cannot be issued to the farmers as long as the list of ARBs has not been finalized. In cases 
involving tenants, this process is expected to lead to only weak resistance as the farmers 
already live on the land and are easy to identify according to the specific lots they occupy. In 
cases involving farmworkers, the landowner resistance is expected to be strong because in 
absence of a formal contract and of a determined lot within the landholding, the farmers can 
more easily be excluded from the list or scared away by the landowners. The comparison 
between tenants and farmworkers fully supports our hypothesis that landowner resistance to 
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the process of identification of the ARBs is stronger when cases involve farmworkers than 
when they involve tenants.  
 
Resistance to Identification of ARBs Process: Farmworkers versus Tenants. In the cases where 
tenants were involved, there was no resistance from the landowners to the process of 
identification of the ARBs. In Salacan, the farmers even said that the landowner helped them 
during that phase. And in Manlayo, while the two lessees obstructed the land reform 
implementation in many ways, they made no attempt to resist the identification of the ARBs. 
In the cases where farmworkers were involved however, it’s a different story. In Kalimpak, the 
first obstacle to the identification of ARBs was the fact that through harassment and 
intimidation, the landowner had scared the farmers away from the land and forced them to hide 
in the surrounding mountains. When NGOs visited the farmers in the mountains to encourage 
them to add their names to the list of potential beneficiaries, most of them hesitated and took a 
long time to agree as they feared the reaction of the landowner and the overseer. And even 
once the process was well engaged and a CLOA was issued to the ARBs years later, the 
landowner submitted a new list of ARBs to be included in the CLOA which led the DAR to 
investigate and thus delay the process once again. In Dalag, the landowner introduced names 
of illegitimate ARBs in the first CLOA issued in 1995 to try and instill conflict within the 
farmers’ community. When that did not work, the landowner filed a petition for inclusion to 
have more of his loyal farmers from other estates in the province listed as ARBs, prompting 
the DAR to investigate and thus delay the process. The forced eviction of farmers in 1988 and 
the waiver agreements signed by others further complicated the identification of legitimate 
ARBs. 
 
The Influence of the Tenurial Status on the Installation of ARBs. The installation of the farmers 
is the last phase in the implementation of land reform. To be sure, the agrarian reform program 
doesn’t end with the installation of the farmers: support services also need to be provided to 
the farmers afterwards. The installation phase is only the last phase of what we are concerned 
with in this thesis, which is the redistribution of land and refers to the farmers physically 
occupying the land and tilling it at their own will. The resistance to the installation process 
generally takes an extra-legal form. The reason is that once the landowners have received 
financial compensation from the Land Bank and the farmers have been issued the legal title to 
the land (CLOA), there remains no legal ground on which the landowner can oppose the 
installation of the ARBs. At that point then, the use of threats and violence remains the best 
way to keep the farmers off the land. This violence also does not have to occur specifically 
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after the issuance of the CLOA to be an impediment to the installation. Past episodes of 
harassment and intimidation are often sufficient to instil fear in the farmers’ community and 
make them very cautious about entering the land again. In cases involving tenants, the 
resistance to the installation process is expected to be minimal as the farmers are already 
occupying the land and have been there for years, often generations. The farmworkers however 
require a real installation to start occupying the land. In their case, that installation can be 
prevented by the landowner’s threats or intimidation, past or present. The comparison between 
tenants and farmworkers fully support our hypothesis that landowner resistance to the 
installation process is stronger when cases involve farmworkers than when they involve 
tenants.  
 
Resistance to Installation of ARBs Process: Farmworkers versus Tenants. In the cases 
involving tenants, in Salacan and Manlayo, there was no resistance to the installation of the 
ARBs. In Salacan, the farmers were already living on specific family lots and thus were 
automatically ‘installed’ once they received their mother CLOA. In Manlayo, the families of 
the ARBs had been tilling the land for generations. Upon the issuance of the CLOA, their 
installation was also a simple formality. The ceremony organized with the DAR Secretary a 
few weeks later was simply a matter of protocol which didn’t change anything for the farmers 
who were now occupying and tilling the land for their own profit. In the cases involving 
farmworkers, the installation was more tumultuous. In Dalag, the ARBs received their CLOA 
in 2005. Their installation however was far from automatic. The farmers were waiting for the 
DAR to organize a safe installation because they feared that the landowner would send their 
own private army to remove them. Two years passed however and there had been no sign of an 
imminent installation. Thus with the help of PhilNet, they staged a land occupation in 2008 to 
take possession of the land which had legally been theirs since 2005. When the DAR organized 
an ‘official’ installation in May 2008, although the farmer had already been there for a few 
months, they still came accompanied by police officers, fearing the reaction of the landowner. 
In the case of Kalimpak, the long history of harassment and intimidation organized by the 
landowner’s side made the farmers fear from their safety. To force the hand of the DAR in 
delivering the CLOA for the 54-hectare lot of the landholding, the farmers and FARDEC 
staged a land occupation in 1999. Fearing the reaction of the landowner however, they had 
been careful to get media coverage and secure strong public support prior to their move. On the 
other part of the landholding, the 51-hectare lot, the issuance of the CLOA had been pending 
because of a legal dispute over ownership of the lot. Thus farmers and FARDEC also launched 
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a land occupation on that lot in 2005. As a result of past harassment and intimidation however, 
the farmers still went back to hide in the mountains after their work day on the land.  
 
 
 Table 7.2 Tenurial Status and Landowner Resistance in Case Studies 
Landowner 
Resistance to 
CARP 
Processes 
Tenants Farmwrkers 
Salacan Manlayo Kalimpak Dalag 
Identification 
of ARBs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Weak 
No resistance; the 
landowner even 
helped 
Weak 
No resistance 
Strong 
Harassment; 
presentation of an 
alternative list of 
ARBs 
Strong 
Inclusion of 
illegitimate ARBs 
in the CLOA by 
the landowner;  
Evictions 
Installation of 
ARBs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Weak 
No resistance; 
installation was 
automatic upon 
reception of the 
CLOA 
Weak 
No resistance; 
installation was 
automatic upon 
reception of the 
CLOA 
Strong 
Harassment and 
fear kept many in 
the periphery; it 
took two land 
occupations to 
install the farmers 
Strong 
Fear of 
harassment kept 
farmers away 
during three years 
after reception of 
the CLOA; 
It took a land 
occupation to 
install them 
 
 
So how does the tenurial status influence the implementation process of land reform? Our 
hypothesis was that landowner resistance in cases involving farmworkers would be stronger 
than in those involving tenants because while tenants are easy to identify and install due to 
their previous contract agreements with the landowner and their occupation for years of a 
specific lot, the farmworkers are more difficult to identify as legitimate ARBs and easier to 
scare away. The comparison between cases involving tenants and those involving farmworkers 
supports our hypothesis. The process of ARB identification has been strongly resisted by 
landowners in cases involving farmworkers - through petitions for inclusion, alternative lists of 
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ARBs and evictions - while there was no sign of resistance in cases involving tenants. The 
installation process was also the site of stronger resistance in cases involving farmworkers than 
in cases involving tenants, relying on harassment, intimidation and fear to keep the farmers 
from entering the land. 
 
 
7.2 Second Research Question 
7.2.1 Three Structural Settings 
Comparing the influence of the type of crop and tenurial status on the land reform 
implementation process stems from the need to evaluate the level of contentiousness of private 
landholdings covered by the CARP in order to anticipate the strength of landowner resistance 
and the expected implementation outcome. The previous comparisons showed that the type of 
crop and tenurial status variables could lead to weak or strong landowner resistance to four 
different processes of land reform: the land coverage, the identification of ARBs, the land 
compensation, and the installation of ARBs. We argue that the levels of contentiousness – 
what we call here structural settings - can be predicted by taking into account the expected 
landowner resistance resulting from the type of crop and tenurial status in a particular case. As 
we have showed previously, a case involving a sugar land and farmworkers is likely to induce 
strong landowner resistance to the four aforementioned processes of land reform, making the 
structural setting of that case a highly contentious one. A case combining either a sugar land 
and tenants or a corn land and farmworkers is likely to induce strong landowner resistance to 
two land reform processes, making the structural setting a moderately contentious one. Finally, 
a case involving a corn land and tenants should lead to only weak resistance from the 
landowners to all the processes, making the structural setting of that case a somewhat 
contentious one.  
 
A rigid interpretation of the model however would fail to take into account some possible 
combinations of landowner resistance. In Table 1.4,we can see that the model would allow 
only for cases in which landowners put up strong resistance to zero, two, or four processes. 
This would leave out the possibility for landowners to put strong resistance to one or three of 
the processes. To include all possible variations in our model, we categorized the three 
structural settings according to the number of processes to which landowners put up strong 
resistance.  
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Thus we argue that the combinations of landowner resistance to the four different processes of 
land reform should be categorized as follows: strong resistance to three or four processes 
makes the case highly contentious; strong resistance to two processes makes the case 
moderately contentious; and strong resistance to one or none of the process makes the case 
somewhat contentious. We call these levels of contentiousness structural settings because they 
are elements which affect the patterns of behaviour of the landowners and their allies. 
According to our typology, two of our case studies (Dalag and Kalimpak) take place in a 
highly contentious; one (Manlayo) takes place in a moderately contentious structural setting; 
and one (Salacan) takes place in a somewhat contentious structural setting.   
 
7.2.2 Structural Settings and Expected Implementation Outcomes 
The type of crop and the tenurial status have an influence on the strength of landowner 
resistance to key CARP processes which results in different structural settings. These three 
structural settings in turn are helpful to predict the final outcome of land reform 
implementation in specific cases. We distinguish between three different final outcomes based 
on the amount of land attributed to the farmers and the delays to install them. A full 
implementation occurs when farmers receive all the land they were entitled and are installed 
within five years following the issuance of the NOC. A partial implementation is one where 
farmers either receive less land than what they were entitled to or experience long delays in 
their installation. A weak implementation is one where farmers receive less land than what 
they were entitled to and experience long delays in their installation. 
 
It has been said before that within a state/society driven model of land reform, the participation 
of the farmers themselves is crucial to ensure the proper implementation of the program. Thus 
we argue that the final outcome of land reform implementation can be anticipated based on the 
structural setting of the case provided that there is a minimum of peasant mobilization. On that 
basis, we argue that a highly contentious setting will lead to a weak implementation; that a 
moderately contentious setting will lead to a partial implementation; and that a somewhat 
contentious setting will lead to a full implementation. 
  
The rationale here is that the structural setting (our independent variable) influences the 
expected outcome (dependant variable) of land reform implementation. The peasant strategy 
however acts as an process variable which can alter the expected outcome (dependent 
variable). We have identified three possible variations of our process variable, or three 
different peasant strategies, as well as their impact on the expected outcome. The peasant 
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mobilization strategy is used as our ‘baseline scenario’. Using that strategy should not change 
the expected outcome because it is the minimum needed to ensure a ‘normal’ implementation. 
Another possible strategy, which has been used by farmers in one of our case studies (Salacan), 
is the risk avoidance strategy. By using this strategy, the peasants consciously make the choice 
of not mobilizing and not allying themselves to CSOs. Because that strategy does not involve 
the minimum of peasant mobilization, it should weaken the expected outcome of 
implementation. The third strategy is the bibingka strategy. This strategy relies not only on 
peasant mobilization but also on an alliance with CSOs and dialogue with DAR officials. This 
more integrated strategy should strengthen the expected outcome of implementation.  
 
Four case studies are not enough to cover all the possibilities which are listed in our 
Conceptual Model A. (See Table 1.7) Our four case studies however allow us to proceed to 
two comparisons: comparing the impact of the bibingka strategy on the implementation 
outcome in two different structural settings; and comparing the impact of the bibingka strategy 
and risk avoidance strategy on the implementation outcome. 
 
7.2.3 Structural Settings, Peasant Strategies, and Implementation Outcomes of the Four Case Studies 
 
Comparing the Impact of the Bibingka Strategy on the Expected Implementation Outcome in 
Two Different Structural Settings. In three of our four case studies, peasants have opted for the 
bibingka strategy in order to secure their rights over the land they were entitled to under the 
land reform program. In two of these cases, Dalag and Kalimpak, the bibingka strategy was 
used within a highly contentious structural setting. In the other case, Manlayo, the same 
strategy was used but within a moderately contentious structural setting. Here we compare the 
implementation outcomes of the bibingka strategy according to the structural setting. 
 
In all three cases, peasants have mobilized, they have allied themselves with CSOs, and they 
have supported dialogue with DAR officials. However in the cases taking place within a highly 
contentious setting, the bibingka strategy led to a partial implementation; in the moderately 
contentious structural setting, it led to a full implementation. Although all three groups of 
farmers in the end received all the land they were entitled to, the farmers of Dalag were 
installed 15 years after the issuance of the NOC, those of Kalimpak had to wait at least 13 
years (Lot A) and 20 years (Lot B) and after Manlayo farmers only waited four years. The 
main difference in the implementation outcome thus is the delay of installation. The structural 
setting thus constrained the possibility of a full implementation in Dalag and Kalimpak. 
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This difference in the delay of implementation between the cases can be attributed mainly to 
the fact that the farmers of Dalag and Kalimpak where farmworkers and that those of Manlayo 
were tenants. The landowners’ resistance to the process of identification of ARBs has been 
delaying the process significantly in Dalag where inclusion procedures initiated by the 
landowner slowed the implementation process between 1995 and 2005; as well as in Kalimpak 
where most of the farmers were still waiting for their mother CLOA in 2008. Being tenants 
facilitated that process for the Manlayo farmers. 
 
Another important difference resulting from the tenurial status should be noted here in terms of 
strategies. In Dalag and Kalimpak, the peasants each staged two land occupations in order to 
pressure the process while no such strategy was used in Manlayo. Being farmworkers, the 
peasants of Dalag and Kalimpak faced stronger resistance to their installation and had to take 
stronger measures in order to enter the land. This and the unexpected resistance to land 
coverage in the case of Kalimpak suggest that the tenurial status variable may have more 
weight than the type of crop on the strength of landowner resistance. This is an issue that could 
be explored further in another study. 
 
 It is also interesting to note that while Dalag peasants were working with PhilNet and 
Kalimpak farmers were working with FARDEC, both groups used land occupation as a 
strategy to push forward the implementation process. Both groups also entered into dialogue 
with DAR officials at various levels. Thus the fact that FARDEC is identified as a more radical 
group than PhilNet made no difference between the groups in terms of strategy, unlike the type 
of structural setting. One again, this is an issue which would deserve further research. 
 
Comparing the Impact of the Bibingka Strategy and of the Risk Avoidance Strategy on the 
Implementation Outcome. In three of our case studies, peasants have opted for the bibingka 
strategy. In the other case, they have opted for the risk avoidance strategy. Here we compare 
the different impact of both strategies on the expected implementation outcome. For this 
comparison, it is not the structural setting itself which we focus on but the strengthening or 
weakening of the expected outcome. 
 
The three cases where peasants have opted for the bibingka strategy took place in two different 
structural settings. In a highly contentious setting, the bibingka strategy led to a partial 
implementation while in the moderately contentious setting, it led to a full implementation. 
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The important thing to note here is that in all three cases, the use of the bibingka strategy 
strengthened the expected outcome, turning an expected partial implementation into a full one 
in the moderately contentious setting of Manlayo, and turning an expected weak 
implementation into a partial one in Dalag and Kalimpak. These three case studies show that 
the bibingka strategy strengthens the expected outcome of land reform implementation, 
whatever the structural setting.  
 
The only case where peasants have opted for the risk avoidance strategy took place in a 
somewhat contentious structural setting. In such a context, a minimum of peasant mobilization 
– which we use as our baseline scenario – should have led to a full implementation. However 
because the risk avoidance strategy does not meet the necessary requirement of peasant 
mobilization, it had a weakening effect on the implementation outcome: rather than a full 
implementation, the outcome of that particular case was a partial implementation where tenants 
received smaller lots than what they were entitled to.  
 
The comparison between the outcomes of both strategies show that while we cannot predict the 
implementation outcome of a case based solely on the chosen peasant strategy, it is possible to 
anticipate the effect of that strategy on the expected outcome if we also take into consideration 
the structural setting within which the case it is taking place. 
 
7.3 Summary of Chapter Seven 
The comparisons to which we proceeded in Chapter Seven have led to several findings which 
have enriched our .understanding of the links between the variables of our two main research 
questions. Regarding the first research question, we found that the strength of landowner 
resistance was generally stronger to the processes of land coverage and land compensation in 
cases involving sugar lands than in cases involving corn lands. The case of Kalimpak however 
– where landowner resistance was strong despite the presence of a corn land – illustrated the 
limits of our Conceptual Model A (Table 1.4) and indicated the need to take additional 
structural features into account, such as the possibility of land conversion, in order to increase 
our model’s ability to predict landowner resistance. We also found that the landowner 
resistance to the processes of identification and installation of ARBs was stronger in cases 
involving farmworkers than in those involving tenants, this time without exception. As for our 
second main research question, we also addressed through two comparisons, The first one 
showed that we cannot predict the outcome of a land reform implementation only on the basis 
of the strategy used by peasants, In the three cases in which peasants relied on the bibingka 
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strategy, the two cases taking place in a highly contentious structural setting ended up in  a 
partial implementation while the case taking place in a moderately contentious structural 
setting ended up as a full implementation. This suggests that the structural setting plays an 
important role in constraining the implementation outcome of land reform despite the use of 
the bibingka strategy. The second comparison was a complement of the previous one as it 
showed that the implementation outcome of land reform can also not be predicted by looking 
only at the structural setting. In the three cases in which it was used, the bibingka strategy 
strengthened the expected implementation outcome; and in the only case in which it was used, 
the risk avoidance strategy weakened the expected implementation outcome. The conclusion 
here is that it is only by taking into account the interaction between the independent variable of 
structural settings and the process variable of peasant strategies that we may succeed in 
anticipating the implementation outcome of specific cases of land reform. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Summary 
The implementation of land reform under CARP in the Philippines has been more successful 
than what most observers had predicted at the outset in 1988. The state/society-driven model of 
implementation designed as a compromise between a liberal approach and a state-led model 
pushed by peasants and civil society on one side, and a conservative approach and market-led 
model advocated by the landed elite on the other made the success of implementation 
contingent upon the interactions between peasants, civil society organizations, state actors, and 
landowners. Author and activist Jun Borras explained that in such a state/society-driven model 
of land reform, the cases of successful redistribution on contentious landholdings could be 
attributed to the use of the bibingka strategy. This strategy rests on the combination of peasant 
mobilization, CSO involvement and positive interactions with state officials against landowner 
resistance. When the coalition of the pro-reform side is stronger than the coalition of the 
landowner’s anti-reform side, then redistribution occurs. The bibingka strategy is said to have 
led to significant results in terms of redistributing contentious lands under the leadership of 
former DAR Secretary Ernesto Garilao, during the administration of President Fidel Ramos. 
Since then, the political opportunity for successful implementation has decreased, especially 
under the administration of President Arroyo. 
 
Although they may not be as numerous as they could or should be, successful cases of land 
reform implementation have also occurred under administrations other than that of Fidel 
Ramos and encourage us to look for other factors which may explain the outcome of particular 
land struggles. We have argued that improving our understanding of the way in which land 
struggles unfold requires to  pay more attention to the particular structural setting of individual 
cases - and to the strength of landowner resistance they induce - as well as to the impact of 
peasant strategies on the implementation outcome. This thesis was thus organized around two 
main research question. 
 
Our first research question asked: what is the influence of specific structural elements – namely 
the type of crop and the tenurial status of farmers – on the strength of landowner resistance to 
key CARP processes? We have showed through our four case studies that these two variables - 
the type of crop and tenurial status - had an influence on four specific processes of land reform.  
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Using corn lands and sugar lands to compare the influence of different types of crops, the data 
gathered from the case studies showed that cases involving corn lands led to weak landowner 
resistance to the processes of land coverage and land compensation while the presence of sugar 
lands led to strong resistance to the same processes. A first argument used to explain this 
observation is that corn lands had already been identified for redistribution in the 1970s under 
Marcos’ PD 27 while sugar lands were so contentious that their redistribution was delayed 
until a second phase of CARP implementation in the 1990s. This provided less incentive for 
landowner resistance to land coverage on corn land than on sugar land. A second argument is 
that more financial benefits can be reaped from the production of sugar than from the 
production of corn, making the incentive to have the land exempted from coverage and to 
increase the financial compensation higher for owners of sugar lands than for owners of corn 
land. The comparisons between both types of crops generally confirmed our hypothesis that 
landowner resistance to land coverage and land compensation is stronger in cases involving 
sugar lands than in those involving corn lands. However one case study, the case of Kalimpak, 
reminded us of the limits of our Conceptual Model A and underscored the need to take more 
structural features into account in order to improve the model’s ability to predict the strength of 
landowner resistance. 
 
Using tenants and farmworkers as two possible variations of the tenurial status variable, we 
have shown through the case study that the presence of tenants led to weak landowner 
resistance to the processes of identification and installation of the ARBs while the presence of 
farmworkers led to strong landowner resistance to both processes. The arguments used to 
explain this observation is that because tenants have contract agreements with the landowners 
and because they have been occupying specific lots on the landholding for years, sometimes 
generations, they are much easier to identify as potential ARBs than the farmworkers who 
could more easily be dismissed by landowners or scared away from the land. The same 
arguments apply to the installation process as landowners can oppose more resistance to 
farmworkers attempting to enter the land than to tenants who have already been there for years. 
Comparing cases involving farmworkers with those involving tenants also supported our 
hypothesis which stated that cases involving farmworkers would lead to stronger resistance to 
the processes of identification and installation of ARBs than cases involving tenants. 
 
Our second research question asked: how do peasant strategies influence the outcome of land 
reform implementation? In this question, the peasant strategy was used as an process variable 
altering the influence of the structural setting on the implementation outcome. The structural 
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setting, our independent variable, is the result of the different combinations of landowner 
resistance discussed in the analysis of our first research question.  The strength of landowner 
resistance that can be expected to these four specific processes of land reform thus largely 
depends on the type of crop and tenurial status involved in a specific case. The strength of 
landowner resistance to these processes in turn is reflected in the level of contentiousness of 
the structural settings. The three structural settings which we have identified are the highly, 
moderately and somewhat contentious settings. These settings allow us to anticipate the 
outcome of land reform implementation in specific cases, based on the level of landowner 
resistance to the four specific processes of land reform.  
 
We distinguished three possible implementation outcomes: full, partial and weak 
implementation. A full implementation is one where farmers receive all the land they are 
entitled to and are installed within five years of the issuance of the NOC. A partial 
implementation is one where one of these conditions is not met while a weak implementation 
means that none of the two conditions are met.  In a highly contentious setting, the expected 
outcome is supposed to be a full implementation. In a moderately contentious setting, it is 
expected to be a common implementation and in a somewhat contentious setting, we expect a 
full implementation to occur. These outcomes however also depend on the type of peasant 
strategy used.  
 
The baseline scenario for implementation to occur as expected according to the structural 
setting is that peasants rely on mobilization as their strategy to push for land reform. We have 
however identified three peasant strategies that can influence the implementation outcome of 
land struggles in specific structural settings. The first one, as we mentioned, is peasant 
mobilization alone. Because peasant mobilization is a minimum requirement for success in a 
state/society-driven model of land reform, it is not expected to change the implementation 
outcome associated with a particular structural setting. The risk avoidance strategy however 
was expected to weaken the implementation outcome. And the bibingka strategy, on the 
contrary, was expected to strengthen the expected outcome.  
 
What our analyses showed was that independently, structural settings and peasant strategies 
cannot predict the implementation outcome of specific land struggles. The cases in which 
peasants used the bibingka strategy had different outcomes when taking place in different 
structural settings; and the expected outcome of the Salacan case was weakened by the use of 
the risk avoidance strategy while the bibingka strategy strengthened the implementation 
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outcome of the cases of Dalag, Kalimpak, and Manlayo. These findings underline the 
importance of taking into account both structure and agency, structural settings and peasant 
strategies, to understand and anticipate the implementation outcome of specific land struggles.  
 
Limits of the Thesis 
We mentioned on several occasions in this thesis that our conceptual model for our first 
research question was incomplete. The case of Kalimpak showed that we need to take into 
account additional structural features to be able to better predict the strength of landowner 
resistance to land reform. It has never been our pretention that this conceptual model was 
complete and that it exhausted all structural features. The type of crop and the tenurial status 
appeared to be the basic elements of a structural setting but other features such as the 
possibility of land conversion or the type of landowner (traditional elite, religious 
organizations, corporations, etc.) should definitely be taken into account in an eventual 
‘upgrading’ of that model.  
 
The criteria which we used to establish the ‘quality’ of an implementation outcome are also 
limited. The amount of land received and the delay of implementation may not be the most 
important elements for the farmers themselves who might attribute more value to a peaceful 
transition or security for example. This issue could also be explored further. 
 
In general, our findings can also not be generalized to all the cases of land reform in the 
Philippines. Four cases do not constitute a large enough sample to make such generalizations. 
Although it has uncovered some interesting patterns, this thesis has taken into account a 
limited number of variables in what constitutes a very complex process.  
 
Issues to Explore  
Throughout the presentation of this thesis, issues that did not fit our analytical framework but 
would be potentially interesting to explore in further studies were numerous. For one, the 
similarity in the strategies used by PhilNet and FARDEC, such as land occupations and critical 
engagement with DAR officials, questions the relevance of the labels often applied to these 
two organizations. While PhilNet is considered a moderate organization which we expect to 
engage with DAR officials, the same engagement from a group close to KMP and associated 
with the radical Left is more surprising.  
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During our interviews and our analysis of the case studies, it became clear that in each case 
study, only a few peasants were actively involved in the land reform struggle. Many are only 
slightly aware of the land reform process and simply rely on what the leaders tell them. This 
underscores the important role that these leaders play in these communities in terms of 
decision-making regarding strategies to adopt to push for land reform.  
 
Contribution of the Thesis 
It is our hope that this thesis has been able to contribute to the literature on land reform in the 
Philippines in general and that it has provided useful data to partially fill in the gaps around the 
bibingka strategy. Through our first research question, we have shown the other side of the 
struggle for land reform, i.e. the landowner resistance to CARP processes and the structural 
features that influence the strength of that resistance. In addressing our second research 
question, we also showed that relying on agency and peasant strategies alone to anticipate the 
results or the outcome of particular land struggles is not sufficient: the context within which 
these cases take place, with their specific structural features, also play a determining role. 
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